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Summary and Overview 
 
The vast majority of households in developing countries are located in rural areas and still 
depend on agriculture as their main income generating activity. Despite economic progress 
was recently achieved by many of these countries at the macroeconomic level, welfare 
indicators remain at critical levels for a large proportion of their populations. The absence of 
well-functioning insurance and credit markets coupled with the prominence of different 
covariate and idiosyncratic shocks (droughts, floods, inflation, conflicts, and health-related 
shocks) exacerbate the vulnerability of the poorest among these households. Under such 
circumstances, a general consensus among development practitioners has been that policy 
interventions will only be effective if they help households prepare for and protect themselves 
against stressors and shocks, mitigate ex post their potential losses, and reinforce their 
abilities to respond adequately to future threats to their well-being. This goal can only be 
achieved if we understand the deep causes that trigger those shocks and the ways in which 
they affect households with different initial conditions and characteristics, in particular the 
processes through which they prevent some households from moving out of poverty or thrust 
some others into spirals of destitution and poverty. 
This thesis explores several issues related to our understanding of the causes, consequences, 
and households’ responses to different shocks and stressors. One particular type of shocks is 
at the core of this dissertation, namely food price shocks. Indeed, the recent sharp increases in 
food and other commodity prices between 2006 and 2008 and again in 2011 have generated 
passionate debates about their potential drivers and consequences on households, especially in 
developing countries. Some of these countries reported social tensions and turmoil, food riots 
or social unrest as a direct result of rising food prices while simulations across different 
countries have revealed that many vulnerable households even reduced their calorie intakes 
(Bellemare, 2015). The four closely related studies of this thesis address respectively the 
following research questions: 
1.  What macroeconomic and environmental drivers explain changes in food price 
volatility observed in Uganda between 2000 and 2012? Subsequently, how strong is the 
evidence of spillover, asymmetry, and seasonality effects in these volatilities? 
2. To what extent are the econometric estimates of welfare effects of food price shocks 
sensitive to models’ assumptions, in particular to the incorporation of both labor market 
frictions and households’ net positions in food and labor markets? 
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3. How do agricultural and market-related risks as well as farmers’ expectations about 
future output prices and yield levels shape their crop choice and acreage allocation decisions? 
4. How strong is the link between poverty traps and differential exposure and 
vulnerability to food price shocks? 
This dissertation is motivated by the following gaps in both the theoretical and empirical 
literature on food price shocks that are epitomized in the above questionings.  First, studies on 
food price volatility in developing countries in general, and in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 
particular, have mainly focused on the extent of price transmission between international and 
domestic markets and have applied simulation models to identify the poverty impacts of such 
price transmission. In regards to the drivers of the observed price volatilities, most empirical 
studies typically enumerate a list of potential candidates without quantifying the differential 
contribution of each of them. Accordingly, the main purpose of essay I, titled Food price 
volatility in Uganda: Trends, Drivers, and Spillover effects, is to fill this empirical gap by 
modeling changes over time of food price volatilities and identifying its potential drivers by 
means of time-series econometrics. The motivation that propelled this study in Uganda was 
guided by the observed increases in consumer food price indices since 2008 despite the 
landlocked position of the country and the relatively small price transmission from 
international to its domestic food markets, which is an indication that internal or regional 
rather than international factors might have been at work. Furthermore, Uganda is among the 
rare countries in SSA to have a rich history in gathering household and food price data.  
This first essay has a fourfold objective. The first objective checks the claim that increases in 
food price levels since 2006 were also accompanied with rises in price volatilities. The second 
objective is to analyze the patterns of conditional food price volatilities between 2000 and 
2012; the third is to model and test for the presence of spillover and leverage effects in food 
price volatilities and the fourth is to model the potential macroeconomic and environmental 
drivers of observed food price volatilities and uncover their differential effects.  
The analysis is applied to six of the main staple foods produced and consumed in Uganda: 
matooke, cassava, maize, potatoes, beans, and millet flour. The graphical representation of 
consumer food price indices shows that food prices were astonishingly stable between 2000 
and 2007 before starting a rapid upward trend thereafter. Results from variance equality tests 
further reveal that for the majority of commodities under investigation (5 out of 6), the 
unconditional price volatility (measured by the standard deviation of the price returns) did 
effectively increase since January 2008. This implies that from that period onwards, Ugandan 
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households have entered phases of higher uncertainties and instabilities regarding food prices. 
And since high volatility generally implies large and/or rapid changes in food prices, it 
became more challenging for producers to make optimal decisions concerning input and land 
allocations, while consumers (most of them also producers) may have increased difficulties in 
planning their future consumption decisions. The empirical findings also indicate limited 
evidence in favor of asymmetric and leverage effects in food price volatilities for about half of 
the staples. In addition, no clear picture is portrayed in regards to the nature and extent of 
volatility spillover effects across food markets in Uganda, with most of them being only 
unidirectional. Finally, this first essay reveals that changes in consumer price indices, rainfall 
and fuel volatilities were the main drivers of observed changes in historical food price 
volatilities and their impacts were particularly important during periods of high price 
instabilities. Gven these findings, the essay highlights the importance of mixing actions that 
target primarily the agricultural sector with more global interventions likely to ensure price 
stabilization or, at least, reduce price volatility. 
The second main research question is tackled in essay II (co-authored with Gabriella 
Berloffa) titled Welfare effects of food price changes in Uganda under non-separability: How 
relevant is the net market position? This study incorporates the insights from the agricultural 
households’ literature (Singh et al., 1986; Strauss, 1986; de Janvry et al., 1991; Taylor and 
Alderman, 2002) to identify welfare effects of food price changes in Uganda. The study is 
motivated by the lack of both theoretical and empirical work that explicitly takes account of 
market failures when analyzing those effects. The study shows that although there exists an 
abundant empirical literature on welfare impacts of food price shocks (and especially since 
the global food price crisis of 2007/8), these studies generally fall short of recognizing a 
crucial feature of markets in developing countries, namely the presence of important market 
frictions and failures (Barrett and Carter, 2013) that may lead to deviations from the standard 
neoclassical model of rational consumers. The essay demonstrates theoretically that the 
effects of food price changes on consumption levels are not straightforward when we allow 
for the possibility of labor market imperfections and disaggregate households by their net 
positions in the food and labor markets. As a consequence, it becomes a priori impossible to 
identify the welfare effects of price changes which may be over- or under-estimated when we 
assume perfect functioning food and labor markets.  
Methodologically, this second study uses household panel dataset collected in three waves 
(2005/6, 2009/10, and 2010/11) to investigate the impacts of allowing for labor market 
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frictions and to identify groups of households that lost or gained from food price shocks. To 
that end, the essay estimates a panel stochastic production frontier function using the Battese 
and Coelli’s (1995) Maximum likelihood estimator and applies the Sherlund et al.’s (2002) 
and Barrett et al.’s (2008) approaches to compute shadow wages for non-labor market 
participants. It tests for the separability hypothesis using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the 
Epps-Singleton tests of distributions’ equality between market wages of off-farm workers and 
shadow wages of self-employed agricultural households.   
In order to estimate the welfare effects of food price changes, the study relies on the 
econometrics of demand systems’ estimation using the Quadratic almost ideal demand system 
(QUAIDS) of Banks et al. (1997). It is a flexible functional form that incorporates nonlinear 
effects and interactions of price and expenditures in the demand relationships. Furthermore, it 
is a hybrid model where some goods face a nonlinear expenditure specification (QUAIDS) 
while other goods face a linear specification (AIDS). I estimate expenditure and price demand 
elasticities for 10 key commodities and commodity groups plus leisure time using the 
QUAIDS model. The demand systems are estimated using a Non-linear Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (NSUR) model taking account of censoring in food consumption and the 
endogeneity of both households’ expenditures and shadow wage. The QUAIDS is estimated 
for each panel wave to check whether households reacted differently to food price changes in 
periods of low and high price volatility as outlined in the first essay.  
Demand estimates are provided for each sub-group of households to take into consideration 
their potential heterogeneous behavior regarding price changes. Accordingly, households are 
categorized into 5 groups: non-agricultural households, significant net seller, significant net 
buyers, insignificant net sellers, and insignificant net buyers. These last 4 sub-groups are 
defined using a 50%-threshold rule: for instance, an agricultural household is a significant net 
seller (net buyer) if the total values of its crop sales (of matooke, maize, potatoes, cassava, 
beans, rice, millet, sorghum, fruits and vegetables) is at least 1.5 times larger (lower) than 
their total market purchases of the same crops.  
Estimates of compensating variations using estimated price elasticities computed under 
perfect and imperfect labor markets reveal that the welfare effects of food price changes are 
globally lower in the non-separable model and different in signs and magnitudes for the sub-
groups of households. In particular, the results show that the welfare effects even present 
opposite signs in the sub-period 2005/6-2009/10. Indeed, while Ugandan households as a 
whole have benefited from high food price increases between 2005/6 and 2009/10 by 15.4% 
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(meaning that they have to decrease their total expenditures of 2009/10 by 15.4% to reach the 
utility level achieved in 2005/6), they lost from these price increases by 9.7% if we 
incorporate virtual or shadow effects due to labor market frictions. By and large, the findings 
from this second essay indicate that non-agricultural, poor, and urban households have 
suffered from price increases while among agricultural households, only significant net sellers 
and, to a small extent, marginal net sellers have benefited from the price upsurges. However, 
the magnitudes of these welfare effects are found to be slightly less important than those 
obtained previously through price simulations. 
In settings characterized by the prominence of shocks, the uncertainty about the future, and 
the quasi-absence of formal insurance and credit markets, agricultural households in most 
developing countries can only rely on informal mechanisms or crop diversification strategies 
to protect themselves against high variances in food prices (Fafchamps, 1992). Essay III, 
titled How strongly do agricultural risks and farmers’ expectations influence acreage 
decisions? Dynamic models of land use in Uganda, explores the question of crop choices and 
land allocations in environments where farmers face uncertainties about end-of-season output 
prices and yield levels, weather variability, and formulate expectations about their future 
levels. In particular, this essay answers the following empirical questions: Are Ugandan 
farmers more sensitive to changes in expected prices or expected yields? Or is it the volatility 
of prices and yields that finally matters? Do farmers keep growing the same crop once it has 
been selected previously or do they instead take advantage of crop rotational effects? Which 
factors—household characteristics (such as education, sex, or household size), environmental 
factors (such as land quality, typology of soil, or irrigation practices), or agricultural and 
market-related risks—are most important when it comes to selecting and allocating land to 
particular crops? 
To that end, I estimate two econometric models: a multivariate crop selection model that 
analyses the factors affecting the probability of selecting and growing different crops under 
market uncertainties and a conditional acreage share model that investigates how farmers 
allocate their agricultural land to different crops so that to maximize the expected utility of 
their profit. In these models, the choices that the farmers made in the past regarding the crops 
they grew and how much land they allocated to different crops are assumed to influence 
current farmers’ choices, leading to dynamic crop choice and land allocation problems. 
Moreover, farmers’ behavior is modeled as a generalized two-step Heckman-type approach 
consisting in a sequential decision: first they select the crop (s) to grow and second, they 
Summary and Overview 
 
xviii 
 
determine the proportion of land to share out among the selected crops. The model 
specifications allow to distinguish true state dependence in crop choice and land allocation 
from spurious state dependence (due to unobserved heterogeneity) and to check for the 
presence of inertia effects (if farmers do not change their previous crop choice patterns) or 
spillover/rotational effects (if choices made in the past by a farmer regarding one crop affect 
current decisions about competing crops). Both the selection and land share models are 
estimated for 6 crops or crop groups, matooke, cassava, maize, potatoes (both Irish and sweet 
potatoes), beans, and other cereals (rice, millet, and sorghum), as well as a residual category 
for all other crops not selected in the present analysis using panel dataset of 1,598 agricultural 
households over 4 periods.  
To take account of initial observations problem posed by the dynamic nature of the farmers’ 
decisions, I apply in both crop choice and acreage allocation models the Wooldridge’s (2002) 
recommendation by including as an additional covariate the first observations of each 
dependent variable. Furthermore, to deal with farm and crop unobserved heterogeneity, I 
apply the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach by assuming that unobserved heterogeneity can be 
specified as a linear function of the average values of all time-varying independent variables. 
The crop selection problem is then modeled as a dynamic multivariate probit regression and 
estimated through Simulated Maximum Likelihood and the G (Geweke) H (Hajivassiliou) K 
(Keane) simulator; whereas the conditional acreage share model is estimated using a dynamic 
multivariate fractional logit model (Mullahy, 2011).  
The empirical findings suggest that price, yield, and weather risks are more important than 
their expected values in both crop choice and acreage share models. Farmers are found more 
sensitive to changes in expected yields and yield volatility than in expected prices or price 
volatility. Moreover, most conditional expected acreage share elasticities in the static models 
are overestimated compared to the dynamic models and finally, I find evidence of strong state 
dependence in farmers’ crop choices and acreage allocations while the presence of rotational 
effects is relatively limited compared to inertia effects. 
The final essay, titled Welfare growth, poverty traps, and differential exposure to food price 
shocks: Evidence from Uganda, explores the last main research question of this dissertation 
by investigating the link between poverty traps, poverty persistence, and differential exposure 
and vulnerability to food price shocks using four waves of Uganda National Panel Surveys 
(UNPS) spanning over the years 2005-2012. The motivation behind this last essay is the 
unproved claim that food price shocks, especially since the recent global food price crisis, 
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might have thrust thousands, or even millions, of households in most developing countries 
into chronic poverty and have even exacerbated the risk of being trapped into poverty (Martin 
and Ivanic, 2008).  The essay develops a modified Ramsey consumption growth model 
allowing for reference-dependent preferences and both food price and asset shocks to model 
theoretically the impact of shocks on welfare growth. To uncover the link between exposure 
to food price shocks and the patterns of welfare growth dynamics, the study first constructs 
both household-specific food price shocks’ variable and asset index (using a livelihood-based 
regression model). Three types of econometric methods (parametric, non-, and semi-
parametric) are then applied to check for the hypothesis of food-price-shocks-induced poverty 
traps.  
Under parametric methods, consumption and asset dynamics are modeled as cubic polynomial 
regressions of lagged consumption levels and asset indices, respectively, and estimated by the 
two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments (S-GMM). During these estimations, I test 
for the existence of serial correlations of error terms using the Arellano-Bond first order AR 
(1) and second order AR (2) tests, and check for over-identification of the instruments 
through the Hansen J test. To allow for nonlinearities in the effects of food price shocks, I 
enter the price shocks’ variable both linearly and interacted with the degree of the household’s 
vulnerability to food price shocks. This latter is computed using the principal components 
analysis by incorporating three factors likely to determine the extent of this vulnerability, 
namely the food dependency ratio, the degree of market participation, and the level of 
household’s income.  
The results suggest the presence of nonlinearities in both consumption and asset dynamics. 
Furthermore, I find that changes in the degree of exposure to food price shocks tend to 
decrease the rates of both consumption and asset growth during the sample period, with the 
effects being more important in the consumption growth model. Concretely, the parametric 
results show that the consumption growth rate is on average marginally decreasing with the 
degree of exposure to food price shocks, and this effect is increasing with the extent of 
household’s vulnerability. The vulnerability threshold to food price shocks is found to be 
1.364, meaning that on average the effect of food price shocks starts inducing detrimental 
impacts on consumption growth once the vulnerability index exceeds this level, and this was 
the case of around 58% of the surveyed households.  
However, I did not find any evidence of food-price-shocks-induced poverty traps or 
bifurcated welfare dynamics necessary for the existence of multiple welfare equilibria. 
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Instead, graphical representations of the predicted consumption levels and asset indices reveal 
that Ugandan households are converging towards a single welfare equilibrium located slightly 
above the official poverty line, at around 29,000 Ugandan Shillings (UShs) for monthly real 
values of consumption per adult equivalent and 1.10 Poverty Line Units (PLUs) for asset 
index. Non-parametric (Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing and locally weighted 
scatterplot smoother, LOWESS) and semi-parametric methods (Ruppert et al’s (2003) 
penalized spline regression estimation) also indicate the absence of poverty traps caused by 
exposure to food price shocks.  
When households are disaggregated into different sub-groups sharing some similarities, the 
econometric results suggest that different household groups appear to be moving towards 
specific welfare equilibria. For instance, households exposed to food price shocks are moving 
towards a consumption threshold that is 6.5% lower than the equilibrium of their unexposed 
counterparts, with 30,260UShs of consumption values against 32,360UShs. Households 
located below the vulnerability threshold 1.364 (meaning less vulnerable households) are 
expected to reach a welfare equilibrium that is on average 57.1% greater than that of 
households beyond the estimated critical vulnerability index. Hence, although there is no 
evidence of food-price-shocks-induced poverty traps, the essay finds evidence of conditional 
convergence across groups of households with female-educated, less educated, highly 
exposed and vulnerable households to food price shocks converging towards lower 
consumption and asset equilibria, regardless of the selected econometric method. 
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Essay I  
 
Food Price Volatility in Uganda: 
 Trends, Drivers, and Spillover Effects 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
The recent unprecedented shifts in global commodity prices observed between 2007 and the 
middle of 2008 and from 2010 to 2011 have revived interest and widespread concerns about 
their potential adverse consequences on households, especially in developing countries. 
Indeed, between 2005 and 2007, international prices of many staple foods rose drastically: 
milk powder by 90 percent, maize by 80 percent, wheat by 70 percent, and rice by 20 percent 
(Ivanic and Martin, 2008). Further, at the peaks of the crisis in mid-2008, the international 
prices of some food commodities - such as wheat, maize, and rice - had more than doubled 
(von Braun, 2008).  While in developed countries the budget shares of food expenditures are 
relatively modest, in developing countries, most households not only are producers and 
consumers of food, but also consume all or part of the output of their productive activities.  
In Uganda for example, agriculture provides about 42% of earning sources (UBoS, 2010), 
employs 65% of the total labor force of the country (World Bank, 2013) and the population 
relies primarily on staple foods as its main source of caloric intakes. To grasp the importance 
of the staples for the population, table 1.1 gives an overview of caloric intake and 
consumption of the most important staple foods in Uganda (matooke
1
, cassava, maize, sweet 
and Irish potatoes, beans, rice, sorghum, millet, wheat, and groundnuts) between 2000 and 
2011. Overall, matooke has been both the most consumed staple food with a per capita annual 
average of 154kg and the most contributing item in terms of caloric intake, averaging 16.33% 
throughout the sample period. Cassava, maize, and sweet potatoes also play an important role 
in both consumption and daily caloric intakes. They account respectively for 12.6, 11.6 and 
8.8% of average caloric intakes. The remaining staples only contribute marginally to annual 
                                                          
1
 Matooke refers to starchy bananas that are cooked and consumed as staple (Haggblade and Dewina, 2010) 
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consumption and daily caloric intakes, revealing a diet highly diversified among the 
population with no staple food accounting for more than 20% of the daily caloric intakes.  
In such an environment characterized by a high dependency of the population on staple foods 
for both consumption, caloric intakes and  agricultural revenues, any substantial changes in 
food prices (both in levels and volatility) are likely to impact on household real income, 
particularly for agricultural households, and exacerbate food insecurity of the poor (Apergis 
and Rezitis, 2011). A visual inspection of the price volatility of these staple foods helps 
understand the need of investigating their behavior and identifying their main drivers.  
Table 1.1 Caloric intakes and consumption of main staple foods (2000 – 2011) 
Staple foods Caloric intakes (kcal/person/day) Consumption (kg/person/year) 
Average % min max Average Min Max 
Matooke 375.75 16.33 318 439 154.06 130.3 180.2 
Cassava 290.25 12.62 267 312 97.24 88.8 104.7 
Maize 265.25 11.55 203 344 29.05 22.4 40.7 
Sweet potatoes 202.67 8.81 162 225 77.16 61.8 85.6 
Beans 124.58 5.51 91 166 13.42 9.8 17.9 
Millet 94.17 4.08 39 127 14.82 5.4 18 
Wheat 67.67 2.94 16 97 9.01 2 13.1 
Groundnuts 55.08 2.39 49 69 3.65 2.8 4.6 
Rice 45.25 1.97 34 54 4.64 3.5 5.6 
Sorghum 41.25 1.79 30 50 4.96 3.5 5.8 
Irish Potatoes 27.75 1.21 26 29 14.27 13.4 14.9 
Others 670.33 29.16 569 749    
Total 2,299.83 100 2,250 2,380    
Source: FAO data, various years. 
Indeed, the trend of monthly real food prices in Uganda between January 2000 and December 
2012 suggests that price volatility (measured by the standard deviation of real price returns) 
has been time-varying over periods of both months and years and can be characterized by 
three main stylized features (Figure 1.1). Firstly, it has remained relatively low between 
January 2000 and December 2007, barely reaching 10 percent and averaging 7.8 percent. 
Secondly, food price volatility appeared particularly high during the sub-period January 2008 
and December 2012, which coincides with the recent international food price turmoil. Finally, 
price volatility has peaked three times between January 2008 and December 2012: during the 
second quarter of 2008, the first quarter of 2009 and the last quarter of 2011, with respectively 
13, 16, and 19 percent.  
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Figure 1.1 Monthly real food price volatility, January 2000 – December 2012 
 
 
Understanding factors that drive changes in food price volatility is of utter importance for 
both market participants and policy-makers. On the one hand, increases in food prices (both in 
mean and volatility) imply that farmers receive high but more instable revenues from food 
markets and that consumers not only have to pay consistently high prices but also cannot 
perfectly predict future market prices due to their highly unpredictable variability. On the 
other hand, high price volatility may be source of social tensions and conflicts, and may 
hamper the efficacy of policy responses
2
. 
There exists a rich body of literature that has investigated the determinants of food price 
volatility. Macroeconomic factors such as inflation rates, adverse weather conditions, 
increasing fuel and energy prices, exchange and interest rates, yield and stock levels, have 
generally been identified among the key contributing factors of changes in commodity price 
volatility (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1990; Ai et al., 2006; Balcombe, 2009; Roache, 2010; 
                                                          
2
 For example, Berazneva and Lee (2013) found that between 2006 and 2008, food riots occurred in at least 14 
African countries: Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Cameroon, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Egypt, Madagascar, Somalia, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. Bellemare (2015) is another example of recent 
studies on the impact of high prices (both price levels and price volatility) on social unrest.  
Note: Weighted index of 10 key food commodities in Uganda: matooke, cassava, maize grains and 
flour, sweet potatoes, beans, millet flour, rice, sorghum, and groundnuts. Nominal prices were 
deflated using the UBoS all items’ consumer price index (2005/06=100). 
 
 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
5 
 
Dong et al., 2011; Apergis and Rezitis, 2011; Karali and Power, 2013). Notwithstanding the 
vast number of theoretical and empirical studies on commodity volatility, they have 
overwhelmingly focused on spot and futures markets in developed or at least in some 
emerging countries. By contrast, in developing countries and especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, although different factors have been listed as potential causes of agricultural price 
volatility, existing studies only present a qualitative, rather than a quantitative, evaluation of 
these factors and are therefore unable to identify the specific contribution of each factor to 
observed or historical price volatility (FAO, 2009; FAO, 2011; Minot, 2012; Gouel, 2013).  
The aim of this first study is to fill this empirical gap with a twofold objective. Firstly, the 
paper models conditional price volatility of the main staple foods in Uganda and examines the 
extent to which volatility in principal food markets in Uganda spills over each other. This is 
particularly important in the Ugandan setting insofar as previous studies (see, Rashid, 2004;  
Conforti, 2004; and Boysen, 2009)
3
 have shown that different food markets across the country 
are rather integrated. The evidence of spillover effects across food markets would therefore 
imply that price stabilization policies should primarily focus more on global solutions instead 
of favoring market-specific measures. Furthermore, the study addresses the question of 
asymmetric effects in price volatility. Although largely analyzed in regards to financial 
markets where good and bad news of the same magnitude generally have different effects, 
recent studies have also found evidence of such asymmetric effects in agricultural markets 
(Carpantier, 2010; Piot-Lepetit, 2011).  
Secondly, the present study investigates the differential impacts of various factors in driving 
changes in food price volatility in Uganda between 2000 and 2012. More specifically, the 
paper aims at answering the following question: How does agricultural price volatility react to 
changes in macroeconomic fundamentals and environmental factors, on the one hand, and to 
own- and cross-price shocks, on the other? 
                                                          
3
 For example, Rachid (2004) analyzes internal integration of Ugandan maize markets in the years following the 
agricultural market liberalization in the early 1990’s. Using weekly wholesale price data for 8 district markets 
over the periods from 1993, week 1 to 1994, week 40 and from 1999, week 40 to 2001, week 30, he ﬁnds that 
the majority of the district markets are integrated and that integration with Kampala improved from the ﬁrst to 
the second period.  
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 The Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) family models are 
employed to investigate both the conditional price volatility and the presence of asymmetric 
or leverage effects in food price volatilities. The Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models are 
used to explore the extent of spillover effects in food markets across the country and to 
identify the responsiveness of food price volatilities when shocks occur in their own markets 
or in others. Finally, the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model is applied to estimate 
the impact of macroeconomic variables and seasonality factors on observed food price 
volatilities. The analysis is conducted for six key staple foods consumed by Ugandan 
households between January 2000 and December 2012, namely matooke, cassava, maize, 
sweet potatoes, beans, and millet flour.  
This study, including the preceding introduction, has five sections. The foregoing has 
highlighted the importance of understanding price volatility in countries largely dependent on 
food consumption. In the next section, I provide a graphical overview of the patterns of food 
price indices between 1997 and 2012. In section 3, I present different econometric models for 
analyzing successively conditional price volatility, asymmetric and leverage effects in food 
price volatilities, spillover effects across commodity markets, and factors driving the observed 
or historical price volatility. Section 4 describes the data and constructs volatility variables. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the results of the GARCH, VAR, and SUR models. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses the policy implications of the key findings. 
 
1.2 Patterns of food price indices in Uganda 
 
In this paragraph, I analyze the evolution of monthly consumer price indices in Uganda 
between July 1997 and December 2012 and identify their main patterns. As shown in figure 
1.2, while non-food price indices
4
 were continuously increasing, the monthly price indices of 
food commodities reveal four different patterns in their evolution between July 1997 and 
December 2012.   
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Here, non-food price indices represent the weighted average of six commodity groups: clothing and footwear; 
rent, fuel, and utilities; household and personal goods; transport and communication; education; and health 
and other commodities.  
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Figure 1.2 Monthly consumer price indices, July 1997 – December 2012 (Base: 2005/06=100) 
 
  Source: Own computation based on UBoS data, various years 
 
 
First phase: Stability of food price indices (July 1997 – September 2007) 
During this phase, the food price index is remarkably stable, around the 2005/06 level. At the 
macroeconomic level, the Ugandan government has launched substantial economic reforms 
that contributed to sustaining the economic growth (6.7% on average between 1997 and 2007) 
and to stabilizing the economy. Indeed, in 1999, the government introduced Poverty 
Reduction Strategic Papers (PRSPs) with the aim of making the economic performance more 
pro-poor. The liberalization of the economy during that period improved the incentive of the 
private sector to invest into the economy which boosted the private capital formation at the 
expense of public investments
5
.  Other reforms included the Medium-Term Competitive 
Strategy for the Private Sector (MTCS) in 2000 aiming at improving the performances of the 
private sector
6
; the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) in 1997 whose objective 
was to eradicate poverty through competitive and sustainable agriculture and agri-business 
                                                          
5
 For example, the share of private capital formation rose from 7% of GDP in 1989/90 to 13% in 1998/9, 
whereas the public capital formation fell from 7 to 5% during the same period (Devarajan et al., 2001). 
6
 Among its objectives, it tried to enforce prudential requirements in the banking system and carry out 
supervision of the financial sector, to reduce the incidence of corruption and improve the general investment 
climate.   
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sector; and the Strategic Export Intervention Program (SEIP) whose primary interest was to 
increase the competitiveness of Ugandan exports. Consequently, the overall inflation rate was 
very low during this period, around 5% while it reached 16.6% on average in the early 1990s. 
The growth rate of the monthly food consumer price indices was relatively stable during this 
period as visualized in figure 1.3.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Growth rates of monthly consumer food price indices (July 1997 – September 2007) 
 
Source: Own computation based on UBoS data, various years 
 
Second phase: Steep increase of food price indices (October 2007 – September 2009) 
This period covers the international food price crisis of 2007/2008. Uganda food price indices 
were continuously increasing with an average monthly growth rate of 2.3% against -0.005% 
during the previous period. This observed pattern led several authors to analyze the potential 
links between the world and Ugandan food prices and they generally came up with the 
conclusion that, although the world and Ugandan domestic markets were integrated, the price 
transmission was not only imperfect but also highly dependent of the type of commodities 
analyzed.   
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For example, Conforti (2004) and Boysen (2009) analyzed how an increase in food prices 
impacts on poverty in Uganda. Although they focused on different items in their respective 
studies
7
, they both found that world and Ugandan domestic markets were integrated. The 
same results were obtained by Rapsomanikis et al. (2003), Dorosh et al. (2003) and Bussolo et 
al. (2007) who restricted their study to the analysis of the Ugandan coffee markets over 
various periods and found a significant link between the world and Ugandan coffee markets. 
Kaspersen and Føyn (2010) analyzed the impact of the world prices’ increases on the 
Ugandan domestic markets of Robusta coffee and sorghum. They used wholesale weekly 
prices of Foodnet, collected at the main local markets in four districts (Gulu, Jinja, Mbale and 
Soroti). Contrarily to previous studies, their paper found that sorghum markets in Uganda, 
unlike the Robusta coffee’s markets, were not integrated into the world markets. Their 
empirical analysis also indicated that rising food prices (of little-traded crops) in world 
markets would not have a direct effect on food prices in Uganda. Finally, Benson et al. (2008) 
assessed the potential impact of rising world food prices in 2007/2008 on the welfare of 
Ugandan households. They suggested that only domestic prices of internationally traded 
goods (in their study, rice and wheat) were directly affected by international market prices.  
By and large, these studies suggest that international food prices were imperfectly transmitted 
to Ugandan local markets and among the reasons usually put forward, we have high 
transaction costs due to the insulation of the country from international markets (Benson et 
al., 2008) and the relatively large quantity and range of staples consumed from home 
production (Boysen, 2009). Therefore, the observed increases in Ugandan food prices during 
this period have been attributed, without formal tests of the proposed explanations, to diverse 
factors, including the global rise in oil prices, the post-election crisis in Kenya at the 
beginning of 2008 that has increased the demand for Ugandan products, new demands from 
DR Congo and southern Sudan, and localized production problems, for example floods in the 
Teso region between July and October 2007 (Benson et al., 2008). 
 
Third phase: Sharp decline in food price indices (October 2009 – June 2010) 
Between October 2009 and June 2010, food inflation ceased off its upward trend 
characterizing the previous spell but still remained higher than during the period July 1997 - 
                                                          
7
 Wheat, sorghum, milk powder, sorghum, maize, rice, cassava, soybean,  poultry  and  pork  meat for Conforti 
and matooke, cassava flour, millet flour, cassava fresh, sweet potatoes, rice, dried beans Nambale, dried beans 
Kanyebwa, Irish potatoes, maize flour and “unpounded” groundnuts for Boysen. 
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September 2007.  Among the potential causes of this food price deflation, we may find the 
combined effects of good harvest periods in major cereals (especially, maize and rice) and 
relatively lower fuel prices. With regards to rainfall variability, this period which covers 
almost all the four agricultural seasons
8
 in Uganda enjoyed particularly good average rainfall 
levels. Indeed, from figure 1.4, it appears that rainfall levels between January and June 2010 
were globally higher than the corresponding months of 2007, 2008, and 2009 which led to 
relatively important production during the first harvest season.  
Figure 1.4 Average rainfall levels (in mm) in Uganda (2007 – 2010) 
 
Source: Sector economic performance reports of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development of 
Uganda, various years. 
On the other hand, although rainfall was lower in October and November 2009 comparatively 
to other years, it started increasing since December 2009 with an impact on the production 
during the second harvest period.  
                                                          
8
 The second planting season, which usually starts from September and goes until November, the second 
harvest period which covers the period December to February, the first planting season over the months of 
March to May, and the first month of the first harvest period (Asiimwe and Mpuga, 2007). 
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Furthermore, fuel prices could have played an important role in explaining the downward 
trend in food price indices. Indeed, many Ugandan farmers are located in remote areas, far 
from the main roads of the country. Access to food and input markets therefore requires 
relatively important transport costs that may be detrimental for small farmers and increase 
food prices charged by producers due to higher production costs. Fuel price inflation as 
depicted in figure 1.5 remained high in 2008 (around 10% quarterly) but sharply decreased 
between January 2009 and June 2010.  During this period, the average quarterly fuel inflation 
was -3.75% against 8.1% between September 2007 and June 2009. 
Figure 1.5 Evolution of quarterly fuel pump inflation in Uganda, September 2007 – September 2010 
 
Source: Bank of Uganda’s Quarterly macroeconomic reports, various years. 
 
Fourth phase: Skyrocketing food price indices (July 2010-December 2012) 
 
During this last phase, Uganda has experienced the second remarkable increase in its food 
price inflation. Indeed, food inflation, which accounts for around 27.2% in the overall 
inflation, drastically increased from -2.8% in the second quarter of 2010 to 12% in the first 
quarter of 2011 (Bank of Uganda, 2011). Furthermore, since April 2011, food inflation has 
not stopped rising, peaking in October 2011 and April 2012, with an index of around 250. 
This surge in food prices may result from various and intertwined factors.  
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First, international crude oil prices accelerated since March 2011 and reached 123$ per barrel 
in April 2011. Second, the rise in food crop inflation might have resulted from periods of 
droughts that adversely affected agricultural production in most growing food regions of the 
country. Third, increased fuel prices coincided with the depreciation of the Uganda 
Shilling/US dollar exchange rate (figure 1.6). Finally, increased inflation in Uganda’s trading 
partners, particularly in Kenya, Euro area, China, and the United Kingdom, may have been 
translated into rising food prices. For example, in Kenya, a country that accounted for around 
19% of the total Uganda exports between 2010 and 2013, the overall annual inflation rate 
increased from 4% in 2010 to 14% in 2011, while in the Euro area, China, and the United 
Kingdom, it rose from 1.5, 3.3, and 3.3% in 2010 to 3.3, 5.4, and 4.5% in 2011, respectively 
(World Bank , 2013). 
 
Figure 1.6 Evolution of nominal and real effective exchange rates UShs/$US (July 1997- March 2013) 
 
1.2 Econometric models of conditional volatility, asymmetric and spillover effects, 
and drivers of price volatility 
 
In this section, different econometric models of evaluating conditional food price volatility, 
testing for the presence of asymmetric and spillover effects of price volatilities across 
Source: Own computation based on Bank of Uganda (2013) 
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Ugandan commodity markets, and examining the differential impact of potential drivers of 
observed volatilities are successively presented. 
1.2.1 Conditional volatility model 
To analyze historical food price volatility in Uganda, I draw on the Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedastic (ARCH) model introduced by Engle (1982) and the generalized 
ARCH (GARCH) model by Bollerslev (1986). The ARCH model is specified so that the 
current price volatility will be positively affected by the more recently observed shocks 
whereas the GARCH model assumes a positive impact of both previous shocks and 
volatilities. 
Consider the following general  qp,ARMA  process with autoregressive order p and moving 
average order q: 
     tqttp LXYL    
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with tY , the dependent variable, is a food price volatility time-series ; jtY  , j = 1, 2,…, p, its 
lagged dependent variables; tX  are independent variables; L is the lag operator; and t  are 
the error terms assumed to be white noise. The mean equation (1.1) does not take account of 
heteroscedasticity of the time series process generally observed in the form of fat tails and 
leverage effects (Würtz et al, 2006). To solve this problem, Engle (1982) defines the error 
terms in (1.1) as an autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic process, giving the following 
 qARCH  process: 
ttY  βXt  
where                                                             
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with 2t  is the time-varying variance of the error term t ;  1t  is the information set 
available at time t-1. In the  qp,GARCH , the lagged values of 2t  are now included into the 
model which gives:  




 
p
j
jtj
q
i
itit
1
2
1
22   
where 
 
 is the mean of 2t ; i  and j are the ARCH and GARCH terms, respectively.  
For the  qp,GARCH  to be stationary, the following restrictions are sufficient:  
jiji
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  
I introduce two types of variables in the mean equation (1.3). First, to check whether the 
conditional price volatility has significantly changed since 2008, I include in the vector X a 
dummy variable Dum  which takes the value 1 during periods of structural breaks in food 
price series and 0 otherwise (see next section). The sign of this variable is expected to be 
positive, implying a significant increase in conditional price volatility associated with these 
turning points.   
Second, one of the common features of agricultural food markets is the presence of 
seasonality in volatility patterns. Food prices tend to fluctuate across the agricultural season, 
rising during the planting season as the stocks of commodities are depleting and declining 
during the harvest period (Buguk et al., 2003).  To incorporate deterministic seasonal 
components into the volatility models, I follow Goodwin and Schnepf (2000) by adding a sum 
of trigonometric functions corresponding to the t
th
 month of the year into the vector X. 
Concretely, if tm  represents the month of the year associated with the observation t, the 
seasonal component ts can be written as: 
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where k  and k , Kk ,...,1 , are parameters to be estimated.  
Through this specification, the unknown seasonal function is expressed as a k
th
-order Fourier 
approximation within a period of one year. The presence of seasonal patterns into price 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
(1.7) 
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volatility can then be assessed by testing the significance of the estimated values of k  and 
.k  Following Goodwin and Schnepf (2000) and Buguk et al. (2003), k = 3 is used in 
deriving the seasonal component.  
1.2.2 Asymmetric and leverage effects 
One of the limitations of a standard GARCH (1, 1) model is its assumption of symmetric 
impacts of good and bad news on volatility. However, empirical evidence, originated from 
financial markets and stock exchange, extensively shows that not only is there an asymmetric 
response of price volatility to positive and negative past returns (asymmetric effects) but also 
increases in volatility appear to be larger when previous returns were negative than when they 
were positive with the same magnitude (leverage effects) (Black, 1976; French et al., 1987; 
Nelson, 1991a, b; Engle and Ng, 1993; Villar, 2010; Apergis and Rezitis, 2011). In terms of 
food prices, this would mean that households would not react identically to unanticipated 
increases and decreases in food prices of the same magnitude. To test for the robustness of the 
GARCH (1, 1) estimation results, I now allow price volatility to react asymmetrically to both 
positive and negative shocks. To that end, I estimate an Exponential GARCH model proposed 
by Nelson (1991b)
9
. In addition to accounting for asymmetry in the responsiveness of food 
price volatility to shocks of opposite signs, the EGARCH model does not impose any 
restrictions on the parameters to guarantee a positive variance as do standard GARCH models 
(Villar, 2010). The EGARCH (1, 1) model specifies the conditional variance 2t of equation 
(1.5) as follows: 
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where the ratio ttth  /  represents the standardized shock for time t. The parameters   and 
  capture the presence of asymmetric and leverage effects in food price volatility whereas   
reports persistence in volatility. Since the EGARCH (1, 1) model is based on the standardized 
residuals th , the regularity condition is satisfied if 1 . 
The model will be symmetric if 0  and in that case the model reverts to the standard 
GARCH (1, 1). It will exhibit asymmetric effects if   is statistically significant. When 0  
                                                          
9
 Other possibilities include Asymmetric power ARCH (A-PARCH) models first proposed by Ding et al. (1993) or 
Threshold ARCH (TARCH) models of Zakoian (1994).  
(1.8) 
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and significant, then there exist leverage effects, meaning that negative shocks on price 
volatility have larger impact than positive shocks of the same magnitude. The effects of high- 
(unexpected price increases) and low-price news (unexpected price decreases) on the 
conditional variance will be given respectively by    and    (Zheng et al., 2008). If 
  , then low-price news have more effects on the conditional variance than high-
price news of the same magnitude. 
1.2.3 Volatility spillover model 
To examine the possibility of spillover effects from one market to another within the country, 
I specify a multivariate framework in which the current price volatility of a commodity i is 
allowed to depend on both past own shocks and price shocks to other commodities. To that 
end, I use a Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) specification of Sims (1982) which identifies how 
each endogenous variable (i.e. food price volatility) reacts over time to own shocks and to 
shocks from other food markets. I estimate the following VAR model: 





















































































t
t
p
k
i
ktk
p
k
i
ktk
p
k
i
ktk
p
k
i
ktk
p
k
k
p
k
k
k
k
i
t
i
t
u
U
Yd
YD
Yc
YC
qb
QB
a
A
Y
Y
1
1
1
1
1
1  
where itY is the price volatility of commodity i and 
i
tY
  is a vector of price volatilities of other 
commodities which effects are assumed to spill over the market of the commodity i ; Q is a 
vector of dummy variables capturing structural breaks; kA , kB , kC , and kD  and their 
lowercase counterparts are the vector of coefficients in itY  and 
i
tY
 equations, respectively. 
Schwartz information criterion was used to select the appropriate lag length. 
1.2.4 Model of drivers of food price volatility 
One of the questions arising when inspecting figure 1.1 is whether the blame of the upward 
trend in food price volatility in Uganda could be put on the international food price turmoil of 
2007/8. The answer depends crucially on how integrated are Ugandan domestic markets to 
global commodity markets. By and large, the existing studies tackling this issue have come up 
with the conclusion that international food prices were imperfectly transmitted to Ugandan 
local markets. As previously outlined, high transaction costs due to the insulation of Uganda 
(1.9) 
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from international markets (Benson et al., 2008; Kaspersen and Føyn, 2010) and the relatively 
large quantity and range of staple foods consumed from home production (Boysen, 2009) are 
the reasons usually advanced to explain these results. Here, I take a more formal approach by 
identifying and analyzing the differential contributions of the key drivers to the observed 
price upswings in the main Ugandan markets.  
Economic theory predicts that changes in price volatility will depend to a larger extent on 
factors directly affecting the decisions of buyers and sellers of commodities analyzed and to a 
smaller extent on indirect factors. Direct determinants will generally include supply shocks 
(such as weather variability, changes in input prices, yield variability, and changes in stock 
levels) and demand shocks (like changes in income or consumption habit persistence) 
whereas indirect causes may result from speculative behavior, volatility in market prices of 
substitute or complement commodities, exchange rate volatility, or inflation rates.  
The choice of the potential determinants of food price volatility is mainly guided here by 
economic theory, results of other empirical studies, and data availability constraints. To 
analyze the impact of macroeconomic and environmental variables on changes in price 
volatility, I estimate the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model introduced by Zellner 
(1962):  
6,...,1;122012,...,12000
,221 ,
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  
 where MiCPV ,  is the food price volatility of the commodity i in month M; ia , ib , ic  , id  , ie  
if  , ,ih  ,ik il  are parameters to be estimated; Mi,  are the error terms. 
Among the explanatory variables, I include the inflation rate volatility MCPI  , real effective 
exchange rate volatility between the Uganda Shilling and the US dollar $/,ShsMERV , fuel price 
volatility MFPV , interest rate volatility MIRV , and rainfall variability MRFV  as well as dummy 
variables for different agricultural seasons in the country Harvest1, Harverst2, and Planting2.  
The variable MCPI captures the impact of the overall food inflation on the price movements 
of a particular commodity. I expect a positive correlation between the changes in consumer 
price index and individual price volatility (Roache, 2010; Azad et al., 2012).  
(1.10) 
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Volatility in the exchange rates increases the riskiness of both the returns of the exporters and 
the prices of imported goods. Including this variable into the model will help discriminate the 
effects of regional and international forces on domestic price variations of each commodity 
(Gilbert, 1989; IMF, 2008). I adopt a standard measure of exchange rate volatility $/,ShsMERV   
of a particular month M by taking the standard deviation of the percent changes of the real 
effective exchange rate MRE  between the Uganda Shilling and the US dollar over a three-
month window width (Chowdhury 1993; Hau, 1999; Arezki et al., 2012)
10
:  
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The effective exchange rate is computed in such a way that a decline of its value implies a 
real appreciation of the domestic currency. I assume that the impact will be higher and 
significantly positive for commodities which are more regionally and/or internationally traded 
by Uganda, such as maize, millet flour, and beans.  
The rainfall volatility variable MRFV  captures the impact of weather shocks on price 
volatility. Weather variability is among the main causes of production shortfalls, particularly 
in developing countries where agricultural plots are predominately rain-fed. As suggested by 
the storage model, supply shocks (here consecutive to weather shocks) are likely to be 
important factors of agricultural price volatility (Deaton and Laroque, 1992, 1996). I 
hypothesize that the more rainfall-dependent the commodity, the larger the impact of weather 
variability on its price instability.  
Interest rate volatility MIRV  is used as a proxy for commodity stocks given the absence of 
monthly data. It therefore represents the opportunity costs of holding potential commodity 
stocks (Balcombe, 2009; Azad et al., 2012; Karali and Power, 2013).  
Transaction costs and particularly transportation costs are also obvious candidates as drivers 
of food price volatility in Uganda. Fuel price volatility MFPV  is used as proxy of these costs. 
Indeed, farmers often have to choose between selling their products at the farm gate and 
therefore earn less or carrying these products to markets and incur a transport cost (Fafchamps 
and Hill, 2005). When a crop has a low value-weight ratio (such as matooke or cassava), these 
                                                          
10
 I also used other alternatives window widths (1, 4, and 6 months) to check for the robustness of the volatility 
measures but results did not significantly change. 
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costs may represent a non-negligible component of the market prices and fuel their volatility. 
It is thus hypothesized that the impact of fuel price volatility will be more important the 
heavier the commodity. Similarly to the exchange rate volatility, I measure inflation rate, 
interest rate, rainfall and fuel price volatilities as the standard deviation of their growth rate 
with a three-month window width.  
Finally, it is likely that food prices exhibit important seasonalities, being relatively higher and 
lower during planting and harvest seasons, respectively (Koekebakker and Lien, 2004). To 
account for that possibility, I include seasonal dummy variables corresponding to different 
harvest and planting seasons in Uganda: Harvest1 takes 1 if the corresponding months are 
June, July and August, and 0 otherwise; Harvest2 has 1 if months are December, January and 
February, and 0 otherwise; and Planting2 takes 1 if the corresponding months are September, 
October and November, and 0 otherwise. The first planting season (March, April, and May) 
has been used as baseline.  
1.3 Data 
 
In all the estimated models, the dependent variables are the food price volatilities. There exist 
different ways of measuring historic food price volatility. For example, O’Connor and Keane 
(2011) and Piot-Lepetit (2011) used the coefficient of variation (CV) which is the ratio of the 
standard deviation over the mean. However, as pointed out by Minot (2012), given the non-
stationarity in most food prices, the estimates of price variability derived from the standard 
deviation approach are dependent on the sample size and may be particularly large when the 
time period approaches infinity. To avoid this undesirable feature, I follow Gilbert and 
Morgan (2011) and use instead the standard deviation of price returns, where returns stand for 
the proportional change in logarithm prices. Therefore, the average monthly price volatility of 
the i
th 
commodity in the t
th 
month tiCPV ,  can be formalized as follows (Balcombe, 2009; 
Minot, 2012): 
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tjip ,,  and tjir ,,  are respectively  the real price and  price return of the i
th 
commodity in the j
th 
week of the month t. tir ,  stands for the average monthly price return of the i
th 
commodity.  N 
represents the number of weekly price information available for each month. 
I use data obtained from different sources: exchange and interest rates are obtained from Bank 
of Uganda; consumer price indices, inflation rates, and rainfall data are collected from various 
issues of Statistical abstracts of the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBoS) and the Background 
to the Budget of the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development. Fuel pump 
prices are obtained from the Agriculture Market Information System (AGMIS) Uganda. 
Monthly nominal food prices of the selected commodities come from time series’ prices 
collected by the Foodnet market price information project of the International Institute of 
Tropical Agriculture (IITA). The dataset contains weekly wholesale price series for around 
twenty Ugandan markets across all the geographical regions
11
 and for more than 25 staple 
foods from September 1999, week 40 to December 2012, week 52. For each series, nominal 
prices were deflated by the UBoS all items’ consumer price index (2005/06=100) to take 
account of potential changes in the purchasing power of Ugandan households. 
Table 1.2 reports the values of unconditional price volatility of 6 food commodities, namely 
matooke, cassava, maize, sweet potatoes, beans, and millet flour between January 2000 and 
December 2012 (see Appendix A.1 for individual volatility plots). The data are divided into 
two sub-periods (January 2000 to December 2007 and January 2008 to December 2012), 
which gives 96 and 60 monthly observations, respectively. A standard F-test of variance 
equality is presented in the penultimate column and its implications in terms of significance 
rise or fall in unconditional volatility are summarized in the last column.  
The table reveals that monthly food prices have been globally more volatile since January 
2008, rising from 8.4 to 11.7%, which represents an average growth rate of 38.8% between 
the two sub-periods. The distribution of food price volatility across commodities shows that 
beans and sweet potatoes were the most volatile respectively in the first and second sub-
periods.  
                                                          
11
 Arua, Gulu, Kitgum and Lira in the Northern region; Luwero, Masaka, Rakai, Kiboga, and Kampala (Kisenyi, 
Owino, Nakawa, Kalerwe) in the Central region; Iganga, Mbale, Jinja, Soroti, and Tororo in the Eastern region; 
and Jinja, Kabale, Kibale, Kasese, Hoima, and Mbarara in the Western region 
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Table 1.2 Unconditional price volatility of key food commodities in Uganda (2000m1 –2012m12) 
 2000m1- 
2007m12 
2008m1-
2012m12 
Growth 
rate 
2000m1-
2012m12 
F-test (p-value) Conclusion 
Matooke 0.099 0.134 0.354 0.112 1.617 (0.037) Significant rise 
Cassava 0.056 0.108 0.929 0.076 3.699 (0.000) Significant rise 
Maize 0.101 0.127 0.257 0.111 1.757 (0.014) Significant rise 
Sweet potatoes 0.097 0.154 0.588 0.120 3.171 (0.000) Significant rise 
Beans          0.112     0.114     0.018    0.112     0.993 (0.989) Insignificant rise 
Millet  flour 0.040 0.064 0.600 0.049 3.437 (0.000) Significant rise 
Average 0.084 0.117 0.388 0.065 2.714 (0.000) Significant rise 
Note: The growth rate of each price volatility is defined as aab /)(  , where a and b are respectively 
the mean volatility during the first and the second sub-periods. Source: Analysis based on price data 
from FoodNet project. 
 
Globally, price volatility is the lowest for millet flour (4.9%) and cassava (7.6%) and the 
highest for sweet potatoes (12%), matooke (11.2%), and maize (11.1%). Furthermore, all 
commodities but beans have exhibited a significant increase in the variance of their 
unconditional volatility since January 2008. 
 
1.4 Empirical results 
 
1.4.1 Conditional price volatility 
Unconditional price volatility assumes that the stochastic processes generating the data on 
price returns are independent and identically distributed and therefore, the data may be 
considered as random draws from the same (unconditional) distribution. In the conditional 
volatility model, the stochastic process has now a time-varying volatility (Green, 2012). The 
model thus estimates a conditional variance at each date in the time series given current and 
past price information (Gilbert and Morgan, 2011).  
A prerequisite for estimating conditional volatility through GARCH models is the stationarity 
of the process being analyzed. However, since our sample covers periods of recent food price 
turmoil, I suspect the possibility of breaks and shifting trends in Ugandan price series. In case 
of evidence in favor of structural breaks in price series, standard econometric tests 
(Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, or Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares) 
become biased because of their potential confusion of structural breaks in the series as 
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evidence of non-stationarity (Baum, 2005; Ghoshray et al., 2014). Hence, before performing 
unit root tests, I first identify the potential breaks or turning points in food price trends, 
following testing procedures proposed by Clemente, Montañés, and Reyes (1998) 
(henceforth, CMR) and Bai and Perron (2003) (henceforth, BP).  
Detecting structural breaks in commodity food prices 
 
The behavior of food commodity prices depicted in previous paragraphs highlighted the 
possibility of breaks and shifting trends in Ugandan price series. However, relying strictly on 
visual inspection of data plots to detect the presence of structural breaks may be misleading 
due to its inherent impossibility to disentangle a simple level shift from real shocks. Hence, 
since Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950), researchers such as Perron (1989), Zivot and 
Andrews (1992), Vogelsang and Perron (1998), Clemente, Montañés, and Reyes (1998), Bai 
and Perron (2003), Harvey et al. (2009), Perron and Yabu (2009a, b), and Ghoshray et al. 
(2014) have developed various econometric procedures to detect breaks in the level and/or the 
scope of commodity trends and estimate both the number and locations of break dates. 
Although the primary motivation behind these studies and their methodological procedure has 
been to test the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis
12
, they can also be used to differentiate real 
structural breaks from pure level shifts identified in the previous sections.   
Clemente, Montañés, and Reyes’ model  
 
The CMR procedure allows for up to two distinct and endogenous structural breaks using two 
different models: the additive outliers model (the AO model) which identifies a sudden 
change into a time series and the innovative outliers model (the IO model) that tests for a 
gradual shift in the mean of the time series (Baum, 2005). The AO model is defined as 
follows: 
tttt vDUDUy  22110   
where 
 
 


 
k
i
k
i
titiititbi
k
i
itbit evvDTDTv
1 1
,22
1
,11 
                                                           
12
  The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis states that the time series of primary commodity prices relative to 
manufactured goods present a downward trend in the long run. Theoretical explanations of such declining 
relative commodity prices include “…a low income elasticity of demand for primary commodities, lack of 
differentiation among commodity producers (…), productivity differentials between North (industrial) and 
South (commodity producing) countries, and asymmetric market structure (…)” Harvey et al. (2010:2) 
(1.14) 
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In equation (1.14), yt is the commodity price (in levels or logged) at time t; 
.2,1with,otherwise0andif1  iTBtDU iit
 
There are two potential 
break points, TB1 and TB2, unknown ex ante and determined by grid search. The residuals 
from (1.14), ,tv are then estimated in equation (1.15) using their lagged values, lagged 
differences, and a set of dummy variables for the test tractability. In equation (1.15), 
1, tbiDT for 1 iTBt
 
and 0 otherwise, with i = 1,2. The model is then estimated over 
different feasible couples of TB1 and TB2, seeking for the minimum t-ratio for the null 
hypothesis .1  Perron and Vogelsang (1992) provided critical values that will then be 
compared with the value of the minimum t-ratio. 
 
The IO model uses an ARMA representation to express the shocks affecting the price series in 
the following formulation: 
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In both AO and IO models, an estimate of 1  will indicate that the price series has not a 
unit root. The appropriate lag order of k is determined using sequential F-tests
13
. 
 
Bai and Perron’s model  
 
Two important weaknesses may bias the results from the CMR model. Indeed, imposing a 
predefined number of potential breakpoints (here, maximum two) to the data generating 
process while in reality there are more can render the tests inefficient and either cause 
spurious appearance of non-stationarity of the price series in a trend stationary process 
(Perron, 1989) or incorrectly suggest stationarity in a non-stationary process (Leybourne et 
al., 1998). To address this problem, Bai and Perron (2003) developed AO and IO models that 
account for multiple breaks. They test the null hypothesis of absence of breakpoints vs k 
breaks and k vs k + 1 breaks using an efficient algorithm to obtain the global minimisers of 
the sum of the squared residuals. Their dynamic programming algorithm allows, on the one 
hand, for both pure and partial structural changes, where all (respectively some) coefficients 
                                                          
13
 Stata routines clemao2 and clemio2 implement the AO and IO models of CMR procedure for two 
breakpoints, respectively.  
(1.16) 
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are subject to changes, and on the other, the construction of confidence intervals of 
breakdates
14
. 
In both the CMR and BP models, I apply the following procedure. First, I test for one 
structural break in the slope of the trend function while allowing for the intercept to change. 
Second, given the evidence in favor of one structural change in a time series, I then test for 
one against two or more break points in the data. I choose between the AO and IO models for 
each food commodity based on the value of the minimum t-statistics of dummy variables 
introduced in the models. Specifically to the BP test, I select the optimal number of break 
dates that minimizes the Bayesian Information Criteria.  
Table 1.3 reports the results for the 6 food price series using the Clemente, Montañés, and 
Reyes (1998) and Bai and Perron’s (2003) models for endogenously determined break points 
in each price series.  
 
Table 1.3 Optimal endogenous break dates of food price series in Uganda 
Commodity Clemente et al. (1998) Bai and Perron (2003) 
One break Two breaks One break Two breaks 
 k TB1 k TB1 TB2 TB1 TB1 TB2 
Food
* 
- - 2 2008m8 2011m5 - 2008m5 2008m8 
Matooke
* 
- - 1 2005m1 2008m3 - 2008m3 2011m1 
Cassava
* 
- - 2 2008m7 2009m8 - 2008m10 2011m1 
Maize
* 
3 2008m3 - - - - 2008m3 2011m3 
Sweetpotato
** 
- - 1 2008m2 2009m9 - 2008m4 2009m1 
Beans
** 
3 2007m10 - - - - 2007m10 2011m2 
Millet flour
** 
4 2009m2 - - - 2009m7 - - 
Note: * and ** mean that the AO or IO models have been applied in the CMP and BP procedures, 
respectively.  
The results from table 1.3 show that all selected commodities contained either one or two 
breaks in the slope. Out of the 6 food commodities, respectively 1 and 3 commodities were 
found to exhibit one structural change in the BP and CMR models. A number of interesting 
features can be derived from these results.  
                                                          
14
 Zeileis et al. (2003) developed the package strucchange in the R system that performed all tests 
developed in Bai and Perron (2003).  
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First, the AO model was more efficient in explaining the price behavior of matooke, cassava, 
and maize which reveals that breaks in the scope of these series took place rapidly rather than 
gradually. Second, both CMR and BP models detect similar break points for 2 commodities – 
matooke and beans– and for the consumer food price index. Hence, December 2007 and 
March 2008 were selected as optimal endogenous break dates by both models for beans, 
matooke, and maize, respectively. In December 2007, monthly real prices of beans exceeded 
for the first time 1,000UShs, growing by 11.5% from the previous month while since March 
2008, matooke prices have consistently been above 400UShs. 
Third, discrepancies between the break points identified by both models are more or less 
important depending on each commodity. Indeed, while the CMR model selects January 2005 
and March 2008 as optimal dates of matooke, the BP model instead started with March 2008 
as first break point and January 2011 as the second one. Furthermore, CMR model only 
identified one break point in the case of maize and beans against two break dates in BP’s.  
However, as stated above, the BP model is more robust in case of conflicting results with the 
CMR since it does not impose any limit to the number of potential breaks which can be 
selected a posteriori using either the BIC or RSS criteria (Ghorshay et al., 2014).  
To sum up, despite discrepancies between CMR and BP models, a general conclusion 
emerging from the above analysis is that key commodity food prices in Uganda have been 
characterized by shifting trends since 2008.  In fact, the estimated break dates have globally 
occurred when significant internal, regional, and international events took place in food 
commodity markets. An important number of break dates were observed in the first and last 
quarters of both 2008 and 2009 as well as the first semester of 2011.  
Unit root tests 
Given evidence of structural breaks in all price series, I perform Bai-Perron’s unit root tests 
(table 1.4). It appears that even when accounting for the presence of structural breaks in the 
time series, all the prices are difference stationary I(1) variables. I then apply the Box-Jenkins 
methodology to determine the values of p and q in the ARMA (p,q) process through the 
Bayesian information criteria (BIC). 
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Table 1.4 Bai-Perron’s unit root tests in the presence of structural breaks in food prices 
Commodities TB1 ; TB2 supF-stat Conclusion 
Matooke 2008M3 ; 2011M1 3.049 I(1) 
Cassava 2008M10 ; 2011M1 2.046 I(1) 
Maize  2008M3 ; 2011M3 4.758 I(1) 
Sweetpotato 2008M4 ; 2009M1 8.042 I(1) 
Beans 2007M10 ; 2011M2 7.805 I(1) 
Millet flour 2009M7 3.435 I(1) 
Food price index 2008M5 ; 2008M8 5.716 I(1) 
Note: The critical values for 15% trim, 5% significant levels, and 1 regressor (each commodity price)  
are 8.58 and 7.22 for one and two break dates, respectively (Bai and Perron, 2003). 
 
GARCH (1, 1) estimation results 
 
Table 1.5 shows the GARCH (1, 1) estimation results with structural breaks and seasonality in 
price volatility. Since the turning points occurred during the first quarters of 2008 and 2011 
for most commodities, the Dum  variable takes 1 for those months and 0 otherwise. All 
ARCH coefficients ( ) are significant at 10% level and positive, thereby satisfying the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of the ARCH specifications. Furthermore, 
the GARCH (1, 1) estimated coefficients for all the commodities satisfy the covariance 
stationary condition since 1   for each staple food. The sum of the ARCH and GARCH 
terms helps analyze the persistent nature of shocks to food price volatility. The closer the sum 
of these terms to one, the more persistent the shocks to food price volatility. The results reveal 
that shocks are more persistent for most commodities, suggesting that once a shock occurs, 
price volatility tends to persist for a long period (Apergis and Rezitis, 2011), particularly for 
matooke, cassava, and beans.  
With regards to the impact of structural breaks on estimated conditional price volatility, the 
empirical results (coefficients of the variable Dum ) indicate that, at a 1% significance level, 
the mean of the conditional volatility has increased for half of the commodities analyzed, 
namely cassava, sweet potatoes, and millet flour. As shown in table 1.2, these commodities 
were characterized by the most important growth rates in their unconditional price volatility. 
Moreover, they are generally traded regionally which, as predicted by trade or spatial 
equilibrium models, implies that their prices would be more sensitive than others to breaks or 
shifting trends associated with internal or regional market events.  
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The presence of deterministic seasonal components in price volatility can be analyzed through 
the estimated trigonometric seasonality terms k  and k . For each commodity, only around 
half of the seasonal components are statistically significant, suggesting a relatively moderate 
seasonality effect on conditional mean volatility.  
 
Table 1.5 Results of the GARCH (1, 1) model estimation 
 Matooke Cassava Maize 
 
Sweet 
potatoes 
Beans Millet 
flour 
Mean equation :
t
t DumY




33221133
2211
sinsinsincos
coscosconstant
 
Constant 0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.006)
 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Dum  
 
0.012 
(0.042)         
0.038 
(0.014)
***
        
0.011 
(0.036)      
0.106 
(0.030)
*** 
         
-0.040 
(0.073)            
0.017 
(0.007)
**
          
1  0.004 
(0.002)
** 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.001)
** 
2  0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.004)
** 
0.005 
(0.003)
* 
0.021 
(0.010)
** 
-0.020 
(0.009)
** 
-0.001 
(0.000)
** 
3  0.004 
(0.001)
*** 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.002)
** 
-0.000 
(0.000)
* 
1  0.004 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.000)
*** 
0.003 
(0.001)
** 
0.007 
(0.004)
** 
0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
2  0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.005)
** 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.000)
** 
3  0.017 
(0.009)
* 
0.001 
(0.000)
*** 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.004)
** 
0.026 
(0.009)
*** 
0.004 
(0.004) 
 
Variance equation: 2 1
2
1
2
  ttt   
  0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000)
** 
0.002 
(0.001)
** 
0.003 
(0.001)
** 
0.014 
(0.001)
*** 
0.001 
(0.000)
**
 
  0.155 
(0.088)
*
        
 
0.214 
(0.111)
*
        
 
0.339 
(0.194)
*
           
0.269 
(0.163)
*
          
 
0.033 
(0.017)
*
    
 
0.290 
(0.162)
*
         
 
  0.761 
(0.131)
***
        
0.769 
(0.219)
***
      
 
0.463   
(0.100)
***
 
 
0.496 
(0.219)
**
        
 
0.871    
(0.027)
***
    
 
0.559 
(0.264)
** 
         
   0.916 0.983 0.802 0.765 0.904 0.849 
Note:  Standard errors are given into brackets with 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denoting significance at 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. tY  is the food price volatility in month t.   is the GARCH term,   is the ARCH 
term.   12/2coscos tk mk    and   12/2sinsin tk mk   , .3,2,1k  
 
Essay I 
28 
 
Indeed, when we look, for example, at the patterns of price volatility for each agricultural 
season in Uganda (see Appendix A.2), there is no clear picture of whether price volatilities 
were higher during planting seasons as one would expect. The last row of the Appendix A.2 
reveals that for some commodities, the average monthly volatility was higher during planting 
seasons (the case of cassava and beans) while for others harvest periods were associated with 
greater volatility (for example matooke and maize). This lack of strong seasonality in price 
volatility has also been found by Buguk et al. (2003) and Balcombe (2009).  
1.4.2 Asymmetric and leverage effects in food price volatility 
Table 1.6 summarizes the estimated results of the EGARCH (1, 1) model for each food 
commodity. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic for a joint test for the significance of 
ARCH/GARCH effects (parameters  ,,  and  ) is also provided. The effects of high- 
(unexpected price increases) and low-price news (unexpected price decreases) on the 
conditional variance as well as the existence of the leverage effects are shown in the last three 
rows of the table.  
Table 1.6 EGARCH (1, 1) estimation results, Monthly data, 2000 – 2012 
Parameters Matooke Cassava Maize Sweet 
potatoes 
Beans Millet flour 
  
 
-8.125 
(1.191)
***
 
-2.872 
(0.895)
*** 
-2.245 
(0.951)
** 
-0.600 
(0.179)
*** 
-1.071 
(0.256)
*** 
-2.288 
(1.093)
** 
  
 
0.122 
(0.084)
 
-0.038 
(0.141)
 
0.065 
(0.152) 
0.719 
(0.173)
*** 
-0.970 
(0.202)
*** 
0.260 
(0.151)
* 
  
 
0.311 
(0.163)
* 
1.103 
(0.212)
*** 
0.696 
(0.238)
*** 
0.315 
(0.105)
** 
0.605  
(0.157)
*** 
0.600 
(0.273)
** 
  
 
-0.556 
(0.229)
** 
0.510 
(0.152)
*** 
0.615 
(0.166)
*** 
0.865 
(0.046)
*** 
0.773 
(0.058)
*** 
0.661 
(0.161)
*** 
 
LM stat 22.47
*** 
51.91
*** 
35.63
*** 
70.72
*** 
77.06
*** 
70.84
*** 
   0.433 1.065 0.761 1.034** -0.365*** 0.860** 
   0.189 1.141 0.631 -0.404** 1.378*** 0.340** 
Leverage 
effect? 
No No No Inverse Standard Inverse 
Note: Standard errors into brackets with 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
denoting significance at 1, 5, and 10%, 
respectively. The Lagrange Multiplier statistic computed under the null hypothesis that  ,  , and   
are jointly zero. 
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Interesting features are highlighted in table 1.6. First, it reveals that price volatility reacts 
symmetrically to positive and negative past shocks for half of the commodities under 
investigation, matooke, cassava, and maize, but asymmetrically to positive and negative 
shocks for sweet potatoes, beans, and millet flour. Second, the estimated value of   is 
statistically significant for all food commodities which indicates that the absolute size of past 
shocks affects current food price volatility. The effects were the largest for cassava and maize 
with respectively 1.10% and 0.70% increases of current price volatility due to past shocks. 
Third, once asymmetric effects of innovations or shocks are accounted for, only beans 
exhibited standard leverage effects, meaning that negative shocks had more impact on price 
volatility than positive shocks of the same magnitude. Indeed, an unexpected price decrease 
measured by a unit decrease in the standardized residuals 11 /  tt   decreases the price 
volatility of beans by 1.38 %, while an unexpected price increase of the same magnitude 
increases its price volatility by only 0.37%. However, for sweet potatoes and millet flour, 
increases in volatility appear to be larger when previous returns were positive than when they 
were negative of the same magnitude. Hence, past positive shocks (unanticipated price 
increases) rise price volatility of sweet potatoes and millet flour by respectively 1.03 and 
0.86% and negative past shocks (price decreases) reduce price volatility of sweet potatoes by 
0.40% and increase that of millet flour by 0.34%. This type of leverage effect has been named 
inverse leverage effects or “inventory effects” by Carpantier (2010) since they do not 
display the expected sign. The economic interpretation of such effects can be found in the 
theory of storage (Deaton and Laroque, 1992, 1996). Increases in commodity prices may act 
as a signal of the depletion of the commodity inventories and therefore positive price shocks 
may induce more volatility while negative price shocks may indicate an excess of supply over 
demand, reducing thereby current volatility. 
1.4.3 Volatility spillover effects 
Appendix A.3 reports the estimated results of the multivariate VAR model from equation 
(1.9). The optimal lag length of 2 in the VAR model was chosen using the Schwartz criterion. 
Results show that current price volatilities are positively and significantly impacted by past 
own-price shocks. Hence, higher volatility in the previous months leads to more volatility in 
the current one, suggesting persistence in price volatility (Balcombe, 2011). With regards to 
volatility spillovers across Ugandan markets, the estimated results indicate that there is no 
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clear picture about the presence of spillover effects. We note for example that cassava 
volatility is affected positively by shocks to sweet potatoes’ volatility but negatively by 
matooke volatility. Maize volatility declines following shocks to cassava and millet flour 
volatilities but increases in reaction to shocks to beans volatility. Furthermore, these volatility 
spillover effects are globally unidirectional, except for cassava and sweet potatoes.  The 
matrix of pairwise correlations across different food price volatilities (Appendix A.4) also 
gives a similar picture. Although half of the pairwise correlations are statistically significant, 
their magnitude is relatively small, below 35%. 
Finally, the results from the VAR system can also be used to understand the dynamic 
behavior of price volatility through the computation of impulse response functions (IRFs). An 
IRF gives the impact of one standard deviation (SD) shock of own- and cross-price volatility 
to food price volatility after a certain period of time (here after x  months). However, because 
the disturbances obtained from VARs may be correlated, I first orthogonalized the 
innovations through a Cholesky decomposition in order to get a causal interpretation of the 
estimated impulse response functions (Hossain and Latif, 2007). Table 1.7 reports the 
responses after one month of food price volatility to Cholesky one SD shock to own- and 
cross-volatility as well as the number of months before the effects of the shocks disappear.  
Table 1.7 Responses after one month of price volatility to Cholesky one SD shocks  
 
Commodities 
Response variable 
Matooke Cassava Maize  Sweet 
potatoes 
Beans Millet  
Flour 
 
Matooke 0.040 
 [6] 
0.002  
[3] 
0.001  
[1] 
0.002 
[4] 
-0.011 
[3] 
0.001 
[3] 
 
Cassava -0.001 
[3] 
0.034 
[5] 
-0.014 
[3] 
0.022 
[3] 
-0.025 
[4] 
-0.005 
[1] 
 
Maize -0.001 
[2] 
0.003 
[4] 
0.023 
[5] 
0.007 
[2] 
0.004 
[2] 
-0.002 
[1] 
 
Sweet 
potatoes 
0.006 
[3] 
0.008 
[5] 
0.003 
[2] 
0.036 
[4] 
0.006 
[2] 
0.001 
[4] 
 
Beans -0.001 
[3] 
-0.003 
[3] 
0.007 
[3] 
0.003 
[2] 
0.033 
[4] 
-0.001 
[1] 
 
Millet flour 0.005 
[3] 
-0.003 
[1] 
-0.007 
[3] 
0.002 
[4] 
-0.001 
[1] 
0.019 
[5] 
Note: The number of months before the effects of the shocks disappear are reported into brackets. 
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A closer look at the table suggests an asymmetric pattern in the distribution of volatility 
shocks. First, for all commodities, the effects of shocks to own-price volatility are both 
positive and relatively large, implying that food price volatility in Uganda was “self-feeding”. 
For example, a one standard deviation shock to matooke and cassava volatilities has led to 4 
and 3.4% increases of their own-price volatility after one month relative to their equilibrium 
levels.  Second, there is no clear evidence of strong market integration across Uganda. Indeed, 
the estimated results show that shocks to price volatility of different markets within the 
country only have a very marginal and insignificant impact on price volatility in the other 
markets, these effects being in all markets less than 1%. Third, in terms of the persistence of 
these effects, the table indicates that they last longer when shocks originated from own 
markets. For all markets, the effects of one SD shock from own-price volatility take on 
average at least four months to disappear against around one quarter in case of shocks to 
cross-price volatilities. 
1.4.4 Effects of macroeconomic factors on changes in food price volatility   
Table 1.8 reports the estimates and robust standard errors of the determinants of price 
volatility for 6 commodities using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. Since 
we have 6 commodities and 96 months in the first sub-period (2000m1-2007m12) and 60 in 
the second (2008m1-2012m12), a total of 576 and 360 observations, respectively, are 
available in the SUR system. The sample is divided into two sub-periods to check for 
differential impacts of the potential determinants in periods of low and high volatility. 
With regards to the first sub-period (2000m1-2007m12), table 1.8a shows that the coefficient 
of MCPI  is positive and significant for all commodities which suggests that changes in 
consumer price index in Uganda have affected the volatility of food commodity prices. A 1% 
increase in the monthly consumer price index is associated with an increase in price volatility 
ranging from 0.17% in the case of millet flour to 1.84% for maize, with an average inflation 
effect of 0.94%. In periods of high volatility (table 1.8b), the impact of inflation is also 
significant and positive for all commodities. On average, the magnitude of the changes in 
price volatility during this sub-period is of 1%, higher than that of the relatively stable period. 
These results are consistent with other empirical findings that have suggested that not only is 
the commodity price volatility generally increasing with changes in consumer price index but 
also the impact will be greater in periods of higher price instability (Cashin and McDermott, 
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2001; Engle and Rangel, 2008; Roache, 2010; Karali and Power, 2013). For example, Karali 
and Power (2013) found that a 1% increase in inflation led to 0.76% in the low-frequency 
volatility of heating oil in the US.  
Real effective exchange rate volatility MERV is not statistically significant for all commodities 
in the first sub-period while in the second its effect is only significant for maize and sweet 
potatoes. This insignificance for the majority of the commodities may result from at least two 
factors. First, Uganda is relatively self-sufficient in terms of staple foods it consumes, which 
limits the influence of changes in exchange rate insofar as financial transactions within the 
country are primarily realized in the local currency. Although some commodities are imported 
(such as rice, cassava, or beans), the significance of these imports is quiet marginal (Benson et 
al., 2008). Second, the Ugandan economy is rather imperfectly integrated to international food 
commodity markets (Conforti, 2004; Atingi-Ego et al., 2008; Boysen, 2008; Benson et al., 
2008). And since most contracts in international commodity trade are settled in USD, the role 
played by exchange rate volatility in shaping domestic food price volatility is therefore 
limited. 
As expected, fuel price volatility MFPV  has a positive impact on monthly volatilities of most 
commodities. However, between 2000m1 and 2007m12, the effect is only significant for two 
commodities – matooke and cassava – while between 2008m1 and 2012m12, the effect is 
positive and significant for all commodities. In both sub-periods, the impact of 1% increase 
was the highest for matooke (0.36 and 1.25%, respectively). All the commodities for which 
fuel price volatility has a significant effect are characterized by a lower value-to-weight ratio 
and given the long distances across different population centers and the poor transport 
infrastructure, fuel price variability is likely to transmit to market prices of these commodities 
(Dillon and Barrett, 2014).  
Real interest rate volatility MIRV  is a poor predictor of food price volatility in Uganda during 
both periods and for almost all commodities, its coefficient is insignificant.  Unlike the well-
functioning futures markets in developed or some emerging countries, this result is not 
surprising for Uganda where the majority of both internal and regional agricultural 
transactions are realized out of the banking system and where despite the emergence of 
microfinance institutions in the country, credit markets are still in their infancy. 
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Table 1.8 Determinants of changes in food price volatility in Uganda – SUR model 
 Matooke Cassava Maize 
 
Sweet 
potato 
Beans Millet 
flour 
a. Sample period: January 2000 – December 2007 
 
Intercept 0.013 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.055 
(0.016)
*** 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.048 
(0.017)
*** 
0.006 
(0.007) 
MCPI  0.681 
(0.207)
*** 
1.194 
(0.227)
*** 
1.841 
(0.294)
*** 
1.326 
(0.357)
*** 
0.984 
(0.279)
*** 
0.178 
(0.101)
* 
MERV  0.546 
(1.076) 
0.994 
(0.788) 
-0.353 
(1.383) 
0.629 
(1.598) 
-1.727 
(1.549) 
0.605 
(0.584) 
MFPV  0.356 
(0.130)
*** 
0.075 
(0.004)
*** 
0.042 
(0.317) 
0.209 
(0.222) 
0.066 
(0.631) 
0.022 
(0.106) 
MIRV  0.055 
(0.043) 
0.018 
(0.026) 
0.049 
(0.056) 
0.022 
(0.057) 
-0.062 
(0.052) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
MRFV  0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.024 
(0.009)
*** 
-0.015 
(0.028) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.029 
(0.017)
* 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Harvest1 -0.015 
(0.009)
* 
-0.011 
(0.008)
* 
0.023 
(0.013)
* 
-0.011 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Harvest2 0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
0.024 
(0.012)
** 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.000)
*** 
Planting2 -0.022 
(0.011)
* 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
-0.029 
(0.017)
* 
0.054 
(0.022)
** 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
 
b. Sample period: January 2008 – December 2012 
 
Intercept 0.055 
(0.023)
** 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
-0.050 
(0.028)
* 
-0.021 
(0.027) 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
0.022 
(0.013)
* 
MCPI  0.908 
(0.235)
*** 
0.716 
(0.153)
*** 
2.606 
(0.279)
*** 
1.028 
(0.304)
*** 
0.483 
(0.282)
* 
0.326 
(0.121)
*** 
MERV  -1.415 
(1.252) 
0.339 
(0.739) 
1.168 
(0.541)
*** 
1.439 
(0.294)
*** 
0.213 
(1.134) 
1.471 
(1.001) 
MFPV  1.249 
(0.362)
** 
0.717 
(0.309)
*** 
0.414 
(0.244)
** 
0.241 
(0.104)
** 
0.223 
(0.124)
** 
0.241 
(0.115)
** 
MIRV  0.071 
(0.106) 
0.109 
(0.051)
** 
0.069 
(0.108) 
0.194 
(0.097)
** 
0.080 
(0.096) 
0.062 
(0.060) 
MRFV  0.049 
(0.019)
** 
0.016 
(0.001)
*** 
0.022 
(0.010)
** 
0.033 
(0.012)
*** 
-0.015 
(0.002)
*** 
0.027 
(0.008)
*** 
Harvest1 0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.052 
(0.016)
*** 
0.032 
(0.011)
** 
0.043 
(0.012)
*** 
0.008 
(0.021) 
-0.014 
(0.014) 
Harvest2 -0.013 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
0.071 
(0.019)
*** 
0.001 
(0.000)
* 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
Planting2 0.021 
(0.009)
*** 
0.004 
(0.002)
** 
0.024 
(0.003)
** 
0.023 
(0.005)
** 
0.043 
(0.020)
** 
0.011 
(0.002)
** 
Note: Robust standard errors into brackets. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denoting significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively 
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Rainfall variability MRFV  is found to be an important determinant of food price volatility, 
particularly during the second sub-period. This result is recurrent in most studies of price 
volatility of agricultural commodities in developing countries insofar as the majority of the 
plots cultivated by farmers are essentially rain-fed (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010; von Braun and 
Tadesse, 2012; Mirzabaev and Tsegai, 2012). Hence, weather shocks will affect market 
expectations about end-of-season yield and price levels, fuelling in turn food price volatility. 
The hypothesis of seasonality in food price volatility can be verified through the coefficients 
of Harvest1, Harvest2, and Planting2. In sub-period 1, it appears that volatility was higher for 
sweet potatoes in the second harvest period compared to the baseline season, whereas it was 
lower for millet flour in the first harvest period. During the second sub-period, higher price 
volatilities were associated with the second planting season for all the selected commodities 
while during the harvest seasons no clear picture emerges from the results. For some 
commodities (i.e. maize), more volatility occurs during the second harvest period compared to 
the first planting and harvest seasons, while for the others (i.e. sweet potatoes), the first 
harvest season appears more volatility than the second one or the first planting season. 
Similarly to results from GARCH models, price volatility did not seem to follow a seasonal 
path for the majority of the commodities. Consequently, the seasonality hypothesis of price 
volatility can only be partially accepted in Uganda, at least for the 6 commodities analyzed in 
this first essay. Several empirical studies, essentially in agricultural futures markets, have also 
produced mixed results with regards to the seasonal effect on price volatility (Milonas, 1986; 
Galloway and Kolb, 1996; Koekebakker and Lien, 2003; Karali and Power, 2013). 
We finally check whether the effects of macroeconomic variables vary across different 
commodities by running restriction tests. The results from the F –tests reported in table 1.9 
indicate that, at the 10% significance level, we reject in both sub-periods the hypothesis that 
each macroeconomic variable has an identical impact on price volatility of the six 
commodities analyzed. This suggests that, although most macroeconomic variables included 
in the SUR model present the expected sign, the magnitude of their effects on food price 
volatility in Uganda has been commodity-specific. 
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Table 1.9 F – tests on restrictions across food commodities 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
F - stats p - value 
MCPI  58.46  (92.97) .0000 (.0000) 
MERV  11.74 (74.65) .0051 (.0000) 
MFPV  30.43 (42.86) .0012 (.0001) 
MIRV  2.547 (4.95) .0941 (.0018) 
MRFV     4.741 (15.33) .0052 (.0001) 
Note: The first values concern the sub-period 2000m1-2007m12 while those into parentheses are 
related to the second sub-period.  
 
1.5 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the time series behavior of food 
commodity prices in Uganda using monthly price data for six staple foods, namely matooke, 
cassava, maize, sweet potatoes, beans, and millet flour. Results from unconditional price 
volatility analysis revealed that all commodities but beans experienced significant rise in their 
price volatility. Hence, when we compare two sub-periods (2000-2007 and 2008-2012) in 
terms of changes in price instability, cassava had the highest increase in mean price volatility 
(92.9%), followed by millet flour (60%), and sweet potatoes (58.8%). The GARCH (1, 1) 
estimation results also indicated that the mean conditional volatility has increased for half of 
the commodities analyzed, namely cassava, sweet potatoes, and millet flour. The Exponential 
GARCH (EGARCH) model, used to capture possible asymmetric and leverage effects in 
price volatilities, found evidence of standard leverage effects only with respect to beans. This 
suggests that negative shocks would amplify price volatility of that commodity more 
significantly than positive shocks of the same magnitude. Conversely, inventory or inverse 
leverage effects were found in the case of sweet potatoes and millet flour since positive 
shocks to their price volatilities had more impact than negative shocks.  
Results also showed the presence of strong persistence in price volatilities of all commodities 
but a relatively complex spectrum regarding the nature of spillover effects across food 
markets.  Spillover effects were found to be not only moderate compared to inertia effects but 
also essentially unidirectional. For instance, shocks to cassava, beans, and millet flour prices 
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spilled unidirectionally over maize prices whereas price shocks to matooke and sweet potatoes 
affected cassava prices.  
These results clearly have important policy implications, particularly in terms of price 
stabilization mechanisms. For instance, they suggest that policymakers should be aware that 
policies targeting a specific commodity market in the country might also have important 
repercussions on other markets, thereby either exacerbating or mitigating the levels of their 
prices and volatilities. Although net sellers might benefit from these high prices through 
increases of their income, the majority of Ugandan households are either net buyers or purely 
consumers of marketed foods and consequently will be negatively affected if the 
implementation of price control mechanisms end up accentuating volatilities. It is therefore 
crucial to develop and implement measures likely to increase productivity, sustainability and 
resilience, particularly in the agricultural sector (i.e. improving access of farmers to credits, 
increasing formal job market opportunities, or promoting risk management practices), and to 
initiate new transfer programs or improve existing ones so that parts of the gains realized by 
net sellers from high prices could be distributed to more vulnerable households. 
Finally, the study estimated the impacts of macroeconomic factors on observed price 
volatility in Uganda: monthly volatilities of rainfall, overall inflation, real effective exchange 
rate, real interest rate, fuel price as well as seasonality effects have been used as potential 
drivers. Estimating a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model for periods of low and 
high price volatilities, I found that, globally, variables that explained the largest part of 
observed price volatility included Uganda inflation, rainfall, and fuel price volatilities. The 
effects of these factors were more pronounced during the second sub-period. The significant 
and globally positive impact of these variables implies that, beyond actions targeting 
specifically the agricultural sector such as increased investments in agricultural research and 
development and downstream services (storage or processing facilities), additional measures 
would be required to stabilize prices and, ideally, reduce their volatility. Thus, actions such as 
investments in education, roads, electrification and irrigation projects may play a role in price 
stabilization in Uganda. 
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Welfare effects of food price changes in Uganda under non-
separability 
How relevant is the net market position?
15
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
To what extent do large food price changes affect household welfare? Who gains and who loses 
from these price changes? How are these welfare effects distributed across different households? 
And specifically, what happens when market failures are accounted for? These questions and many 
others have been at the core of recent debates among development economists, government 
authorities, NGOs, and the media who fear about the risk of poverty traps, increased vulnerability 
and food insecurity of the least endowed households on the one hand, and on the other the risk of 
political turmoil, economic fragility, and social tensions that high food prices might induce 
(Bellemare, 2015). This concern is particularly germane in developing countries where food 
consumption accounts for the largest share of households’ total expenditures and where the poor 
often spend disproportionally a large part of their income on food (Mghenyi et al., 2011; Dybczak, 
et al., 2010; Akson and Hoekman, 2010).  
Although Uganda is relatively insulated from international markets due to its landlocked position, 
the Ugandan price index of food commodities has been steeply rising since March 2008, in sharp 
contrast with the period before. Indeed, food prices have been relatively stable between 2000 and 
early 2008, rising annually at 5% (UBoS, 2010). From that period onwards, they have continued to 
rise due to internal dynamics (rainfall variability, fuel price inflation, exchange rate volatility,…), 
international food price crisis, and increased demand from neighbor countries (Kenya, DR Congo, 
and Burundi, among others).  Even though high food inflation ceased off between September 2009 
and July 2010, prices remained at higher levels and Uganda experienced again high food prices 
since September 2010, with prices of some commodities like sugar, fish, and milk rising by over 
200 percent.  
                                                          
15
 This second essay was written in co-authorship with Gabriella Berloffa. 
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Several studies have examined the impact of rising food prices in Uganda (Dorosh et al., 2003; 
Conforti, 2004; Bussolo et al., 2007; Benson et al., 2008; Boysen, 2009; Ulimwengu and Ramadan, 
2009; Kaspersen and Føyn, 2010; Silmer, 2010), focusing either on the extent of price transmission 
between international and domestic prices or on the impacts of soaring global prices on poverty. 
However, all these studies suffer from two main drawbacks. First, farmers’ behavior is modeled 
assuming that production and consumption decisions are two separable problems, leading to a 
recursive model (Singh et al., 1986). Notwithstanding its attractiveness, there has been little 
empirical evidence supporting the recursivity hypothesis, due particularly to imperfections 
characterizing rural markets in developing countries
16
 (Lopez, 1984; Benjamin, 1992; Jacoby, 
1993; Skoufias, 1994; Arcand and d’Hombres, 2006). In this study, we explicitly test the 
separability hypothesis under labor market imperfections. This allows us to identify the role played 
by virtual or shadow wages in estimating the welfare effects of price changes (Sonoda and 
Maruyama, 1999). Second, in previous studies, the estimation of direct and substitution welfare 
effects is done through different simulations applied to data collected before the actual food price 
shocks occur, and therefore they only identify households potentially vulnerable to rising food 
prices rather than those with actual welfare losses (Headey and Fan, 2008). Instead, we use three 
waves among the latest Uganda National Panel Surveys (UNPS) spanning over the years 2005-
2011 to estimate the actual welfare effects of increased food prices.  
To analyze the welfare changes of Ugandan households consecutive to food price instabilities, this 
study applied a sequential procedure consisting in three steps. First, virtual and shadow wages of 
self-employed agricultural households are derived by estimating a stochastic production frontier 
function following the Battese and Coelli’s (1995) Maximum Likelihood-random effects time-
varying inefficiency effects model and the Sherlund et al.’s (2002) and Barrett al.’s (2008) 
approaches. After testing for the separability hypothesis, we then estimate expenditure and price 
demand elasticities from a food demand system using the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System 
(QUAIDS) model proposed by Banks et al. (1997) and estimated through a Non-linear Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (NSUR) model in presence of censoring and endogeneity. To take account of 
year-specific effects, the heterogeneity of Ugandan households in terms of their food net market 
position and the impact of labor market frictions, these demand elasticities were estimated for each 
year and sub-group of households (non-agricultural households, significant net sellers and net 
                                                          
16
 These imperfections include: farmers’ preferences towards working on- or off-farm (Huffman, 1980; Lopez, 1986); 
imperfect substitutability between market-purchased and home-produced food (Imai et al., 2011); missing labor 
and/or food markets (Singh et al, 1986; de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991, Taylor and Alderman, 2003); 
presence of fixed and/or variable transaction costs that create a wedge between consumer and producer prices (Key 
et al., 2000; Henning and Henningsen, 2007) 
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buyers, and insignificant net sellers and net buyers) for both separable and non-separable models. 
The final step consists in computing money-metric welfare measures of food price changes with 
and without the possibility of substitution across commodities.  
The remainder of this second essay is organized as follows. In section 2, an agricultural household 
model is presented and its theoretical predictions are analyzed. Particularly, our conceptual 
framework seeks to identify potential deviations from the standard household model when labor 
market imperfections are accounted for and household’s net positions in both food and labor 
markets are incorporated into the analysis. In section 3, we present and discuss the estimation 
strategy adopted for the computation of welfare effects of price changes. Data descriptions and the 
construction of some key variables for our econometric estimations (consumer food prices, 
commodity grouping, and net food market position) are presented in section 4.  Section 5 presents 
and discusses the empirical findings before the conclusion in section 6.  
2.2 Theoretical model 
 
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model of the price effects on farmers’ welfare with 
perfect and imperfect labor markets given that labor is, by far, the most important variable input in 
the production process of Ugandan farmers and the internal labor market, particularly in rural areas, 
is very thin and generally relies on the family force
17
. Consider a farmer that produces a cash crop 
cQ  devoted solely to the market and sold at price cp and a staple food aQ consumed and/or sold at 
market price ap , using family labor
o
fL , hired labor hL , other variable inputs V and quasi-fixed 
inputs (land and/or capital) A. He maximizes his utility by consuming three types of goods: a non-
food good (cn) purchased at market price np ; food consumption (cf), either market-purchased (
m
fc ) 
at price ap or produced on the farm (
a
fc ), and leisure Lc . By simplicity, 
a
fc  and 
m
fc  are assumed to 
be perfect substitutes so that af
m
f
a
f
m
ff ccccc ),( . The farmer receives his income from farming 
activities, off-farm employment ffL , and non-labor incomes (E). His problem can be formalized as 
follows: 
   Lnfu
C
cccCzCUUMax ,,,;   
subject to 
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 These imperfections can result from heterogeneity betwen family and hired labor (Benjamin 1992; Deolalikar and 
Vijverberg 1983, 1987; Thapa, 2003), the presence of transaction costs (Key et al., 2000), or  limited access to 
employment opportunities (Archand and d’Hombres, 2006; Le, 2012) 
(2.1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
(4) 
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     VLLXQQQzAXQG hofcaq ,,;,,0;,,   
0 L
o
f
f
f cLLT  
    ELfQpQpLgVpcpcp ffccaahvnnfa   
In equation (2.1), (.)U  is an instantaneous farmer’s utility function, assumed monotonically 
increasing and strictly quasi-concave; uz is a vector of exogenous shifters in utility. Equation (2.2) 
gives the technology constraint and relates the farm productions  ca QQ ,  to inputs  AVLL hof ,,,  
through a multi-output, multi-input transformation function (.)G , assumed concave and continuous 
in inputs (Lau, 1976), with qz , a vector of production shifters. The farmer is also constrained by the 
time endowment (equation 2.3), where the total time available (T) is allocated to on-farm labor, off-
farm labor and leisure.  The farmer finally faces a budget constraint (equation 2.4) specified in a 
way that accounts for labor market imperfections. Following Henning and Henningsen (2007) and 
Glauben et al. (2012), off-farm revenues and hired labor costs are specified as functions )(
f
fLf  and 
)( hLg , respectively. In case of a perfect labor market, both )(
f
fLf  and )( hLg  are linear functions 
f
f
f
f wLLf )(  and hh wLLg )( , respectively. Thus, the marginal revenue of off-farm employment 
and the marginal cost of hired labor are constant and given by the exogenous market wage rate w. 
Imperfections in the labor market can be captured by modeling )(
f
fLf  and )( hLg  as non-linear 
functions. In particular, off-farm revenues are an increasing and strictly concave function of 
f
fL : 
0;0
2
2
)(
)()(





f
f
f
f
f
f
f
f
L
Lf
L
Lf
, 
while the costs of hired labor are an increasing and convex function of Lh: 
 
   
 
0;0
2
2





h
h
h
h
L
Lg
L
Lg
 
The farmer will choose the levels of consumption goods, on- and off-farm family labor, hired labor, 
and variable inputs to maximize his utility in (2.1), under the resources and time constraints (2.2) to 
(2.4). 
 Let  ,   and   be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget, technology and time 
constraints, respectively. The FOCs for this problem are: 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
41 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   

















































ELfQpQpVpLgcpcp
cLLT
zAXQG
p
QQQip
ccCip
f
fccaavhnnfa
L
f
f
o
f
q
L
f
L
G
L
g
L
G
vV
G
caiQ
G
c
U
nfic
U
f
f
o
f
nh
i
L
i
0
0;,,
0
0
0
0
,0
0
,0
.
.
..
.
.
.
.







                                                                       
From the FOCs, we have that:
     
f
f
o
fL L
f
L
G
c
U







 ...
   
The shadow wage (i.e. the opportunity cost of time) is therefore given by  
f
f
L
f
w



.*

 . In case of a 
perfect labor market, the shadow wage is equal to the exogenous market wage w , leading to a 
separable model, in which the farmer’s labor allocation decisions are not affected by consumption 
preferences, and no tradeoff exists between farm work and leisure (Taylor and Alderman, 2002). If 
instead, the labor market is imperfect, then ww  
* . The shadow wage *w now depends on 
farmer’s preferences through the marginal utilities of wealth ( ) and time ( ). The value of these 
multipliers will depend on the vector of all exogenous market prices of consumption and production 
goods   vnca pppp ,,,p , non-labor incomes, time endowment, consumption and production 
shifters: 
 qu zzTEww ,;,,** p   
The solution to the farmer’s maximization problem leads to a system of output supply 
),;,( * quii zzwQQ p and input demands ),;,(
*
quii zzwXX p , off-farm labor supply )(
*wLL
f
f
f
f
 , 
and a consumption system ),;,,( * quii zzYwCC p , where   EcTwY L 
** , and 
 ofhvccaa LLwVpQpQp  ** . 
 
(2.7) 
 
(2.8) 
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Hence, a change in market prices will lead to a change in the consumption vectors, output supply, 
input demands, as well as in the shadow wage. Following the standard non-separable household 
model (NSM) literature (Singh et al., 1986; Strauss, 1986; de Janvry et al., 1991), this change can 
be decomposed into two components. Concretely, for a farmer producing a quantity aQ  and 
consuming fc of the staple food, the impact of a change in ap  on consumption is given by: 
a
f
wa
f
wa
f
a
f
p
w
w
c
p
c
p
c
p
c











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



*
*
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*
*, **
 
which, expressed in terms of elasticities, becomes: 
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where  jiE /  represents the elasticity of i with respect to j, and Hfc  the Hicksian demand of the 
staple food. The first term in the right-hand side of equation (2.10) represents the direct effect of 
changes in the exogenous market price on the farmer’s consumption, keeping constant the shadow 
wage. This coincides with the effects of price changes that we would have derived in a separable 
household model (SM). Indeed, in a separable model, since the virtual effect in (2.10) is equal to 
zero, an increase of the food price ap induces a clear negative consumption effect if the household is 
a net buyer ( 0 fa cQ ) given that both the income and substitution effects are negative. For net 
sellers, the sign is a priori ambiguous: the effect will be positive if and only if the total income 
effect outweighs the negative substitution effect.  
In the case of non-separability however, we need to consider also the virtual effect, which captures 
the adjustments of consumption to the changes in the shadow wage (  *wcE f ) and due to changes 
in market prices (  apwE * ) (Strauss, 1986; Sonoda and Maruyama, 1999). Since theoretically the 
Hicksian elasticity   0* wcE Hf , the virtual effect will have the sign of the elasticity  apwE *  if 
farmers are net sellers of labor (i.e. if family off-farm labor is larger than hired labor, which means 
that changes in virtual family earnings exceed changes in virtual farm labor costs). In particular, if 
the increase in ap  increases the shadow wage, and farmers are net buyers of food and net sellers of 
labor, the elasticity of food consumption to its price will be less negative under non-separability, or 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
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even change its sign from negative to positive. In other words, under non-separability, food 
consumption will decrease less or even increase as the price of food increases. If instead, the 
increase in ap  reduces the shadow wage, farmers who are net buyers of food and net sellers of 
labor, will have a larger elasticity (in absolute terms) under non-separability (i.e. food consumption 
will fall more after an increase in its price). 
The reasoning is similar for the other cases, which are summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 2.1 Theoretical effects of an increase in food prices on food consumption, by net positions in food and labor 
markets 
 Labor net sellers: 0 hf LL  Labor net buyers: 0 hf LL  
   0* apwE    0* apwE    0* apwE    0* apwE  
 
Food net buyers: 
0 fa cQ  
 (-) direct effect 
 (+) virtual effect 
 Total effect in 
NSM: less negative 
or positive 
 
 (-) direct effect 
 (-) virtual effect 
 Total effect in  
NSM: more negative 
 (-) direct effect 
 (-)/(+) virtual effect 
 Total effect in  
NSM: Indeterminate 
 
 (-) direct effect 
 (-)/(+) virtual effect 
 Total effect in 
NSM: Indeterminate 
 
 
Food net sellers: 
0 fa cQ  
 (-)/(+) direct effect 
 (+) virtual effect 
 Total effect in 
NSM: less negative 
or more positive 
 (-)/(+) direct effect 
 Negative virtual effect 
 Total effect in NSM: 
more negative or less 
positive 
 (-)/(+) direct effect 
 (-)/(+) virtual effect 
 Total effect in NSM: 
Indeterminate 
 
 (-)/(+) direct effect 
 (-)/(+) virtual effect 
 Total effect in NSM: 
Indeterminate 
 
Note: (-) and (+) denote negative and positive effects, respectively. NSM: Non-separable household model 
 
Uncovering the sign of the shadow wage elasticity  
It is therefore important to derive the expression and sign of shadow wage elasticity  apwE *  upon 
which largely hinge the sign and magnitude of  af pcE / . By using the expression of the time 
constraint (equation 2.3) at the optimum (   0),;,,(),;,( ***  quLffquof zzYwcwLzzwLT pp ), and 
applying the implicit function theorem to it (de Janvry et al., 1991; Henning and Henningsen, 
2007), we get: 
a
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dw
***
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

      (2.11) 
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The numerator in (2.11) represents the direct disequilibrium on the ‘household’ labor market 
created by a change in ap , whereas the denominator captures the indirect disequilibrium created by 
the change in the shadow wage caused by a change in ap . In order to get the intuition of how this 
works, consider the case in which there is no possibility to work off-farm. When ap  increases, the 
consumption of food decreases and the marginal value of income increases. Therefore a household 
would like to increase its income, by increasing farm production. This increases on-farm labor 
demand 







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
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
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
0
*w
a
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, but household labor supply may not increase sufficiently
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. In order to restore the equilibrium on the labor market we 
would need an increase in the shadow wage if the labor supply is upward sloping   

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or if it is downward sloping 
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. 
If instead, the labor supply is downward sloping, but flatter than the labor demand, in order to 
restore the equilibrium we would need a reduction in the shadow wage.  
On the contrary, if the direct effect of the increase in ap is an excess of labor supply, the 
equilibrium will be restored by a decrease in the shadow wage if the labor supply curve is upward 
sloping or if it is downward sloping but steeper than the labor demand, and by an increase in the 
shadow wage if the labor supply is downward sloping, but flatter than the labor demand. 
In general, however, under non-separability, it is quite difficult to predict the effect of an increase in 
ap  on both the shadow wage and food consumption. If the direct effect in equation (2.10) dictates 
the total effects, then increases in food prices will lead to a reduction of food consumption for net 
buyers but the effect will remain ambiguous for net sellers. If instead, the degree of labor market 
imperfections is relatively high such that the indirect component of equation (2.10) is predominant, 
then the price effect on consumption is theoretically unclear and can potentially lead to abnormal 
behaviors (de Janvry et al., 1991). As a direct consequence of this ambiguity, we are theoretically 
unable to determine both the sign and magnitude of the welfare effects of price changes. However, 
we can derive a money-metric measure for the welfare effect (the compensating variation, hctCV ), 
as a function of the elasticity of the shadow wage to food prices.  
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Let ),( upe  be the expenditure function associated with the household utility maximization problem, 
i.e. Lnannfa hppwhphpupe ,...),(),(
*  where hi is the Hicksian demand for good i. The CV  is 
generally defined as: ),(),( 0111 upeupeCV  , i.e. it measures the net revenues of the planner who 
must compensate the households. Since in our case income is not exogenous, we have: 
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where in (2.13) we used the identities:  
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Expressed in terms of elasticities, (2.13) becomes: 
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where  yxE |  denotes the total elasticity of x with respect to y. 
Note that, when there is no shadow wage effect, (2.14) reduces to the CV  capturing only the 
immediate effect of price changes, as described for example in Vu and Glewwe (2011). The 
expressions for the short run effect can be derived by taking second order Taylor series expansion 
of the expenditure function (Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002; Porto, 2010; Vu and Glewwe, 2011). 
Ignoring the terms involving the product of two elasticities and two changes in prices (or the second 
order effect of the change in prices on the shadow wage), we have: 
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where  *| wCE Hi  represents the Hicksian compensated elasticity of x with respect to y. 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
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Whether in non-separable models the compensating variation CV is larger or smaller than in 
separable models, it depends on both the household positions in the food and labor markets (net 
buyers or net sellers), and the sign of the elasticity of the shadow wage with respect to food prices.  
2.3 Estimation strategy 
 
In this section we present our empirical strategy to estimate econometrically both the separable and 
non-separable models to assess if and to what extent labor market imperfections influence the sign 
and magnitude of household welfare effects of price changes. Given the above theoretical 
framework, the unobservability and endogeneity of the shadow wage *w , the estimation strategy 
proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate the shadow price of labor and test for the recursivity 
hypothesis.  Second, given the shadow wage thus obtained, we estimate a Quadratic Almost Ideal 
Demand System (QUAIDS), and finally compute money-metric welfare measures of price changes 
under both separability and non-separability. 
2.3.1 Estimation of the shadow wage and test of the recursivity hypothesis 
One of the common features of the agricultural sector in most developing countries is the 
predominance of small-scaled farmers that often rely on their family members during planting and 
harvest seasons. These members are generally unpaid although they benefit from the production 
outcomes through consumption or distribution of part of the farm profits. Under the hypothesis of 
perfect labor markets and perfect substitutability between family and hired labor (Deolalikar and 
Vijverberg, 1987), one can impute the wages for on-farm family labor using the observed market 
wages for labor of similar requirements. However, farmers may attach subjective values to their on-
farm labor that deviate from the market wages or the labor market may simply be missing or 
incomplete due to different sources of market frictions
18
 (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1991). In this 
case, the separability hypothesis will break down and one will need to estimate these subjective or 
shadow prices of on-farm labor. To derive the shadow wages, we build upon Jacoby’s (1993) 
structural labor supply estimation approach, extended by Sherlund et al. (2002) and Barrett et al. 
(2008) who relax the assumption of  allocative efficiency made by Jacoby– equality between the 
marginal revenue product of labor and market wage. 
                                                          
18
 In many rural areas of developing countries, farmers are generally insulated from local markets due to high 
transportation costs, are often constrained by liquidity and have very limited access to both formal and informal 
credits. In this context, hiring labor might represent a significant part of input expenditures that most farmers cannot 
afford, thereby deciding to employ exclusively family labor in the production process. 
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The Sherlund et al.’s and Barrett et al.’s approach is a sequential estimation strategy that can be 
summarized as follows. In the first step, we estimate a stochastic frontier production function on the 
whole sample of agricultural households following the Battese and Coelli’s (1995) approach to 
derive the marginal product revenue of labor  LMRP , using average real market prices of 
commodities produced. Formally, let htY denote the total production (in values)
19
 by a farmer h in 
year t; htX be a vector of productive inputs used by farmer h at time t (such as on-farm family labor 
o
fL , hired labor hL , land size and other variable inputs (fertilizer, seeds, or pesticides); htZ be the 
vector of household characteristics (such as household size, education and sex of the household’s 
head, region- and year-specific dummies) and ht be the vector of environmental factors (like labor 
quality, types of land slope or irrigation). The stochastic production frontier function in the context 
of panel data is written as follows: 
 
  hththththt VUXFY  ,   
 
where  hthtXF ,  is the production frontier; htU is the technical efficiency parameter of production 
assumed to be function of a set of observable characteristics htZ (i.e. ,0'  hththt ZU  with the 
random variable ht  distributed  2,0 N  and truncated from below at the truncation point 'htZ  
(Barrett et al., 2008). htV  is the error term assumed independently and identically distributed 
 2,0 vN  . For the empirical analysis, we opt for a flexible translog specification as an approximation 
to the unknown true production frontier  hthtXF ,  (Sherlund et al., 2002): 
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where 0 , i , ij  and  are unknown parameters to be estimated. 
The Battese and Coelli’s panel data estimator is a method of maximum likelihood that 
simultaneously estimates the parameters of the stochastic production frontier and the technical 
inefficiency effects. Both the market prices and the estimated parameters from the stochastic 
frontier are used to derive the estimated marginal product revenue of labor LPRM
ˆ .  
The second step consists in estimating the allocative inefficiency scores for the subsample of 
farmers that supply off-farm labor f
fL and report a wage w . Using the estimated LPRM
ˆ  and observed 
                                                          
19
 Using values of production instead of physical quantities aims at reflecting the multi-crop nature of most farmers in 
Uganda and enables the aggregation of different crop productions into a single monetary unit. 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
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market wages w , the allocative inefficiency AI is defined as  LPRMwAI ˆ/ln  which is equal to 0 in 
case of technical efficiency LPRMw
ˆ or equivalently 0htU .  
To obtain the estimated shadow wages, we first predict deviations between LPRM
ˆ  and market wages 
w by regressing the allocative inefficiency on a set of household characteristics excluded in the 
estimation of the stochastic production frontier equation. These variables include the age (and its 
squared value), sex, and the level of education of the head, his marital status, the estimated values 
of livestock owned by the household, regional indicators (dummy variables for each region), and 
land endowment (land holdings per household member). Second, given the estimated LPRM
ˆ  from 
the first step and the imputed allocative inefficiency scores IA ˆ  from the second step, the imputed 
shadow wage *wˆ  for households that did not supply labor to the market is computed as follows: 
  LPRMIAw ˆˆexpˆ *   
Finally, having estimated the shadow wages, a simple separability test can be carried out by 
checking whether the shadow wage distribution for self-employed agricultural households is 
significantly identical to the distribution of observed market wages for off- farm workers. The 
rejection of the null hypothesis of equal distributions between these two sub-groups of agricultural 
households will thus suggest that the recursivity assumption is not supported by the data in hand.  
2.3.2 Food demand system 
On the consumption side, the preferences of the household (equation 2.1) are  estimated through a 
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) model proposed by Banks et al. (1997) which 
is a flexible functional form that incorporates nonlinear effects and interactions between prices and 
expenditures in the demand relationships. In terms of budget shares, the QUAIDS model has the 
following form (Banks et al., 1997):  
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where x is the total value of food consumption, xcps iii /  are consumption shares for each good i; 
jp  are consumer prices of commodity j and P is a price index; i , ij , i , i  are unknown 
parameters ; and :  
 
  
n
i
i
n
i
n
i
n
j
jiijii
ipbpppa
11 1 1
0 )(,lnln
2
1
ln)(ln
 PP  
(2.18) 
(2.19) 
(2.20) 
 
(22) 
 
(23) 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
49 
 
Theoretical restrictions of adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry are imposed to the model in terms 
of its parameters. Adding-up restriction requires  
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However, the presence of zero values in the consumption of certain commodities and the 
endogeneity of household total expenditures and shadow wage need to be accounted for to avoid 
spurious estimations of equation (2.19).  
Zero expenditures on certain food items may come from various sources: shortness of the recall 
period, non-preference, non-affordability, purchase infrequency, non-availability, self-consumption 
(Boysen, 2012). Since an important proportion of households reported zero consumption in 
Ugandan surveys, the dependent variable in equation (2.19) becomes censored and estimating the 
QUAIDS model without controlling for the expenditure censoring will lead to biased estimates. To 
deal with censored data in the QUAIDS model, we follow the two-step procedure proposed by 
Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). In the first step, households decide whether to consume a good i or not 
through the estimation of a standard probit model iiii zd  
 , where id  is unobserved 
counterpart of a binary outcome id  that takes 1 if the household did consume the good i and 0 
otherwise; z is a vector of household demographics and regional dummies for the model 
identification; i  is the error term. Conditional on the decision to consume the good i¸ consistent 
parameters of the QUAIDS are estimated in the following way (Barslund, 2011; Boysen, 2012):  
iiiiiiiii zxfzs   )ˆ(),()ˆ(
*  
where )ˆ( ii z are estimates from the first step;  and  are the standard normal and cumulative 
density functions, respectively. i  is the error term. 
 
Expenditure endogeneity appears whenever the household expenditure allocation process across 
products is significantly affected by unobserved factors not captured by explanatory variables 
included in the estimation of is  (Bopape, 2006). To test for expenditure endogeneity, we use 
household income and its square as IVs for total household food expenditure and proceed in two 
steps. In the first stage, we regress household expenditures on consumer prices, household 
demographics, and total income (and its squares). In the second stage, the residuals from step 1 ( ˆ ) 
are then augmented to the each budget share equation. The null hypothesis of expenditure 
exogeneity is then tested by checking whether the coefficient of ˆ  is statistically significant. Given 
potential correlation between the error terms of different budget shares, we also run the endogeneity 
(2.21) 
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test using a restricted SUR model (Bopape, 2006) and determine whether the coefficients of ˆ  are 
jointly significant across all budget share equations. The estimation of the QUAIDS is done by 
applying a modified version of the Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression (NSUR) proposed 
by Poi (2008) to include censoring due to zero expenditures and endogeneity of expenditure and 
shadow wage. 
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, we describe the Uganda National Panel Surveys (UNPS), the procedure for 
constructing the variables used for our empirical analysis, and present their descriptive statistics.  
2.4.1 Samples  
We use three waves of the Uganda National Panel Surveys (UNPS) collected by the Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics (UBoS) in 2005/2006 (hereafter UNPS-2006), 2009/2010 (UNPS-2010), and 
2010/2011 (UNPS-2011), covering periods of both low and high prices. All the surveys were based 
on a two-stage stratified random sampling design and therefore allow for comparisons across 
surveys and aggregation over time. In the first stage, Enumeration  Areas
20
  (EAs)  were  selected  
from  the  4  geographical  regions of the country and grouped by districts and rural-urban locations 
(UBoS, 2010). In the second stage, around ten households in each EA were selected by simple 
random sampling. Each household was then visited twice in order to capture seasonalities in the 
agricultural production module
21
. Among the 3,123 targeted households in UNPS-2006, the UBoS 
was able to track 2,607 households in 2009/10, among which only 2,566 had complete information 
(Ssewanyana and Kasirye, 2012), which represents an attrition rate of 17,8%.  And among the 2,566 
households tracked in the UNPS-2010, 2,390 were re-interviewed in the UNPS-2011 with only 
2,310 households having complete information in all the three waves. Because our interest is in 
understanding the welfare consequences of large food price changes in Uganda during the 2005-
2011 period, we only keep households with complete information tracked in all the three surveys, 
giving us a balanced sample of 2,310 observations over three periods
22
. The panel surveys provide 
                                                          
20
 An enumeration area represents “the smallest ground area, mapped with definite boundaries within which a study 
or interview is carried out” (UBoS, 2012: 32).  
21
 In the UNPS-2006, households were first visited between May and October 2005 and then between November 2005 
and April 2006. In the UNPS-2010, first visits occurred between September 2009 and January 2010 while the second 
were conducted between February 2010 and August 2010. For the last wave, first visits were conducted between 
October 2010 and March 2011, while the second were between April and September 2011. 
22
 Given the relatively high attrition rate (26% from 2005 to 2011), we first checked whether attritors and non-attritors 
were statistically different in terms of household characteristics and consumption patterns. In Appendix B.1 we report 
the procedure used to test for attrition bias in the data and compute inverse probability weights (IPW) to correct for it. 
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detailed information on household demographics, production (labor
23
 and non-labor inputs, outputs 
harvested and sold), consumption (food and non-food commodities), land holdings and livestock 
ownership, among others. For each commodity, they list the measurement unit as well as the 
quantities and values for different types of consumption (household consumption from purchases, 
consumption away from home, consumption from home production, and consumption of goods 
received in-kind). Different recall periods were used depending on the nature of the expenditure 
item: from a seven-day recall period for food consumption to one year for durable, semi-durable 
and non-consumption expenditures (taxes and duties, pension, social security contribution, 
remittances, gifts, contribution to funerals...).  
2.4.2 Consumer prices, commodity grouping, and consumption shares  
Information on consumer prices is given in terms of unit values, obtained by dividing values by 
quantities. Seen as the highest acceptable price or “subjective price” (Pons, 2011), these unit values 
might contain measurement errors and reflect both quality and price differences (Deaton, 1988, 
1997) and therefore require a correction before being used as a proxy of prices. To that end, we 
followed the approach proposed by Deaton (1988) whose basic idea is that, insofar as households 
within the same village (cluster) are usually surveyed within a period of relatively few days, they 
should normally face the same prices (Boysen, 2012). We first constructed clusters as a 
combination of EAs and districts, and got 321, 337, and 356 clusters for each panel, respectively. 
For each commodity in a specific cluster, we generated mean unit values that are then regressed 
through OLS over household characteristics (households’ physical assets, household composition, 
education, gender, age of the head...), cluster and other regional dummies. The predicted values for 
the estimation are then used as imputed consumer prices
24,25
.  
Furthermore, given the large number of goods consumed by households
26
, the estimation of 
consumption share equations would become cumbersome without prior adjustments. In practice, the 
solution consists in grouping commodities in order to reduce the number of goods to a relatively 
                                                          
23
 In the surveys, the agricultural modules measure the time spent working on-farm in person-days which reflect both 
the size of team and the number of days spent. For each plot, the surveys report the number of household members 
involved and the total person-days. For hired labor, only the total number of person-days per plot is reported for 
male, female, and children (except in the 2005/6 survey). Hence, to convert these person-days into hours of on-farm (
o
fL ) and hired ( hL ) labor, we assume that for each day-work, adults (children between 6 and 15 years) work on 
average 8 (6) hours. 
24
 Missing prices were approximated using the average prices at the cluster levels, and if still missing, at the district or 
regional levels. 
25
 We also applied other alternative methods to check for the robustness of our results. For example, Attanasio et al. 
(2013) propose to use the median unit value at the cluster level as a measure of consumer price. However, this 
approach gave relatively similar results as the Deaton’s. 
26
 The panels collected information on more than 60 different food, beverage and tobacco commodities.  
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more manageable figure
27
.  As an attempt to obtain a reasonable number of parameters and referring 
to both commodities which are normally close derivatives of one another
28
 and previous studies on 
demand systems in Uganda (Ulimwengu and Ramadan, 2009; Boysen 2012), we constructed 10 
food groups plus leisure
29
:  matooke )( 1k , cassava )( 2k ,  potatoes )( 3k  , maize )( 4k  , beans )( 5k  , 
meat & fish )( 6k , fruits & vegetables )( 7k , fats & oils
30
 )( 8k , alcohol & tobacco )( 9k , and other 
foods for the remaining commodities )( 10k . The prices for each food commodity group were 
computed as weighted means of commodities in that group, the weights being the mean 
consumption shares of each item. To approximate the value of leisure time, we use two types of 
information. In the separable model, we use the reported market wage
31
 obtained by those who 
worked for pay during the last 12 months. For those who did not report any wage, we impute their 
value using the average market wage at each cluster/district level.  In the non-separable model, the 
shadow wage is used as the opportunity cost of leisure time. To obtain the total value of household 
food consumption and therefore food consumption shares, consumption from home production has 
been valued using market prices under the assumption that market-purchased and home-produced 
goods are perfect substitutes
32,33
.  
                                                          
27
 Theoretically, there exist two alternative approaches for commodity grouping. The first approach -called the 
composite commodity theorem- asserts that we should group commodities whose prices are moving in parallel. 
However, since relative prices fluctuate considerably, the applicability of this approach is rather limited. The second 
approach, known as the separability theorem, states that if preferences are weakly separable, then we can construct 
independent sub-utility functions for each group and sum them up to get total utility. The weak separability 
hypothesis can be tested using for instance the F and Likelihood ratio version tests. In case of rejecting the null 
hypothesis of weak separability, the commodity grouping strategy must be guided by both the nature of the problem 
in hand and previous related studies (Abdulai and Aubert, 2004).  
28
 Like cassava flour and grain, maize grain and flour, sweet and Irish potatoes, different types of meat (beef, pork, 
goat, chicken,…) 
29
 The amount of leisure is obtained using the time constraint (equation 2.3) : of
f
fL LLTc  . Assuming that 
each household member aged below (above) 15 years has 12 (16)  hours available per day for work/leisure (Henning 
and Henningsen, 2007; Tiberti and Tiberti 2012), the total annual time available for a household with 1n members 
below 15 years and 2n  above 15 years,     21 *16*12*365 nnT  . 
f
fL  and 
o
fL are the total annual hours for 
off- and on-farm family labor, respectively. 
30
 Cooking oil, margarine, ghee, sugar, salt,… 
31
 It is the ratio between the total payments (in cash and in-kind) divided by the total number of hours  
32
 This assumption can be tested by computing the shadow price of consumption from home production (Arslan and 
Taylor, 2008).  One can then regress these shadow prices over market prices and other household characteristics and 
test whether the coefficients associated with market prices are not significantly different from one.  However, given 
the focus of the present study on labor market imperfections rather than missing or imperfect food markets, this 
assumption was deemed reasonable.   
33
 In this study, we prefer the use of “consumption shares” in lieu of “budget shares” and “total value of food 
consumption” rather than “total food consumption expenditures” given the inclusion of the imputed values of both 
consumption from home production and leisure time, which are not actual purchases/expenditures.  
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In table 2.2, we report the percent changes in real consumer prices
34
 of food commodity groups 
between 2005/06 and 2009/10, 2009/10 and 2010/11, and between 2005/06 and 2010/11. Between 
2005/06 and 2010/11, most commodity groups were characterized by soaring prices, with cassava, 
maize, and beans displaying more than 200% increases; potatoes, fruits and vegetables, and other 
foods more than 100%; matooke, meat and fish, and alcohol and tobacco more than 50% increases.  
Table 2.2 Changes in real consumer prices of commodity groups between 2005/6 and 2010/11 
Commodities Changes in real consumer prices between… 
 …2005/6 
and 2009/10 
…2009/10 
and  2010/11 
…  2005/06 
and 2010/11 
1k  0.472 (0.299) 0.216 (0.297) 0.745 (0.367) 
2k  1.716 (0.117) 0.569 (0.185) 2.493 (0.540) 
3k  0.915 (0.269) 0.511 (0.493) 1.712 (0.447) 
4k  1.555 (0.289) 0.197 (0.231) 2.296 (0.642) 
5k  0.827 (0.180) 0.413 (0.103) 1.069 (0.341) 
6k  1.63 (0.209) 0.235 (0.169) 2.602 (0.679) 
7k  0.829 (0.105) 0.141 (0.067) 0.953 (0.164) 
8k  0.146 (0.335) 0.327 (0.354) 0.471 (0.416) 
9k  0.514 (0.419) 0.099 (0.090) 0.633 (0.565) 
10k  1.23 (0.398) 0.179 (0.210) 1.804 (0.867) 
Overall 1.392 (0.152) 0.214 (0.087) 1.467 (0.170) 
Note: Item indices ik : 1: Matooke; 2: Cassava; 3:  Potatoes; 4: Maize; 5: Beans; 6: Meat and fish; 7: Fruits and 
vegetables; 8: Fats and oils; 9: Alcohol and tobacco ; and 10: Other foods. Standard deviations into brackets.  
 
Comparing different sub-periods, real consumer prices skyrocketed between 2005/06 and 2009/10. 
Indeed, the overall percent increase was 139.2% against 21.4% between 2009/10 and 2010/11. 
During the first two waves, cassava and beans exhibited the highest price increases with 172% and 
163%, respectively, while fats and oils and matooke displayed the lowest changes in their real 
prices (14.6% and 47.2%). Compared to the changes between 2005/06 and 2009/10, real price 
changes, though still positive for all commodity groups, slowed down in 2010/11. Cassava and 
potatoes presented the highest increases with 56.9% and 51.1% respectively, and alcohol and 
tobacco and meat and fish the lowest changes with 9.9% and 14.1%. 
                                                          
34
 Real prices were obtained by deflating nominal prices by the UBoS all items’ consumer price index (2005/06=100) to 
take account of potential changes in the purchasing power of Ugandan households. Prices are set at cluster/district 
level using the Deaton’s approach (1988). 
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Table 2.3 presents both the food consumption shares (excluding leisure) and proportions of zero 
consumption of commodity groups by panel round for rural and urban areas. What is apparent from 
these figures are the disparities between rural and urban Ugandan households in the allocation of 
their budgets to food and non-food items and among food commodities. 
Table 2.3 Food consumption shares and proportion of zero consumption by commodity groups 
 UNPS-2006 UNPS-2010 UNPS-2011 
 Rural Urban 
 
Rural Urban Rural  Urban 
 Mean Zeros Mean Zeros Mean Zeros Mean Zeros Mean Zeros Mean Zeros 
Food 0.637 
(0.198) 
- 0.454 
(0.204) 
- 0.629 
(0.217) 
- 0.431 
(0.199) 
- 0.692 
(0.203) 
- 0.504 
(0.214) 
- 
1k  0.093 
(0.151) 
0.596 0.099 
(0.127) 
0.453 0.099 
(0.153) 
0.575 0.105 
(0.130) 
0.439 0.111 
(0.167) 
0.560 0.109 
(0.128) 
0.389 
2k  0.111 
(0.151) 
0.393 0.044 
(0.089) 
0.573 0.115 
(0.146) 
0.340 0.051 
(0.090) 
0.530 0.085 
(0.134) 
0.536 0.031 
(0.077) 
0.715 
3k  0.095 
(0.143) 
0.470 0.046 
(0.084) 
0.536 0.099 
(0.140) 
0.412 0.053 
(0.089) 
0.450 0.028 
(0.092) 
0.850 0.011 
(0.052) 
0.923 
4k  0.100 
(0.094) 
0.360 0.078 
(0.109) 
0.317 0.110 
(0.157) 
0.376 0.085 
(0.120) 
0.288 0.086 
(0.139) 
0.449 0.069 
(0.103) 
0.334 
5k  0.088 
(0.099) 
0.239 0.066 
(.070) 
0.222 0.096 
(0.109) 
0.243 0.074 
(0.090) 
0.224 0.117 
(0.140) 
0.241 0.080 
(0.096) 
0.212 
6k  0.149 
(0.145) 
0.278 0.176 
(0.137) 
0.195 0.144 
(0.145) 
0.311 0.173 
(0.141) 
0.209 0.175 
(0.171) 
0.286 0.189 
(0.141) 
0.170 
7k  0.101 
(0.094) 
0.066 0.090 
(0.067) 
0.076 0.104 
(0.096) 
0.071 0.096 
(.148) 
0.068 0.097 
(0.100) 
0.084 0.093 
(0.081) 
0.063 
8k  0.032 
(0.034) 
0.030 0.039 
(0.036) 
0.067 0.032 
(0.032) 
0.039 0.037 
(0.033) 
0.053 0.038 
(.067) 
0.034 0.041 
(0.037) 
0.055 
9k  0.033 
(0.075) 
0.670 0.033 
(.080) 
0.748 0.028 
(0.071) 
0.722 0.019 
(.073) 
0.840 0.036 
(0.089) 
0.710 
 
0.024 
(0.077) 
0.830 
10k  0.197 
(0.187) 
0.101 0.329 
(0.237) 
0.020 0.174 
(0.184) 
0.122 0.307 
(0.067) 
0.027 0.225 
(0.213) 
0.094 0.352 
(0.234) 
0.028 
Sample 1818 492 1823 487 1804 506 
Note: Item indices ik : 1: Matooke; 2: Cassava; 3:  Potatoes; 4: Maize; 5: Beans; 6: Meat and fish; 7: Fruits and 
vegetables; 8: Fats and oils; 9: Alcohol and tobacco ; and 10: Other foods.  Standard deviations into brackets.  
 
By and large, rural households, predominately agricultural, have allocated to food items 41% more 
of their budget than urban households whose shares of food consumption in total expenditures 
counted for around 46%. Between the first and the last surveys, food consumption shares rose for 
both rural and urban households by 8.6 and 11%, respectively, due particularly to substantial 
increases between 2009/10 and 2010/11 (10% and 16.9% in rural and urban areas, respectively), 
while between 2005/6 and 2009/10 food consumption shares slightly decreased for both rural and 
urban households (1.3% and 5.1%, respectively).  
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Out of the food consumption, the consumption shares of different food items are relatively close 
(around or less than 10%), except for meat & fish and other foods which shares are on average 
greater than 15%. This may suggest that the Ugandan diet is particularly diversified and thus there 
might be large possibilities of substitution across commodities as a response to food price increases. 
When we compare the dynamics of these shares during the sample period,  beans (32.9% and 21.2% 
in rural and urban areas, respectively), matooke (19.4% and 10.1%),  and meat & fish (17.4% and 
7.4%) displayed the highest increases in their consumption shares between 2005/6 and 2010/11, 
while potatoes (-70.5% and -76.1%), cassava (-23.4% and -29.5%), and maize (-14% and -11.5%)  
had the highest decreases.  
When we disaggregate these total changes into the two sub-periods, it appears that for both rural 
and urban households, most consumption shares showed larger changes (in absolute values) in the 
first sub-period (2005/6 – 2009/10) than in the second (2009/10- 2010/11) .  In the first sub-period, 
the shares increased on average by 28.9 and 3.5% for rural and urban households, respectively, 
whereas during the last sub-sample period, they rose in rural areas (+1.4%) but decreased for urban 
households (-4.6%). Finally, the proportion of zero consumption is relatively high for all food 
groups, except for fruits & vegetables, fats & oils, and other foods. This underscores the need to 
explicitly deal with the censoring issue when estimating the food demand systems.  
2.4.3 Identification of the household’s food market position  
In addition to the assumption that the welfare effects of price changes are significantly different 
under separable and non-separable models, we also assume that these effects are likely to be 
different across households due to their heterogeneity in terms of food market position. As outlined 
in our conceptual framework, frictions in the labor markets (whether due to risks, transaction costs, 
or imperfect substitutability between different types of labor) introduce into the model virtual or 
shadow effects of food price changes which signs and magnitudes are a priori indeterminate. These 
additional effects will either over- or under-estimate the expenditure and price elasticities and, 
consequently, the welfare effects of price changes derived under the recursivity hypothesis, 
depending on the extent of the household’s net positions in both the food and labor markets (see 
equation 2.15). To take account of this fact, households are first divided into non-agricultural and 
agricultural households. The former act as pure consumers of staple foods and their welfare effects 
are theoretically the same in both separable and non-separable models, while the latter produce 
foods that are either consumed or sold, or both. Second, for each agricultural household, the net 
market position (or market surplus/deficit) is defined as the difference between the total market 
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value
35
 of quantities sold )( 1A  and quantities purchased )( 2A  of key staple foods consumed and 
produced by Ugandan households, namely matooke, maize, potatoes, cassava, beans, rice, millet, 
sorghum, fruits & vegetables. Hence, a household is defined as a global net seller (buyer) if 1A
)(  2A . Moreover, among net sellers, significant net sellers are those with  21 *5.1 AA   while 
insignificant or marginal net sellers are characterized by 212 *5.1 AAA  . A similar subdivision is 
applied to net buyers. This profiling of the net market status of households using the value 
definition – instead of weight definition, for example – is particularly suitable in the context of this 
study as it provides greater insight on households’ vulnerability to unexpected price changes by 
incorporating information on both prices and quantities of staples sold and purchased. Furthermore, 
this disaggregation will shed light on whether differences in market surplus/deficit led to significant 
differences in the welfare impacts of price changes as outlined in the theoretical framework.  
Summary statistics and descriptions of key variables used in the estimation of different models are 
reported in table 2.4 by survey round and net market position.  The table depicts significant 
discrepancies among the different types of households in terms of the dynamics of key variables of 
interest, hence highlighting the need to profile households through their net market position. 
Unsurprisingly, non-agricultural households (column A) present the highest monthly real 
expenditures per adult equivalent both in terms of food purchases (vcmarket) and non-food 
expenditures (vnctotal), with respectively an average over the sample period of 43,400 and 81,500 
Uganda Shillings (UShs)
36
. While the total household expenditures (tothexp2) excluding non-
purchased foods (imputed values of consumption from home production, vcproduce, and 
consumption of food received in-kind or as gifts) have decreased over time by 10.9% between the 
first and second surveys (henceforth, the first sub-period) and by 32.3% between the second and last 
surveys (the second sub-period), non-agricultural households increased their expenditures on food 
items (vcmarket), and particularly of staple foods (vcmarketstaples) in the first sub-period. Hence, 
when taken together, food purchases rose by a modest 2.2% during that period, but expenditures on 
staples soared on average by 66.7%, before declining afterwards by 16.8%. These dynamics provide 
some insights on the possible reallocation of households’ budget between food and non-food items. 
During periods of high and volatile prices, pure consumers are generally found to decrease their 
expenditures on non-food items such as health and education to smooth their consumption 
                                                          
35
  To check for the robustness of our results, we also applied different definitions of the net market position, using for 
example the values of harvest instead of values of sales and the values of consumption instead of purchases (net 
producers vs net consumers).  
36
 Average nominal exchange rate between May 2005 and April 2006 (first survey coverage): 1USD = 1,809.9 Uganda 
Shillings; between September 2009 and August 2010 (second survey): 1USD = 2,054.4 UShs; and between October 
2010 and September 2011 (third survey): 1USD = 2,441.3 UShs (Bank of Uganda, 2013) 
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(Hoddinott, 2006; Carter et al., 2007). Finally, the table shows that non-agricultural households are 
likely to have lower family size, younger heads with more years of education and are predominately 
male-headed.  
Significant net sellers (column B) logically spent the least on food consumption with a real monthly 
average per adult equivalent of less than 10,000UShs. However, they followed the same dynamics 
as non-agricultural households in terms of expenditures of staple foods: first an increase (of 62.5%) 
between 2005/6 and 2009/10 and then a decrease (of 42.3%) during the second sub-period. This 
feature is recurrent among other agricultural households, although occurring at different growth 
rates. Significant net sellers are also characterized by the highest levels of crops harvested and sold 
which, compared to relatively stable expenditures on variable inputs (vinputs: seeds, pesticides, 
fertilizer, and costs of hired labor), yielded the highest farm profits in each survey round. However, 
while most indicators present a positive growth rate between the first and second surveys, 
significant net sellers recorded a striking drop during the second sub-period, particularly in regards 
to quantities harvested (-56.6%), sold (-55.5%), and farm profits (-64.5%).  Several reasons may 
explain these figures, among them the relatively modest increases in real food prices (21.4% against 
139.4% in the first sub-period) that may have incited farmers to engage in alternative activities 
(non- or off-farm employment) that became more profitable. This can be seen by the decreases in 
the land size allocated to crops (-36.9%), the number of crops grown (-18.6%), on-farm family 
labor (-3.7%), and hired labor (-61.1%), but increases in off-farm labor (+67.2) or non-farm income 
(+58.1%). 
At the opposite side of significant net sellers, significant net buyers (column C) have the highest 
levels of food purchases. Although they both have relatively similar levels of total values of food 
consumption (vctotal), and non-food (vnctotal), food expenditures of significant net buyers exceed 
that of significant net sellers on average by 82.4, 74.7, and 87.7% in each survey round, 
respectively. Further, they harvested and sold the least, yielding the lowest farm profits (even 
experiencing a net loss in 2010/11). They also cultivated the lowest proportion of land (on average 
2.52 acres), grew less crops (around 4), allocated less time to on-farm family labor and much of 
their time to off-farm labor. Their heads are on average relatively older and the least educated. Put 
together, these features make significant net buyers particularly at the mercy of instabilities in 
commodity price markets. As shown in the table, they are selling food crops (vsalestaples) even 
when their harvest might be insufficient to cover their consumption needs. And given that farmgate 
prices are generally lower than consumer prices due to high transaction in most developing 
countries, they end up selling at low prices during harvested seasons but buying at high market 
prices at the lean periods. 
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Table 2.4 Household characteristics by year and net market position 
Variable  
labels 
 
All 
A B C D E 
2006 2009 2010 2006 2009 2010 2006 2009 2010 2006 2009 2010 2006 2009 2010 
                 
vcmarket (
a
) 19.4 
(24.3) 
45.6 
(45.9) 
46.6 
(39.9) 
38.4 
(33.8) 
10.2 
(11.4) 
9.1 
(11.2) 
8.1 
(10.5) 
18.6 
(17.9) 
15.9 
(14.9) 
15.2 
(14.4) 
13.5 
(12.1) 
12.5 
(8.3) 
13.1 
(10.9) 
14.5 
(15.8) 
15.4 
(11.6) 
11.7 
(10.9) 
vcmarketstaples(
a
) 9.8 
(12.7) 
15.7 
(13.2) 
26.2 
(20.1) 
21.8 
(19.8) 
1.6 
(2.5) 
2.6  
(4.1) 
1.5 
(2.9) 
8.8 
(10.3) 
11.1 
(10.8) 
9.7 
(10.5) 
4.4 
(4.5) 
6.2 
(4.9) 
4.6 
(4.5) 
4.9  
(5.2) 
8.4 
(7.6) 
5.1 
(5.7) 
vcproduce(
a
) 10.8 
(12.8) 
- - - 19.5 
(15.5) 
18.2 
(12.3) 
14.4 
(12.1) 
11.5 
(13.8) 
11.6 
(12.1) 
9.5 
(9.8) 
17.2 
(21.8) 
16.4 
(9.6) 
14.7 
(10.9) 
16.2 
(12.3) 
18.7 
(13.6) 
17.1 
(13.1) 
vctotal(
a
) 32.9 
(26.7) 
51.1 
(45.8) 
52.5 
(42.4) 
44.8 
(33.9) 
31.3 
(20.4) 
29.1 
(17.3) 
25.2 
(16.9) 
32.1 
(25.9) 
29.8 
(19.2) 
26.6 
(17.9) 
31.9 
(27.7)  
31.1 
(17.4) 
33.1 
(37.2) 
32.1 
(23.2) 
35.7 
(19.2) 
30.7 
(32.7) 
vnctotal(
a
) 31.7 
(162.4) 
105.5 
(625.2) 
88.1 
(95.3) 
52.8 
(61.6) 
22.6 
(26.3) 
24.6 
(36.5) 
13.7 
(21.1) 
22.9 
(36.2) 
24.1 
(54.4) 
15.3 
(34.3) 
28.3 
(34.5) 
23.7 
(24.8) 
14.1 
(21.8) 
26.2 
(34.6) 
30.1 
(27.2) 
18.3 
(25.5) 
tothexp1(
a
) 64.7 
(168.8) 
156.6 
(630.9) 
140.5 
(121.4) 
97.6 
(84.5) 
53.9 
(38.9) 
53.6 
(42.9) 
38.9 
(30.3) 
54.9 
(52.5) 
53.8 
(61.1) 
41.9 
(42.3) 
60.3 
(50.1) 
54.9 
(34.3) 
47.1 
(45.1) 
58.4 
(47.4) 
65.7 
(35.8) 
48.9 
(36.7) 
tothexp2(
a
) 51.1 
(168.9) 
151.1 
(631.3) 
134.7 
(120.2) 
91.2 
(85.2) 
32.7 
(32.9) 
33.6 
(41.1) 
21.7 
(26.8) 
41.5 
(47.8) 
40.1 
(60.6) 
30.5 
(41.3) 
41.8 
(42.9) 
36.2 
(29.1) 
27.2 
(27.7) 
40.8 
(43.1) 
45.3 
(32.2) 
30.1 
(32.7) 
vharvest(
a
) 397 
(746) 
- - - 1,061 
(1,179) 
1,009 
(1,206) 
438.1 
(449.5) 
318.9 
(519.8) 
122.6 
(319.9) 
84.8 
(233.1) 
898.4 
(1,061) 
524.8 
(468.1) 
347.9 
(394.5) 
699.4  
(778.1) 
559.9 
(542.9) 
366.2 
(519.9) 
vharveststaples(
a
) 306 
(559) 
- - - 855.5 
(883.3) 
815.6 
(908.1) 
361.6 
(449.5) 
244.7 
(344.8) 
67.5 
(147.7) 
50.1 
(125.6) 
654.9 
(702.9) 
437.9 
(420.3) 
290.4 
(324.1) 
557.8 
(566.9) 
424.8 
(399.6) 
306.7 
(438.3) 
vsales(
a
) 197 
(421) 
- - - 506.9 
(664.7) 
626.3 
(727.2) 
278.8 
(345.2) 
76.5 
(208.7) 
67.7 
(147.7) 
45.2 
(125.4) 
403.1 
(564.4) 
398.7 
(299.6) 
215.6 
(188.1) 
273.3 
(455.4) 
325.1 
(361.6) 
172.3 
(192.9) 
vsalestaples(
a
) 137 
(323) 
- - - 385.9 
(534.6) 
502.3 
(604.5) 
221.6 
(267.2) 
28.5 
(68.2) 
28.1 
(61.8) 
21.5 
(58.8) 
240.1 
(355.9) 
218.9 
(223.3) 
173.1 
(164.2) 
164.6 
(261.3) 
201.4 
(164.7) 
129.9 
(157.6) 
vinputs(
a
) 25 
(102) 
- - - 101.3 
(262.8) 
120.9 
(215.8) 
96.9 
(181.9) 
42.8 
(242.1) 
49.9 
(162.4) 
51.5 
(107.2) 
130.1 
(372.2) 
81.1 
(134.7) 
110.7 
(214.6) 
76.9 
(188.3) 
124.3 
(195.7) 
113.3 
(251.4) 
frprofit(
a
) 130 
(386) 
- - - 398.9 
(560.3) 
513.1 
(643.9) 
181.8 
(301.8) 
29.5 
(264.9) 
24.3 
(237.7) 
-6.2 
(130.4) 
301.5 
(551.9) 
220.1 
(267.9) 
104.9 
(239.6) 
218.8 
(421.8) 
203.5 
(316.6) 
59.1 
(215.6) 
land 3.62  
(14.90) 
- - - 3.63 
(3.45) 
4.33 
(8.29) 
2.73 
(4.03) 
1.98 
(3.12) 
2.95 
(11.8) 
2.61 
(8.10) 
3.89 
(4.06) 
2.64 
(6.18) 
2.97 
(1.78) 
2.49 
(4.15) 
2.89 
(4.41) 
2.89 
(4.93) 
ncrops 4.79 
 (3.22) 
- - - 6.56 
(2.93) 
6.83 
(3.79) 
5.56 
(3.35) 
3.64 
(2.66) 
4.00 
(3.08) 
4.36 
(2.78) 
4.95 
(2.52) 
6.09 
(3.15) 
6.49 
(3.11) 
5.03 
(2.84) 
5.55 
(2.77) 
6.80 
(3.54) 
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 Table 2.4 (continued) 
 
Variable 
labels 
 
All  
A B C D E 
 
 2006 2009 2010 2006 2009 2010 2006 2009 2010 2006 2009 2010 2006 2009 2010 
 
onflabor 3,118  
(5,641) 
- - - 4,221 
(3,819) 
4,342 
(13,794) 
4,180 
(5,882) 
1,862 
(2,508) 
2,413 
(3,164) 
3,312 
(3,673) 
2,712 
(3,146) 
3,963 
(5,081) 
3,207 
(2,657) 
2,747 
(2,777) 
3,278 
(3,318) 
3,086 
(3,561) 
hlabor 24.72 
(289.61) 
- - - 165 
(534) 
329 
(717) 
128 
(356) 
138 
(808) 
291 
(4,886) 
124 
(338) 
419 
(1,119) 
311 
(1,829) 
143 
(365) 
320 
(804) 
239 
(607) 
66 
(183) 
offlabor 1,215 
(3,431) 
- - - 1,032 
(3,438) 
807.8 
(3,917)  
1,351 
(2,633) 
1,819 
(3,919) 
1,315 
(3,798) 
754.8 
(2,546) 
1,234 
(3,619) 
1,214 
(2,958) 
640.4 
(1,805) 
2,057 
(4,161) 
806.7 
(2,861) 
1,133 
(2,978) 
nonfincome(
a
) 384.1 
(1,058) 
1,284 
(1,872) 
300.6 
(1,076) 
461.5  
(1,248) 
212.9 
(789.7) 
200.1 
(769.4) 
316.3 
(697.5) 
548.9 
(1,235) 
215.9 
(776.5) 
273.9 
(803.5)  
481.8 
(1,322) 
277.3 
(970.1) 
398.5 
(1,217) 
469.1 
(935.1) 
218.3 
(8614) 
282.1 
(586.8) 
hhsize 6.55  
(3.36) 
4.46 
(2.88) 
5.29 
(3.11) 
6.23 
(3.66) 
6.16 
(3.22) 
7 (3.36) 7.40 
(3.50) 
5.97 
(2.86) 
6.77 
(3.17) 
7.55 
(3.44) 
6.15 
(3.02) 
6.73 
(3.46) 
7.91 
(3.69) 
6.40 
(3.31) 
7.01 
(3.23) 
7.64 
(4.34) 
age 45.6 
 (15.1) 
36.9 
(12.6) 
41.3 
(13.8) 
42.9 
(14.2) 
44 
(14.78) 
47 
(14.28) 
47.6 
(14.89) 
44.3 
(15.58) 
48.32 
(15.20) 
48.8 
(14.99) 
42.9 
(14.9) 
44.2 
(13.9) 
46.3 
(14.11) 
41.8 
(14.19) 
47.7 
(16.1) 
47.8 
(14.98) 
education 5.30 
(4.10) 
6.86 
(4.35) 
7.06 
(4.62) 
7.18 
(4.83) 
5.34 
(3.51) 
5.31 
(3.64) 
5.33 
(3.85) 
4.58 
(3.88) 
4.44 
(3.98) 
4.96 
(4.09) 
5.47 
(3.31) 
5.25 
(3.48) 
5.69 
(3.34) 
6.09 
(3.48) 
5.27 
(3.52) 
5.54 
(3.94) 
Gender  70.81  79.01 81.82 79.10 78.8 77.62 77.31 70.40 67.28 65.66 69.27 69.95 65.69 76.47 77.42 72.88 
Observations 6,930 423 376 437 552 563 454 1,152 1,201 1,293 81 77 67 102 93 59 
Note: (
a) in ,000’s Uganda Shillings (UShs). Standard deviations into brackets. All monetary values are expressed in real terms using UBOS’ Consumer price index 
(2005/6: Base=100). A represents non – agricultural households, B significant net sellers, C significant net buyers, D insignificant net sellers, and E insignificant net 
buyers.  
Variable labels: vcmarket: real monthly per adult equivalent (r.m.a., henceforth) total food consumption expenditures; vcmarketstaples: r.m.a. food consumption 
expenditures  of staples. vcproduce: r.m.a. values of food consumption from home production.  vctotal: r.m.a total values of food consumption (sum of food 
purchases, consumption from home production, and consumption in-kind or obtained as gifts); vnctotal: r.m.a. total household expenditures on non-food items 
(education, health, durables, non- or semi-durable goods,…); tothexp1 and  tothexp2 denote the r.m.a total household expenditures on food and non-food items, 
including and excluding  consumption from home-production vcproduce  and food received in-kind or as gifts, respectively; vharvest  (vharvestsaples): total annual 
values of all crops (staples) harvested; vsales (vsalestaples): total annual values of all crops (staples) sold; vinputs: annual expenditures on variable inputs (seeds, 
pesticides, fertilizer, hired labor); frprofit: farm profit; land: land size (in acres); ncrops: number of crops grown during the main season; onflabor: annual hours of 
on-farm family labor ; hlabor: annual hours of hired labor; offlabor: annual hours of off-farm labor; nonfincome: real annual non-farm income; hhsize: household 
size; age: age of the household head; education: number of years of education attained by the household head; and gender: proportion of male-headed households.
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In this context, if unexpected price increases occur during periods of low storage capacity and with 
the lack of well-functioning credit and other financial markets, the risk of deterioration of welfare 
conditions becomes increasingly high.  
Between significant net sellers and buyers appear both marginal net sellers and buyers. They both 
spend relatively similar amount of money on food consumption, higher than significant net sellers 
but lower than significant net buyers. Their discrepancies become apparent when we look at the 
production side. Insignificant net sellers (column D) produced on average more than insignificant 
net buyers (+6.3%) only due to the 2005/6’s harvest levels (+28.5%). When we only take account of 
the last two surveys, the picture becomes reversed, with insignificant net buyers (column E) 
producing and selling globally more than insignificant net sellers, although net sellers are still 
selling more staples than net buyers (+18.8%). Other important differences between these two sub-
groups are related to the levels of farm profits, hired labor, or time spent on off-farm employment.  
Hence, the above analyses of household characteristics disaggregated by their net position in the 
food market provide the following key messages that will become apparent in the subsequent 
sections. First, treating all households as a homogenous group is likely to result in a misleading 
picture of the dynamics occurring among them. One evidence of this is that food purchases of non-
agricultural households are for instance at least 2 times higher than the overall average food 
expenditures (second column). Second, decomposing agricultural households between net sellers 
and net buyers still hides important heterogeneity in terms of consumption, production, and other 
household characteristics. Ideally, given the complexity of agricultural households’ behavior (Singh 
et al., 1986; Strauss, 1986; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1991; Key et al., 2001), one would need to build 
as many homogenous sub-groups as data allow. Since different sub-groups of agricultural 
households will certainly be diversely affected by food price changes, depending on their initial 
conditions, observable characteristics, and unobserved heterogeneity, group-specific targeted policy 
interventions are likely to be more effective than uniform policies.  
To conclude these data descriptions, we report in table 2.5 the number of agricultural households by 
their net positions in both food and labor markets. Among the 5,694 total agricultural households, 
the majority (2,670 or 46.89%) is either self-sufficient ( 0 hf LL ) or autarkic ( 0 hf LL ) in the 
labor market. Labor net buyers ( 0 hf LL ) slightly outweigh net sellers ( 0 hf LL ) with 28.96 
against 24.15%. For all types of agricultural households, around three-quarters are labor net buyers, 
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self-sufficient, or autarkic. Referring to equation (2.10)
37
 and table 2.1, this implies that for the 
majority of the surveyed households, both the price elasticities and compensating variations are 
theoretically indeterminate in the non-separable model. 
Table 2.5 Decomposition of Ugandan households by their net positions in the food and labor markets 
 Labor net sellers: 0 hf LL  Labor net buyers: 0 hf LL  
Self-sufficient/Autarkic: 
hf
LL   
 Total 2005/6 2009/10 2010/11 Total 2005/6 2009/10 2010/11 Total 2005/6 2009/10 2010/11 
B 314 116 115 83 543 297 133 113 712 139 315 258 
C 946 428 256 262 949 349 245 355 1,751 375 700 676 
D 45 18 18 9 40 40 18 22 100 23 41 36 
E 70 38 16 16 38 38 30 9 107 26 47 34 
Total 1,375 600 405 370 1,649 724 426 499 2,670 563 1,103 1,004 
Note: B represents significant net sellers, C significant net buyers, D insignificant net sellers, and E 
insignificant net buyers.  
 
2.5 Results and discussion 
2.5.1 Estimation of shadow wages and separability test 
Parameter estimates for both the stochastic production frontier function  hthtXF ,  and technical 
inefficiency htU  are reported in tables 2.6 and 2.7.  The empirical functional form of the production 
frontier function is represented by a flexible quadratic specification in the productive assets
38
. 
Although displayed in two distinct tables, both models were estimated simultaneously using the 
Battese and Coelli’s (1995) Maximum Likelihood-random effects time-varying inefficiency effects 
model. Globally, the estimated coefficients have the expected signs. All labor and non-labor inputs 
statistically significantly increase the values of crops harvested
39
. For instance, increases in the 
quantity of on-farm family female labor appear to have more impact on the marketed values of 
harvests than male labor. Hence, activities such as weeding or transplanting, generally executed by 
women in Uganda, would tend to be more important to the overall production than for example 
                                                          
37
 For self-sufficient or autarkic households in the labor market, equation (2.10) reduces to:
            aHfffaaaHfaf pwEwcEYcE
Y
cQp
pcEpcE **//// 







 
  
38 We also used other functional forms of the production frontier  hthtXF ,  such as a generalized Leontief 
functional form given the preponderance of zero values in input uses. However, only the model presented in this 
study best fitted the data while others fail to converge or present unrealistic parameter estimates. 
39
 For each variable, we run joint tests of the level, quadratic, and interaction terms included in the final empirical 
specification. 
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ploughing in which men are predominantly engaged (Jacoby, 1993; Abdulai and Regmi, 2000; 
Tiberti and Tiberti, 2012).  
 
Table 2.6 Stochastic production frontier estimates  
Dependent variable: Total value of quantity harvested (in log) 
 Coefficients Standard errors 
Constant     11.805        0.202 
land  0.863 0.097
*** 
onfmalelabor 0.181        0.080
** 
onffemalelabor 0.235        0.061
*** 
onfchildlabor 0.040        0.056 
hlabor 0.055        0.024
* 
varinput 0.193        0.025
*** 
wagehlabor 0.043        0.044 
½ land
2 
     -0.227        0.046
*** 
½ onfmalelabor
2 
0.054        0.030
** 
½ onffemalelabor
2 
0.074        0.022
** 
½ onfchildlabor
2 
0.037        0.024 
½ hlabor
2 
0.096        0.020
*** 
½ varinput
2 
0.055        0.004
*** 
½ ghiredlabor
2 
0.021        0.008
*** 
Land × onfmalelabor 0.091        0.034
*** 
Land × onffemalelabor      -0.051        0.039 
Land × onfchildlabor       0.057        0.031
* 
Land × hlabor      -0.005        0.028 
Land × varinput       0.006        0.010 
Land × wagehlabor       -0.028        0.011
** 
onfmalelabor × onffemalelabor      -0.086        0.027
*** 
onfmalelabor × onfchildlabor       0.017        0.023 
onfmalelabor × hlabor      -0.080        0.032
** 
onfmalelabor × varinput       0.003        0.008 
onfmalelabor × wagehlabor      -0.005        0.011 
hlabor × varinput      -0.004        0.006 
hlabor  × wagehlabor      -0.017        0.007
*** 
LqGood       0.217        0.085
** 
LqFair       0.062        0.086 
LdIr      -0.128        0.177 
Yr2009       0.222        0.008
***
 
Yr2010       0.182        0.108
* 
v        0.343        0.043 
u        0.737        0.018 
 222 / vuu          0.827        0.015 
Observations 5,694 
Note: All continuous variables are reported in log. 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%  
levels, respectively.  
Variable labels: land: land size (in acres); onfmalelabor, onffemalelabor, and onfchildlabor : on-farm family 
labor (in person-days) by adult males, adult females, and children, respectively; hlabor: hired labor (in person-
days); varinput: total expenditures on seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer used for production; wagehlabor: costs of 
hired labor. LqGood: proportion of plots of good quality; LqFair: proportion of plots of fair quality; LdIr: 
proportion of irrigated plots; Yr2009 and Yr2010: dummy variables taking 1 if year=2009 and 2010, respectively.  
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Table 2.7 Technical inefficiency estimation results 
 Coefficients Standard errors 
Constant   0.365 0.051
*** 
Gender   0.047 0.003
*** 
Age -0.006 0.001
*** 
Age
2 
 0.000 0.000
*** 
Education: Primary level  -0.103 0.008
*** 
                   Secondary  -0.094 0.010
*** 
                   University -0.132 0.030
*** 
Number of  crops grown  0.012 0.002
*** 
Number of  crops grown
2 
-0.001 0.000
*** 
Married  0.063 0.007
*** 
Number of children -0.005 0.001
*** 
                   adult male -0.013 0.002
*** 
                   adult female -0.021 0.002
*** 
Eastern region  0.047        0.042 
Northern region  0.014        0.043 
Western region  0.124 0.040
*** 
Ratio Labor/Land  0.006 0.001
*** 
Ratio Adult labor/Total labor  0.109 0.007
*** 
Observations 5,694 
Note: 
***  
and 
** 
denote statistical significance at 1 and 5% levels. 
 
Jointly, family labor is found more productive than hired labor which highlights the possibility of 
imperfect substitutability between these two types of labor due for instance to the existence of 
supervision costs or differential work motivations (Deolalikar and Vijverberg 1987).  Land 
characteristics also clearly influence the crop outputs, which values are statistically higher with 
increases in land size, when cultivated lands are of good or fair quality. The costs of non-labor 
inputs (seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer) and hired labor positively influenced the output values, 
though only marginally when compared with the joint effect of family labor. This is probably 
imputable to their limited usage by Ugandan farmers during the sample period
40
.  
In terms of technical inefficiency, table 2.7 reveals that its scores are significantly correlated with 
the gender, level of education of the head and his marital status as well as with household 
composition, regional effects, and labor-land ratio.  
Once we get the estimated parameters from the stochastic production frontier and technical 
inefficiency, we can derive sequentially the estimated marginal product revenue of labor for the 
entire sample LPRM
ˆ , compute the allocative inefficiency scores for farmers engaged in both on- and 
off-farm labor IA ˆ , and finally obtain the estimates of the shadow wages *wˆ  for households that did 
not supply labor to the market. Following the procedure outlined previously (see section 2.3.1), we 
                                                          
40
 For instance, only 3.86, 5.57, and 5.20% of Ugandan farmers use fertilizer (either chemical or organic) in each survey 
round, respectively. The proportion that purchased pesticides was relatively high, with 11.92, 14.72, and 14.56%, 
respectively. 
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summarize in table 2.8 these different values for the full sample, the sub-sample of off-farm 
workers and self-employed farmers. Theoretically, the allocative inefficiency condition should hold 
( wPRM L 
ˆ ) for agricultural households supplying labor off-farm. Descriptive statistics reported in 
table 2.8 indeed reveal that the mean observed market wages of farmers working off-farmers only 
slightly deviate from their estimated marginal product revenue of labor. And as expected, the LPRM
ˆ
of self-employed farmers is on average 22% higher than that of households working off-farm. The 
consequence of these small deviations between the mean LPRM
ˆ  and observed market wages for 
farmers supplying labor is that their allocative inefficiency scores will tend to approach small values 
while they will be higher, in absolute values, for self-employed agricultural households. Negative 
(positive) IA ˆ  will thereby imply that farmers are undersupplying (oversupplying) on-farm labor 
relative to off-farm employment (Barrett et al., 2008). As shown in table 2.8, self-employed, 
contrarily to off-farm workers, tended to undersupply on-farm labor (they reported on average 
negative estimated IA ˆ  scores). Finding similar results when using data from rice production in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Barrett et al. (2008) attributed this empirical evidence to labor constraints that impede self-
employed agricultural households from working off-farm since they do not have sufficient labor to 
operate on their own farms. 
 
Table 2.8 Summary statistics for w , LPRM
ˆ , IA ˆ , and *wˆ  
 w  
LPRM
ˆ  IA ˆ  *wˆ  observations 
Full sample - 815.95 
 (125.05) 
-0.16  
(0.25) 
1,073.14  
(636.23) 
5,694 
Off-farm workers 787.31  
(582.07) 
751.62  
(115.97) 
0.05  
(0.23) 
787.31  
(582.07) 
2,675 
Self-employed 
farmers 
- 916.19  
(50.56) 
-0.21  
(0.20) 
1,520.65 
 (424.27) 
3,019 
Note: w  : Observed real hourly market wage, at the community level ; LPRM
ˆ  : Estimated real marginal 
product revenue of labor; IA ˆ  : Estimated allocative inefficiency score; *wˆ  : Estimated hourly shadow wage. 
Standard deviations into brackets 
 
Furthermore, table 2.8 indicates that the mean values of estimated shadow wages are clearly larger 
than observed market wages, as predicted by the non-separable agricultural households’ literature. 
Thus, the observed market wages w  serve as lower bounds of the farmers’ subjective valuation of 
their on-farm labor. Finally, as a simple separability test, we performed both the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) and Epps-Singleton (E-S) tests for equality of shadow wages’ distributions between 
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the sub-samples of off-farm workers and self-employed farmers
41
. With both tests reporting p-
values of zero, we reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions of estimated shadow wages and 
observed market wages. Otherwise stated, these results suggest that addressing the unobserved 
wage problem of agricultural households not supplying labor to the market by using observed 
market wages would underestimate the true, though unknown, cost of on-farm labor and 
consequently would bias subsequent welfare analyses.  
2.5.2 Demand elasticities 
Expenditure and Hicksian own-price elasticities
42
 are reported in tables 2.9 and 2.10 for both 
separable
43
 and non-separable models to evaluate the extent of virtual or shadow effects on 
household consumption behavior. All sets of elasticities are computed at the mean values of the 
predicted consumption shares and controlled for censoring in food consumption. To account for 
both year-specific effects and households’ heterogeneity in regards to their net position in the food 
market, these elasticities are shown by survey round and net seller/net buyer status.  
Conditional expenditure elasticities 
As expected, all expenditure elasticities ( i ) are found positive and significant at 1% level, 
implying that increases in households’ overall values of food consumption are accompanied with 
increases in demand of the individual food items under consideration. In the separable models, meat 
& fish ( 6 ) and other foods ( 9 ) display elasticities greater than one, suggesting that they are 
luxuries for Ugandan households: as income increases, households will spend proportionally more 
on the consumption of these food items. Furthermore, compared to food items, estimated elasticities 
associated with leisure are the lowest, with a 1% increase in household’s total expenditure leading 
to less than 0.6% increase of time allocated to leisure. This could be a reflection of labor constraints 
faced by Ugandan households, predominately rural and agricultural. The rural labor market is 
structurally thin and characterized by limited employment opportunities and lower wage rates. In 
this context, the household’s time endowment is often allocated to leisure by default and many 
                                                          
41
 Both the K-S and E-S tests check for dissimilarities between two samples by comparing either their distribution 
functions (K-S tests) or their empirical characteristic functions (Epps and Singleton, 1986; Goerg and Kaiser, 2009). 
42
 Theoretical restrictions of adding-up and symmetry were imposed to the model and the system of share equations 
in the QUAIDS was estimated using the Non-linear Seemingly Unrelated Regression (NSUR) suggested by Poi (2008). 
Expenditure endogeneity has been tested and controlled for as well as censoring due to zero purchases using the 
Shonkwiler and Yen (1999)’s approach. Household composition (number of children, male, and female adults), total 
time endowment, non-farm incomes, sex, education and age of the head, and consumer prices were used as 
instruments of the shadow value of leisure in the non-separable model.  
43
 See Appendix B.2 for the expressions of demand elasticities from the QUAID model under separability. 
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households would promptly decrease its share had they received employment offers. In terms of 
year-specific effects, expenditure elasticities have increased for most food items between 2005/6 
and 2009/10 before decreasing in the last survey round. Otherwise stated, periods of higher food 
price volatilities were characterized by higher sensitivity of Ugandan households to changes in their 
total expenditures.  
When disaggregating households by their food net market status, it appears that differences in 
estimated expenditure elasticities are particularly striking between significant net sellers and 
significant net buyers, at least for food items included in the definition of the net seller/net buyer 
position. Significant net buyers are found to increase the consumption of food items on average by 
13% more than their net seller counterparts, with the highest differences related to matooke 
%)31( 1   and beans %)33( 5  . This is easily understandable since significant net buyers are 
conceptually in a more urgent need to cover their food deficit than significant net sellers or other 
agricultural households. By contrast, it is hard to clearly perceive the disparities between 
insignificant net sellers and net buyers. For most food items, their corresponding estimated 
expenditure elasticities are remarkably close. Except for matooke %)17( 1   and beans 
%)14( 5  , their differences barely reach 1%. Non-agricultural households lie somehow between 
these sub-groups of agricultural households. For example, they are increasing the consumption of 
most food items more proportionally than significant net sellers but are relatively closer to 
significant net buyers than to insignificant net sellers or net buyers. 
When we relax the assumption of perfect labor markets and impute the value of leisure using 
shadow wages in lieu of observed market wages, all estimated expenditure elasticities are still 
positive and significant at 1% level but their magnitude is now reduced for most food items and 
household sub-groups. Analytically, the discrepancy between separable and non-separable models 
is attributed to the combined effects of the cross-price elasticities of the shadow wages  */ wcE i  
and the elasticities of the shadow wages with respect to expenditures  xwE /* 44. As reported in 
Appendix B.3, these combined effects were negative for most households which therefore 
underestimated the elasticities obtained with no labor market failures. 
 
 
                                                          
44
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Table 2.9 Expenditure elasticities by survey round, net market position, and (non-) separability 
 2005/6 2009/10 2010/11 Net market position (pooled sample) 
A B C D E 
a. Separable model (Perfect labor market) 
 
1  0.980 
(0.023)
*** 
0.995 
(0.023)
***
 
0.987 
(0.024)
***
 
0.944 
(0.027)
***
 
0.777 
(0.016)
***
 
1.022 
(0.029)
***
 
0.844 
(0.016)
***
 
0.989 
(0.017)
 ***
 
2  0.903 
(0.021)
***
 
0.953 
(0.021)
***
 
0.969 
 (0.034)
***
 
0.926 
(0.060)
***
 
0.954 
(0.023)
***
 
0.984 
(0.021)
 ***
 
0.948 
(0.024)
***
 
0.942 
(0.021)
 ***
 
3  0.908 
(0.022)
***
 
1.001 
(0.022)
***
 
0.970 
(0.087)
***
 
1.013 
(0.022)
***
 
0.892 
(0.083)
***
 
1.054 
(0.029)
 ***
 
0.989 
(0.023)
***
 
0.985 
(0.025)
 ***
 
4  0.859 
(0.022)
***
 
0.880  
(0.021)
***
 
0.884 
(0.031)
***
 
0.869 
(0.028)
***
 
0.783 
(0.033)
***
 
0.917 
(0.021)
 ***
 
0.876 
(0.025)
***
 
0.875 
(0.022)
 ***
 
5  0.729 
(0.019)
***
 
0.756 
(0.019)
***
 
0.704 
(0.019)
***
 
0.792 
(0.016)
***
 
0.588 
(0.032)
***
 
0.783 
(0.018)
 ***
 
0.772 
(0.017)
***
 
0.663 
(0.016)
 ***
 
6  1.214 
(0.015)
***
 
1.342 
(0.015)
***
 
1.244 
(0.015)
***
 
1.273 
(0.016)
***
 
1.236 
(0.014)
***
 
1.364 
(0.015)
 ***
 
1.278 
(0.012)
***
 
1.297 
(0.013)
 ***
 
7  0.886 
(0.014)
***
 
0.892 
(0.014)
***
 
0.874 
(0.018)
***
 
0.870 
(0.017)
***
 
0.873 
(0.019)
***
 
0.892 
(0.014)
 ***
 
0.869 
(0.017)
***
 
0.888 
(0.014)
 ***
 
8  0.866 
(016)
***
 
0.873 
(0.017)
***
 
0.856 
(0.017)
***
 
0.867 
(0.019)
***
 
0.850 
(0.016)
***
 
0.892 
(0.016)
 ***
 
0.875 
(0.017)
***
 
0.874 
(0.016)
 ***
 
9  
1.234 
(0.014)
***
 
1.398 
(0.015)
***
 
1.242 
(0.014)
***
 
1.412 
(0.017)
***
 
1.249 
(0.009)
***
 
1.357 
(0.016)
 ***
 
1.248 
(0.018)
***
 
1.206 
(0.017)
 ***
 
10  0.978 
(0.036)
***
 
0.917 
(0.047)
***
 
0.920 
(0.043)
***
 
0.997 
(0.044)
***
 
0.917 
(0.045)
***
 
0.932 
(0.040)
 ***
 
0.941 
(0.018)
***
 
0.944 
(0.044)
 ***
 
11  0.579 
(009)
***
 
0.526 
(0.011)
***
 
0.551 
(0.010)
***
 
0.578 
(0.011)
***
 
0.588 
(0.009)
***
 
0.536 
(0.010)
 ***
 
0.529 
(0.010)
***
 
0.572 
(0.010)
 ***
 
         
b. Non-separable model (imperfect labor market) 
 
1  0.825 
(0.003)
 ***
 
0.855 
(0.002)
 ***
 
0.841 
(0.003)
 ***
 
0.944 
(0.027)
 ***
 
0.838 
(0.002)
 ***
 
0.841 
(0.002)
 ***
 
0.839 
(0.008)
 ***
 
0.853 
(0.011)
 ***
 
2  0.754 
(0.007)
 ***
 
0.847 
(0.005)
 ***
 
0.777 
(0.007)
 ***
 
0.926 
(0.060)
 ***
 
0.762 
(0.007)
 ***
 
0.802 
(0.004)
 ***
 
0.774 
(0.013)
 ***
 
0.742 
(0.019)
 ***
 
3  0.793 
(0.006)
 ***
 
0.873 
(0.005)
 ***
 
0.833 
(0.011)
 ***
 
1.013 
(0.022)
 ***
 
0.813 
(0.006)
 ***
 
0.829 
(0.005)
 ***
 
0.793 
(0.023)
 ***
 
0.798 
(0.024)
 ***
 
4  0.661 
(0.008)
 ***
 
0.741 
(0.009)
 ***
 
0.674 
(0.008)
 ***
 
0.869 
(0.028)
 ***
 
0.673 
(0.009)
 ***
 
0.699 
(0.006)
 ***
 
0.685 
(0.022)
 ***
 
0.648 
(0.023)
 ***
 
5  0.512 
(0.010)
 ***
 
0.583 
(0.009)
 ***
 
0.538 
(0.008)
 ***
 
0.792 
(0.016)
 ***
 
0.557 
(0.010)
 ***
 
0.549 
(0.006)
 ***
 
0.473 
(0.036)
 ***
 
0.461 
(0.029)
 ***
 
6  1.259 
(0.018)
 ***
 
1.300 
(0.019)
 ***
 
1.289 
(0.021)
 ***
 
1.273 
(0.016)
 ***
 
1.276 
(0.021)
 ***
 
1.295 
(0.014)
 ***
 
1.188 
(0.038)
 ***
 
1.233 
(0.033)
 ***
 
7  0.654 
(0.006)
 ***
 
0.627 
(0.006)
 ***
 
0.663 
(0.008)
 ***
 
0.870 
(0.017)
 ***
 
0.625 
(0.009)
 ***
 
0.657 
(0.005)
 ***
 
0.643 
(0.016)
 ***
 
0.652 
(0.018)
 ***
 
8  0.594 
(0.007)
 ***
 
0.657 
(0.007)
 ***
 
0.619 
(0.006)
 ***
 
0.867 
(0.019)
 ***
 
0.591 
(0.009)
 ***
 
0.641 
(0.005)
 ***
 
0.568 
(0.028)
 ***
 
0.600 
(0.020)
 ***
 
9  
0.736 
(0.046)
 ***
 
1.071 
(0.061)
 ***
 
1.037 
(0.071)
 ***
 
1.412 
(0.017)
 ***
 
1.092 
(0.076)
 ***
 
1.071 
(0.046)
 ***
 
1.007 
(0.119)
 ***
 
1.059 
(0.078)
 ***
 
10  0.794 
(0.006)
 ***
 
0.773 
(0.009)
 ***
 
0.739 
(0.007)
 ***
 
0.997 
(0.044)
 ***
 
0.784 
(0.008)
 ***
 
0.764 
(0.005)
 ***
 
0.781 
(0.024)
 ***
 
0.778 
(0.019)
 ***
 
11  0.349 
(0.018)
 ***
 
0.314 
(0.022)
 ***
 
0.393 
(0.019)
 ***
 
0.578 
(0.011)
 ***
 
0.326 
(0.022)
 ***
 
0.523 
(0.015)
 ***
 
0.201 
(0.056)
 ***
 
0.135 
(0.046)
 ***
 
Note: i  are conditional expenditure elasticities. Item indices: 1: Matooke; 2: Cassava; 3: Potatoes; 4: Maize; 5: Beans; 
6: Meat and Fish; 7: Fruits and vegetables; 8: Fats and oils; 9: Other foods; 10: Alcohol and tobacco; and 11: Leisure. 
The net market position is defined as previously: A represents non – agricultural households, B significant net sellers, C 
significant net buyers, D insignificant net sellers, and E insignificant net buyers. (
***
) denote significance levels at 1%.  
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Economically, an increase in the shadow wage, which represents the opportunity cost of leisure 
time, will have the usual negative substitution effects (leisure becoming virtually more expensive, 
households substitute towards food items and away from leisure) and an ambiguous income effect. 
Thus, the above results suggest that either the income effect was also negative (which reinforces the 
negative substitution effects) or positive but not sufficiently high enough to more than offset the 
negative substitution effects for most households.   
Conditional Hicksian own-price elasticities 
With regards to price elasticities, table 2.10 reports the conditional compensated (Hicksian) own-
price elasticities evaluated at the means of the data by net market position and labor market regime. 
All own-price elasticities are negative and statistically significant at 5%, indicating that increases in 
consumer prices of each commodity group led to reductions in the quantity demanded of the same 
commodity. Similarly to expenditure elasticities, most price elasticities are less than unity which 
suggests some rigidities in households’ demand responsiveness to price changes. Only livestock 
products and fish are found price elastic. Own-price elasticities portrayed in table 2.10 can be 
analyzed either by comparing periods of low (UNPS-2006) and high prices (UNPS-2010 and 
UNPS-2011) or by contrasting household groups by their net market position and labor market 
regime.  
Starting with the separable models, households became more sensitive to price changes when we 
move from periods of low and stable prices to those of high instabilities in commodity prices. 
Particularly, own-price elasticities of matooke, maize, and meat & fish increased, in absolute terms, 
by 13, 17, 22% between 2005/6 and 2009/10 (Tefera et al., 2012).  In terms of net position in food 
markets, non-agricultural households (column A) were more sensitive to price changes of maize, 
potatoes, fish and meat, with the lowest elasticities (in absolute terms) for matooke and cassava 
which are the most important contributive staples to daily caloric intakes in Uganda
45
. Own-price 
elasticities for agricultural households present a more heterogeneous pattern than expenditure 
elasticities. Globally, significant net sellers (column B) are the least demand-responsive to changes 
in food prices, particularly for staple foods. They decrease their consumption by 0.55, 0.60, and 
0.51% in reaction to a 1% increase in the real prices of matooke, potatoes, and beans, respectively. 
As shown by Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991), farm income is generally positively correlated with 
the prices of consumption goods and food production acts as an insurance value that partially 
protects consumer-farmers from price fluctuations. This stabilizing role will be important the larger 
                                                          
45
 Between 2000 and 2009, matooke and cassava were the first and second most important staples in terms of daily 
caloric intakes with respectively 17% and 13% of the total daily caloric intakes (FAO, 2009). 
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the food market surplus of a farmer. Hence, since high food prices are often accompanied with 
higher revenues and consequently increased possibilities for additional consumption, significant net 
sellers have more room for maintaining or reducing their consumption levels less proportionally 
than other agricultural households
46
.  
At the extreme side, significant net buyers (column C) were relatively more sensitive to changes in 
prices of most food items under consideration. In the short run, net buyers behave like pure 
consumers or non-agricultural households to unexpected changes in food prices given the practical 
impossibility to adjust or increase their output production and supply. The higher their food market 
deficit, the more they are likely to react to price changes as non-agricultural households. As shown 
in table 2.10, except for matooke and cassava, own-price Hicksian elasticities of significant net 
buyers are only slightly different to those of non-agricultural households. Insignificant net sellers 
(column D) and buyers (column E) are intrinsically close to each other in terms of sensitivity to 
price changes. Their food market surplus/deficit is not sufficiently high/lower to benefit/suffer from 
high food prices as significant net sellers/buyers. Globally, insignificant net sellers (buyers) are 
found more (less) sensitive than significant net sellers (buyers) to changes in prices of most food 
items. Similarly to expenditure elasticities, accounting for frictions in the labor markets reduces the 
magnitude of most price elasticities.  
Hence, labor market failures tend to rigidify households’ responsiveness in the food markets due to 
the presence of virtual or shadow effects. These findings are consistent with widespread evidence 
on agricultural household responses to market incentives when imperfections are accounted for. For 
instance, studies by de Janvry et al. (1991) and Taylor and Adelman (2002) found significant 
disparities in households’ reactions to price changes in markets with and without frictions, the 
former generally reporting lower responses than the latter. These results also underscore the risk of 
biased welfare estimates when we make the assumption of separability between production and 
consumption decisions of agricultural households and, as a direct consequence, the welfare effects 
of price increases would probably be over-estimated (at least in the present study) with evident 
adverse consequences on policy implementations. 
 
 
                                                          
46
 However, due to transaction costs more or less important in most developing countries, there is a wedge between 
producer or farmgate prices and consumer prices.  Therefore, income growth rate consecutive to food price increases 
will generally be lower than growth rates of consumption expenditures. 
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Table  2.10 Own-price Hicksian elasticities by net market position 
 2005/6 2009/10 2010/11 Net market position (pooled sample) 
A B C D E 
a. Separable model (Perfect labor market) 
 
1  -0.635 
(0.040)
***
 
-0.732 
(0.038)
 ***
 
-0.696 
(0.035)
 ***
 
-0.642 
(0.042)
 ***
 
-0.546 
(0.027)
 ***
 
-1.026 
(0.046)
 ***
 
-0.672 
(0.027)
 ***
 
-0.784 
(0.029)
 ***
 
2  
-0.684 
(0.048)
***
 
-0.702 
(0.044)
 ***
 
-0.678 
(0.064)
 ***
 
-0.516 
(0.119)
 ***
 
-0.632 
(0.049)
 ***
 
-0.978 
(0.043)
 ***
 
-0.598 
(0.053)
 ***
 
-0.637 
(0.047)
 ***
 
3  
-0.894 
(0.044)
***
 
-0.779 
(0.041)
 ***
 
-0.958 
(0.149)
 ***
 
-0.784 
(0.147)
 ***
 
-0.600 
(0.043)
 ***
 
-0.764 
(0.053)
 ***
 
-0.776 
(0.046)
 ***
 
-0.617 
(0.051)
 ***
 
4  
-0.790 
(0.062)
***
 
-0.798 
(0.055)
 ***
 
-0.788 
(0.072)
 ***
 
-0.801 
(0.129)
 ***
 
-0.693 
(0.075)
 ***
 
-0.795 
(0.054)
 ***
 
-0.785 
(0.068)
 ***
 
-0.756 
(0.061)
 ***
 
5  
-0.514 
(0.050)
***
 
-0.500 
(0.045)
 ***
 
-0.537 
(0.040)
 ***
 
-0.427 
(0.072)
 ***
 
-0.508 
(0.039)
 ***
 
-0.621 
(0.042)
 ***
 
-0.515 
(0.042)
 ***
 
-0.531 
(0.040)
 ***
 
6  
-1.001 
(0.030)
***
 
-1.223 
(0.030)
 ***
 
-1.119 
(0.026)
 ***
 
-1.260 
(0.026)
 ***
 
-1.014 
(0.031)
 ***
 
-1.129 
(0.029)
 ***
 
-1.003 
(0.025)
 ***
 
-1.158 
(0.027)
 ***
 
7  
-0.668 
(0.027)
***
 
-0.760 
(0.025)
 ***
 
-0.753 
(0.028)
 ***
 
-0.743 
(0.030)
 ***
 
-0.745 
(0.030)
 ***
 
-0.763 
(0.024)
 ***
 
-0.744 
(0.030)
 ***
 
-0.760 
(0.025)
 ***
 
8  
-0.596 
(0.039)
***
 
-0.626 
(0.039)
 ***
 
-0.328 
(0.006)
 ***
 
-0.350 
(0.034)
 ***
 
-0.365 
(0.045)
 ***
 
-0.305 
(0.036)
 ***
 
-0.258 
(0.039)
 ***
 
-0.257 
(0.039)
 ***
 
9  
-0.715 
(0.041)
***
 
-0.727 
(0.045)
 ***
 
-0.735 
(0.037)
 ***
 
-0.577 
(0.024)
 ***
 
-0.768 
(0.050)
 ***
 
-0.759 
(0.047)
 ***
 
-0.773 
(0.054)
 ***
 
-0.760 
(0.052)
 ***
 
10  
-0.750 
(0.040)
***
 
-0.700 
(0.051)
 ***
 
-0.751 
(0.041)
 ***
 
-0.734 
(0.044)
 ***
 
-0.711 
(0.048)
 ***
 
-0.747 
(0.041)
 ***
 
-0.740 
(0.043)
 ***
 
-0.708 
(0.049)
 ***
 
11  
-0.239 
(0.009)
***
 
-0.196 
(0.011)
 ***
 
-0.319 
(0.009)
 ***
 
-0.340 
(0.011)
 ***
 
-0.285 
(0.009)
 ***
 
-0.269 
(0.010)
 ***
 
-0.217 
(0.011)
 ***
 
-0.214 
(0.011)
 ***
 
         
b. Non-separable model (imperfect labor market) 
 
1  
-0.451 
(0.012)
***
 
-0.581 
(0.013)
 ***
 
-0.561 
(0.014)
 ***
 
-0.642 
(0.042)
 ***
 
-0.528 
(0.014)
 ***
 
-0.838 
(0.011)
 ***
 
-0.569 
(0.034)
 ***
 
-0.653 
(0.040)
 ***
 
2  
-0.431 
(0.011)
***
 
-0.684 
(0.010)
 ***
 
-0.549 
(0.014)
 ***
 
-0.516 
(0.119)
 ***
 
-0.573 
(0.013)
***
 
-0.859 
(0.008)
 ***
 
-0.423 
(0.030)
 ***
 
-0.582 
(0.039)
 ***
 
3  
-0.669 
(0.006)
***
 
-0.671 
(0.006)
 ***
 
-0.697 
(0.013)
 ***
 
-0.784 
(0.147)
 ***
 
-0.699 
(0.006)
 ***
 
-0.680 
(0.005)
 ***
 
-0.691 
(0.020)
 ***
 
-0.703 
(0.014)
 ***
 
4  
-0.661 
(0.007)
***
 
-0.642 
(0.010)
 ***
 
-0.660 
(0.007)
 ***
 
-0.801 
(0.129)
 ***
 
-0.684 
(0.005)
 ***
 
-0.674 
(0.005)
 ***
 
-0.694 
(0.019)
 ***
 
-0.664 
(0.025)
 ***
 
5  
-0.326 
(0.029)
***
 
-0.413 
(0.017)
 ***
 
-0.472 
(0.015)
 ***
 
-0.427 
(0.072)
 ***
 
-0.432 
(0.037)
 ***
 
-0.482 
(0.011)
 ***
 
-0.342 
(0.066)
** 
-0.333 
(0.053)
 ***
 
6  
-0.763 
(0.049)
***
 
-0.773 
(0.004)
 ***
 
-0.778 
(0.005)
 ***
 
-1.260 
(0.026)
 ***
 
-0.775 
(0.005)
 ***
 
-0.782 
(0.003)
 ***
 
-0.763 
(0.012)
 ***
 
-0.783 
(0.009)
 ***
 
7  
-0.584 
(0.009)
***
 
-0.606 
(0.008)
 ***
 
-0.576 
(0.011)
 ***
 
-0.743 
(0.030)
 ***
 
-0.553 
(0.014)
 ***
 
-0.583 
(0.008)
 ***
 
-0.615 
(0.020)
 ***
 
-0.623 
(0.022)
 ***
 
8  
-0.763 
(0.049)
***
 
-0.625 
(0.045)
 ***
 
-0.492 
(0.039)
 ***
 
-0.350 
(0.034)
 ***
 
-0.943 
(0.055)
 ***
 
-0.549 
(0.030)
 ***
 
-0.883 
(0.180)
 ***
 
-0.603 
(0.114)
 ***
 
9  
-0.708 
(0.006)
***
 
-0.723 
(0.007)
 ***
 
-0.787 
(0.023)
 ***
 
-0.577 
(0.024)
 ***
 
-0.798 
(0.012)
 ***
 
-0.769 
(0.007)
 ***
 
-0.873 
(0.045)
 ***
 
-0.757 
(0.011)
 ***
 
10  
-0.681 
(0.013)
***
 
-0.637 
(0.021)
 ***
 
-0.683 
(0.015)
 ***
 
-0.734 
(0.044)
 ***
 
-0.679 
(0.017)
 ***
 
-0.652 
(0.013)
 ***
 
-0.657 
(0.040)
 ***
 
-0.660 
(0.046)
 ***
 
11  
-0.346 
(0.048)
***
 
-0.474 
(0.055)
 ***
 
-0.451 
(0.124)
 ***
 
-0.340 
(0.011)
 ***
 
-0.598 
(0.049)
 ***
 
-0.413 
(0.039)
 ***
 
-0.329 
(0.273)
 ***
 
-0.444 
(0.109)
 ***
 
Note: i  are conditional Hicksian own-price elasticities obtained from table A.1. Item indices: 1: Matooke; 2: Cassava; 
3:  Potatoes; 4: Maize; 5: Beans; 6: Meat and fish; 7: Fruits and vegetables; 8: Fats and oils; 9: Other foods; and 10: 
Alcohol and tobacco; and 11: Leisure.( 
***
 )  and (
**
) denote significance level at 1 and 5%, respectively. A represents 
non – agricultural households, B significant net sellers, C significant net buyers, D insignificant net sellers, and E 
insignificant net buyers.  
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2.5.3 Welfare effects of price changes 
The derivations of both shadow wages and different demand elasticities permit the computation of 
welfare effects of food prices, using real changes between 2005/6 and 2009/10, and between 
2009/10 and 2010/11. In computing these compensating variations, this essay diverges from almost 
all the previous studies in two different ways. First, instead of applying hypothetical price 
simulations as it is commonly done in many empirical studies on price shocks, the essay takes 
advantage of the availability of household panel data collected during periods of stable and high 
prices which allows to take account of changes that households really experienced. Second, and 
contrarily to virtually all previous studies, we derive an expression of compensating variations 
encompassing labor market frictions. We present in this paragraph successively first-order effects 
and global (first- plus second-order) welfare effects of price changes under both perfect and 
imperfect labor markets. We are thus able to evaluate the order of magnitude of these frictions. As 
is standard in empirical literature, these compensating variations are expressed as the percentage of 
the household real expenditures in the baseline periods (2005/06 for price changes between 2005/06 
and 2009/10, and 2009/10 for changes between 2009/10 and 2010/11). These money-metric welfare 
measures are reported such that positive (negative) values represent welfare losses (gains) due to 
increases in real food prices. They indicate by what percentage an average Ugandan household 
would have to increase (decrease) its current total expenditures to achieve the same utility level 
attained in the corresponding comparison period. 
First-order welfare effects of price changes 
These first-order or direct effects only consider the immediate welfare consequences of price 
changes without accounting for potential substitution mechanisms across commodities. What is 
apparent from the results reported in table 2.11 is that the magnitude of these effects was dependent 
of the poverty status of households
47
, their net position in the food market, and the inclusion or not 
of labor market frictions. Under separable models, real price increases between 2005/06 and 
2009/10 led to an overall welfare gain of 11.1%, implying that a typical Ugandan household needed 
to decrease its total expenditures by 11.1% in 2009/10 in order to reach the utility level achieved in 
2005/06. However, this overall gain hides substantial differences among households. Non-
agricultural households are, unsurprisingly, among the biggest losers from price increases. Their 
direct welfare losses were evaluated at 41.9%, suggesting that they would need to be compensated 
                                                          
47
 Poverty lines were constructed using the Cost-of-basic-needs approach and applying the procedure proposed by 
Ravallion and Bidani (1993), and Appleton (2001).  
Essay II 
 
72 
 
by about 42% of their food expenditures in 2009/10 in order to offset the effects of food price 
increases between 2005/6 and 2009/10.  
Table 2.11 Direct welfare effects of price changes between 2005/6 and 2010/11 under separability (SM) and 
non-separability (NSM) (CV as a % of initial household expenditures) 
  
Model 
2005/6-2009/10 2009/10-2010/11 
 Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors 
 
 
All households 
SM -0.111 0.026
*** 
0.094 0.004
*** 
NSM 0.136 0.058
** 
0.041 0.004
*** 
 
 
Agricultural 
SM -0.271 0.030
*** 
0.079 0.005
*** 
NSM  0.038       0.069 0.014 0.004
*** 
 
Non-agricultural S/NSM  0.419 0.016
*** 
0.155 0.008
*** 
 
 
Rural 
SM -0.270 0.031
*** 
      0.081 0.005
*** 
NSM  0.078       0.034
*
 0.024 0.005
*** 
 
 
Urban  
SM  0.489 0.034
*** 
0.141 0.007
*** 
NSM  0.355 0.085
*** 
0.102 0.008
*** 
 
 
Poor 
SM  0.338 0.051
***
 0.115 0.004
*** 
NSM  0.197       0.101
* 
0.044 0.004
*** 
 
 
Non-poor 
SM -0.208 0.031
*** 
-0.090 0.011
*** 
NSM  0.119       0.063
* 
 0.031       0.012
* 
 
 
Significant  net sellers 
SM -0.269 0.053
*** 
-0.149 0.007
*** 
NSM -0.087 0.023
*** 
-0.058       0.011 
 
 
Significant net buyers 
SM  0.211 0.032
*** 
 0.164 0.004
*** 
NSM  0.078 0.012
*** 
  0.041 0.005
*** 
 
 
Insignificant  net sellers 
SM -0.103 0.142
*** 
-0.050 0.014
*** 
NSM      -0.045       0.022
* 
     -0.019 0.008
*** 
 
 
Insignificant net buyers 
SM  0.061 0.011
*** 
      0.139       0.013
 
NSM  0.041 
 
      0.083       0.016 
 
0.005
*** 
Note: Standard errors are reported into brackets. (
***
), (
**
), and (
*
) denote significant levels at 1, 5, and 10%, 
respectively. 
Indeed, contrarily to agricultural households, these households cannot rely on agricultural revenues 
to compensate for price increases. Furthermore, consistent with previous studies, poor and urban 
households also experienced welfare losses of the order of 33.8 and 48.9% (Porto, 2010; Alem, 
2011; Tefera et al., 2012). Notwithstanding agricultural households’ gains from price increases 
(27.1% on average), welfare effects were unevenly distributed among them. Both significant and 
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insignificant net buyers suffered the most with respectively 21.1 and 6.1% of welfare losses. By 
contrast, significant net sellers obtained the highest positive welfare effects (26.9% on average) 
while, in comparison, insignificant net sellers benefited only marginally from price increases 
(10.3%). As shown in table 2.4, significant net sellers experienced the highest increases in both crop 
sales (+23.6%) and farm profits (+33.1%) between 2005/6 and 2009/10, which thereby increased 
their profit effect and offset the magnitude of price fluctuations. While food prices also increased 
between 2009/10 and 2010/11, Ugandan households globally lost from price upsurges. On average, 
they had to increase their expenditures of 2010/11 by 9.4% if they wanted to remain at their 
2009/10’s welfare level. The reason behind this contrasting picture could reside in the relatively 
small price increases between 2009/10 and 2010/11 (21.4%) compared to increases in real prices 
between 2005/6 and 2009/10 (139.2%). Only significant net sellers (14.9%) and to a marginal 
extent, insignificant net sellers (5%) gained from price increases.  
When we allow for imperfections in the labor market, the extent of welfare effects for all 
households is strikingly reduced. Particularly during the first sub-period, Ugandan households as a 
whole lost from price increases (13.6%). Although net sellers are still benefiting from food price 
increases, their welfare gains decline in the first sub-period by 67.7% and 56.3% for significant and 
insignificant net sellers, respectively, whereas the losses of net buyers are 63.3 % and 32.8% lower 
for significant and insignificant net buyers, respectively. In the second sub-period, the global 
welfare loss is now 56.4% lower than that obtained under no labor market frictions. These results 
are in line with standard non-separable agricultural household models whereby market failures often 
hamper farmers’ responsiveness to price changes or reduce their abilities to respond to price 
incentives (Singh et al., 1986; de Janvry et al, 1991; Taylor and Adelman, 2003; Löfgren and 
Robinson, 2002).  
 
Welfare effects of price changes accounting for substitution effects 
Although conclusions drawn from the first-order welfare effects provide useful primary insights of 
price impacts, they have the drawback of ignoring the potential substitution effects of households 
who generally substitute away from commodities whose relative prices have increased. Thus, they 
tend to overestimate the negative impacts for welfare losers (non-agricultural households, poor, or 
net buyers) and underestimate the positive effects for welfare gainers (agricultural and rural 
households, net sellers). Accordingly, we also report in table 2.12 welfare effects accounting for 
substitution effects.  
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Table 2.12 Total welfare effects of price changes between 2005/6 and 2010/11 under separability (SM) and 
non-separability (NSM) (CV as a % of initial household expenditures) 
 Model 2005/6-2009/10 2009/10-2010/11 
 Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors 
 
 
All households 
SM -0.154 0.027
*** 
0.042  0.004
*** 
NSM  0.097        0.057
* 
0.019  0.003
*** 
 
 
Agricultural 
SM      -0.299 0.031
*** 
0.029  0.005
*** 
NSM -0.009        0.068 -0.001        0.003 
 
Non-agricultural S/NSM  0.238 0.017
*** 
 0.101  0.008
*** 
 
 
Rural 
SM -0.397 0.032
*** 
      0.031  0.005
*** 
NSM  0.028        0.069 0.007        0.004
* 
 
 
Urban  
SM  0.393 0.036
*** 
0.082  0.008
*** 
NSM  0.305 0.077
*** 
0.060  0.006
*** 
 
 
Poor 
SM  0.265 0.052
*** 
0.082  0.011
*** 
NSM  0.100        0.055
* 
0.022  0.003
*** 
 
 
Non-poor 
SM -0.280 0.031
*** 
    -0.123    0.005
*** 
NSM   0.085        0.019
*** 
      0.006         0.010 
 
 
Significant  net sellers 
SM      -0.354 0.053
*** 
    -0.200  0.007
*** 
NSM -0.131 0.023
*** 
    -0.068  0.011
*** 
 
 
Significant net buyers 
SM  0.123 0.032
*** 
     0.113  0.005
*** 
NSM  0.051 0.007
*** 
     0.024  0.002
*** 
 
 
Insignificant  net sellers 
SM -0.177 0.143
*** 
    -0.101  0.013
*** 
NSM -0.073        0.036
** 
    -0.035  0.009
*** 
 
 
Insignificant net buyers 
SM  0.035  0.003
*** 
     0.086  0.013
*** 
NSM  0.009        0.012      0.014  0.004
*** 
Note: Standard errors are reported into brackets. (
***
), (
**
), and (
*
) denote significant levels at 1, 5, and 10%, 
respectively. 
Between 2005/6 and 2009/10, welfare gains increased on average by 38.7% under separability and 
welfare losses decreased by 28.6% under non-separability. During the second comparison period, 
welfare losses declined respectively by 53.7% and 55.3% in models with and without labor market 
frictions respectively.  The fact that these substitution effects are relatively high reflect large 
possibilities of diet diversification in Uganda where none of the staple foods represents more than 
20% of average daily caloric intakes (FAO, 2009a; Benson et al., 2008; Haggblade and Dewina, 
2012). Households have therefore a bunch of possibilities to substitute away from expensive 
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commodities. However, not all households have the same improvements in their welfare estimates 
when allowing for commodity substitution effects. For instance, between 2005/06 and 2009/10, 
poor households recorded the smallest changes in terms of welfare effects.  Their losses only fell by 
21.6% against for example an increase of 34.6% for non-poor households under perfect labor 
markets. Indeed, it is reasonable to think that since the diet of poor households is often made up of 
cheap commodities, most possibilities of substitution have already been accounted for, hampering 
the magnitude of their second-order effects.  Furthermore, although agricultural households have 
now gained from price increases in the non-separable models, these welfare effects were too small 
(-0.9% and -0.1% in both sub-periods, respectively) to be significant. Between 2005/6 and 2009/10, 
all agricultural households reported large changes in welfare effects due to substitution across 
commodities under both separability and non-separability. However, during the second sub-period, 
although second-order effects certainly dampened the extent of adverse welfare impacts of price 
changes, they were insufficient to countervail them and transform first-order losers to overall 
gainers.  
The estimated welfare effects reported in tables 2.11 and 2.12 indicate the importance of accounting 
for both labor market frictions and the net seller/buyer status of Ugandan households. These results 
may also suggest that the estimated compensating variations could vary across the income or 
expenditure distribution within the same sub-group of households. In order to explore this 
possibility, we estimated non-parametric locally weighted regressions (LOWESS) using Gaussian 
kernels. The first-order and total (first- and second-order) welfare effects are regressed on the 
logarithm of real monthly total expenditures per adult equivalent for non-agricultural households 
and all sub-groups of agricultural households. Figure 2.1 plots these various welfare effects’ 
distributions of price changes. The solid curves represent first-order effects while the dotted curves 
display the welfare effects accounting for substitution across commodities. The horizontal dotted 
line (at 0) gives the threshold below (above) which the welfare effects become positive (negative).  
Keeping in mind that negative (positive) values of the compensating variations represent welfare 
gains (losses), the general shape of the regression function (part 1.a.) seems to indicate that middle-
class households suffered the least from food price increases between 2005/6 and 2009/10.  By 
contrast, households located at the extremes of the expenditure distributions (the poorest and the 
wealthiest households) were the most hit by price changes. While it is easier for rich households to 
smooth their consumption without jeopardizing their food security or asset holdings, the poorest 
households do not have large possibilities and may cope with price increases by reducing their 
livestock or cuting off other household expenditures, such as education or health. On the other hand, 
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a closer look at the different sub-groups helps grasp the differences in welfare distributions across 
households. Among all sub-groups, non-agricultural households displayed the largest substitution 
effects while the possibilities of substitution appear small for richer significant net sellers. However, 
these second-order effects (the differences between the two curves) appeared particularly neutrally 
distributed for non-agricultural households. At each percentile of expenditure distributions, 
substitution effects are relatively of equal weight, contrarily for instance to significant 
(insignificant) net sellers where households at highest (lowest) percentiles have much (less) 
possibilities of substitution.  
 
Figure 2.1 Non-parametric estimates of the relationship between compensating variations and household 
expenditures (2005/6-2009/10) – Separable models 
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Dynamics of net market position and welfare effects 
As shown in the previous paragraphs, the total welfare impact of price changes will hinge 
essentially upon the magnitude of these changes, the extent of the market surplus or deficit, and 
households’ sensitivity to price movements. In the case of a marginal deficit, the high consumption 
cost due to increased food prices may be more than offset by higher income from agricultural 
activities. This perspective may enhance the possibility to expand production and lead to a shift 
from subsistence production to cash crop activities (Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994; Govereh et al., 
1999; Barrett and Dorosh, 1996) or even a change in the net market position of agricultural 
households (Porto, 2010; Aksoy et al., 2010). For instance, using Mexican data, Porto (2010) 
showed that farmers may change their net selling or buying status in case of large substitution 
effects between crops grown and produced.  Aksoy et al. (2010) also noted that between 1993 and 
1998, price changes pushed about 21% of Vietnamese households to switch between being net rice 
seller and net buyer. Among them, 15% net rice buyers in 1993 became net sellers by 1998, while 
29% followed the inverse pathway.  
Theoretically, in periods of large price increases, switching from a net buying to net selling position 
would also change the welfare status from loser to gainer.  A natural way to address these net 
market position dynamics is by using transition matrices that depict a household net food position at 
time t-1 and its current position at t. Table 2.13 summarizes these dynamics by showing the percent 
of Ugandan households that shifted from one net market position to another during the first and 
second sub-periods. The percents in the main diagonals (values in bold) give the proportions of non-
movers between t-1 and t while off-diagonal percents refer to household switchers.  
A feature that immediately jumped out of these figures is the prominence of important dynamics. 
First, in both sub-periods, non-agricultural households and significant net buyers appear trapped in 
their respective sub-groups, especially in the second-period where around 89% and 77% of non-
agricultural households and significant net buyers did not change their net market position. Second, 
it is revealing that some Ugandan households shifted from non-agricultural households to farmers. 
This is particularly evident between 2005/6 and 2009/10 where 31.4% of non-agricultural 
households become farmers, either net sellers (4.3%) or net buyers (27.2%). This proportion 
dropped to 11% in the second period. A possible reason could be the relative attractiveness of 
agricultural activities consecutive to food price increases during the sample period. Third, only less 
than 50% of significant net sellers managed to maintain their status in both sub-periods and around 
40% of them even became significant net buyers. Some of them forewent farming activities in 
2009/10 (1.1%) and 2010/11 (3.9%). Fourth, in both sub-periods, insignificant net sellers and 
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buyers were the most dynamic. Indeed, 41% and 34% of insignificant net sellers and net buyers in 
2005/6 switched to being significant net sellers in 2009/10, whereas in 2010/1, these proportions are 
reduced to 26% and 30%, respectively. However, the percent of agricultural households that shifted 
from their initial status to becoming significant net buyers is the most important for all types of 
farmers. Hence, by and large, it was relatively easier during the sample period for agricultural 
households to switch to a significant net buyer status than shifting to any other type of household. 
 
 
Table 2.13 Dynamics of food net market position between 2005/6 and 2010/11 
 2009/10 
  A B C D E Total 
 A 68.56 3.55 25.53 0.71 1.65 423 
 
 
2005/6 
B 1.09 48.01 39.49 5.80 5.62 552 
C 6.42 1.66 62.33 3.04 4.08 1,152 
D 3.70 40.74 45.68 6.17 3.70 81 
E 2.64 34.31 55.88 1.96 4.90 102 
Total 16.28 24.37 51.99 3.33 4.03 2,310 
 
 2010/11 
 
 
 
2009/10 
 A B C D E Total 
A 89.10 1.33 9.31 0.27 0 376 
B 3.91 44.23 40.85 6.39 4.62 563 
C 6.33 12.66 77.10 2.00 1.92 1,201 
D 1.30 25.97 61.04 2.60 9.09 77 
E 3.23 30.11 59.14 4.30 3.23 93 
Total 18.92 19.65 55.97 2.90 2.55 2,310 
Note: A represents non – agricultural households, B significant net sellers, C significant net buyers, D 
insignificant net sellers, and E insignificant net buyers. The last columns give the total number of observations. 
 
To see how these movements into and out of net seller/net buyer status translated into changes in 
households’ welfare, we report in table 2.14 the average compensating variations of switchers and 
non-movers from both separable and non-separable models. It is therefore possible to judge of the 
“rationality” of each switch relative to the status quo. As expected, all households that became 
significant net sellers gained from food price increases. However, in the first-sub period, the welfare 
gains of switchers are much less important than those reported by non-mover significant net sellers, 
whereas in the second period, the magnitudes of their welfare effects only slightly diverge. 
Furthermore, in the first sub-period, agricultural households that abandoned their farming activities 
lost more than non-agricultural households that did not switch.  
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Table 2.14 Net market position switching movements and welfare effects of price changes 
 2009/10 
  A B C D E 
 A 0.229 [0.229] -0.325 [-0.177] 0.082 [0.037] -0.114 [-0.09] 0.052 [0.034] 
 
2005/6 
B 0.256 [0.256] -0.577 [-0.196] 0.225 [0.075] -0.223 [-0.084] 0.042 [0.000] 
C 0.267 [0.267] -0.299 [-0.184] 0.226 [0.049] -0.136 [-0.177] 0.027 [0.017] 
D 0.287 [0.287] -0.367 [-0.329] 0.061 [0.024] -0.209 [-0.068] 0.033 [0.012] 
E 0.254 [0.254] -0.365 [-0.042] 0.257 [0.014] -0.310 [0.014] 0.045 [0.031] 
 2010/11 
 
 
 
2009/10 
 A B C D E 
A 0.097 [0.097] -0.184 [-0.057] 0.175 [0.077] 0.017 [-0.008] - 
B 0.161 [0.161] -0.192 [-0.062] 0.092 [0.019] -0.087 [-0.018] 0.071 [0.011] 
C   0.104 [0.104] -0.217 [-0.086] 0.119 [0.025] -0.128 [-0.053] 0.101 [0.020] 
D -0.004 [-0.004] -0.222 [-0.063] 0.102 [0.010] -0.148 [-0.006] 0.087 [0.000] 
E   0.052 [0.052] -0.161 [-0.031] 0.083 [0.013] -0.079 [-0.103] 0.035 [0.092] 
Note: A represents non – agricultural households, B significant net sellers, C significant net buyers, D 
insignificant net sellers, and E insignificant net buyers. In each cell, total welfare effects (first-order plus second-
order effects) are reported. Compensating variations from non-separable models are displayed into brackets.  (-): 
no observation. 
 
Overall, these figures suggest that it was “rational” during the sample period, at least in the 
perspective of compensating variations, for non-agricultural households to engage into farming 
activities, and particularly to become significant net sellers. For these latter, it was not in their 
interest to change their status or if this happens anyway, they should stay net sellers, though 
marginally. Significant net buyers would gain by shifting to a significant-net-seller position or if 
this is impossible, they could minimize their welfare losses by reducing their food market deficit at 
the levels of insignificant net buyers. Finally, insignificant net sellers would improve their positive 
welfare effects of price changes by increase their market surplus, whereas insignificant net buyers 
would rather be net sellers or, as in the second sub-period, drop from farming activities if they 
cannot sustain their position. 
 
2.6 Conclusions  
 
The motivation behind this second study stemmed from the evidence of soaring food prices that 
Uganda has been experiencing since 2008 and the lack of updated empirical studies on the potential 
consequences of price changes on households. To that end, the study made use of a non-recursive 
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agricultural household model under the assumption of labor market imperfections to derive the 
welfare effects of price surges between 2005/6 and 2010/11. The data came from three of the latest 
waves of the Uganda National Panel Surveys (UNPS) collected in 2005/6, 2009/10, and 2010/11 
and covering each 2,310 households from all the four geographical regions of the country and 
periods of both stable and volatile food prices.  
On the production side, the separability hypothesis has been rejected, suggesting that household’s 
production and consumption decisions were intertwined. On the consumption side, the QUAIDS 
model specification has been tested and adopted to derive expenditure and price demand elasticities 
of ten commodities groups, namely matooke, cassava, potatoes, maize, beans, meat and fish, fruits 
and vegetables, fats and oils, other foods, alcohol and tobacco, as well as leisure time. To allow for 
household’s heterogeneous behavior with regards to food price changes, households were divided 
into five exclusive groups based on their net market position: non-agricultural households, 
significant net sellers, significant net buyers, insignificant or marginal net sellers and insignificant 
net buyers.  
It appeared that Ugandan households not only reacted differently to price changes but also were 
differently affected by food price inflation between 2005/6 and 2010/11. Results from the 
compensating variations revealed that welfare effects of price changes were on average globally 
lower when labor market imperfections are accounted for, which implies that separable models tend 
to overstate welfare impacts of price shocks. Further, locally weighted scatterplot smoother 
(LOWESS) regressions showed that, globally, for most household categories, welfare losses were 
the highest for the poorest and, surprisingly, richest categories. This provides evidence that not only 
welfare effects of price changes were unequally distributed both within the same household group 
and between different household categories, but also that poor households were those who suffered 
the most from price upsurges, exacerbating the vulnerability to other types of shocks. Finally, the 
estimation results shed light on important dynamics that occur in the net food market position for 
most households. In particular, we found that a significant proportion of agricultural households 
switched from a net seller to net buyer position and the other way around. As consequence, the 
welfare effects of price changes also reported a similar pattern during the sample period.  
Although the above conclusions help understand what happened to Ugandan households between 
2005/6 and 2010/11, two important facts should be kept in mind. First, our findings are ultimately 
anchored to the assumption of a partial equilibrium framework, particularly that all other sources of 
changes are being held constant. We therefore left out the potential spillover or multiplier effects 
that food price increases might have induced to the rest of the Ugandan economy (Akson and 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
 
 
81 
 
Hoekman, 2010). For example, between 2005 and 2011, the Ugandan economy grew annually at an 
average rate of 7.7% (WDI, 2012), and this could have dampened the negative effects of price 
shocks through income increases. Allowing for these spillover effects through a general equilibrium 
model might improve our estimates (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006). Second, we estimated direct 
welfare impacts and allowed for substitution effects across commodities by using only 
compensating variations and ignoring the risky nature of household activities, most of whom being 
agricultural. Hence, it is possible to extend the analysis carried in the present study by estimating 
for example the extent to which Ugandan households would be willing to pay for price stabilization 
(Bellemare et al., 2013) or by incorporating risk factors both in the consumption and production 
sides of households. 
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Essay III 
 
How strongly do agricultural risks and farmers’ expectations 
influence acreage decisions? 
Dynamic models of land use in Uganda 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Farming is inherently a risky activity. Between the planting and harvest seasons, agro-climatic and 
economic conditions wherein the farmers operate can change drastically. The consequences of 
production decisions, generally made well in advance, are thus imperfectly predictable, leading to 
farm revenues either better or worse than expected (Harwood et al., 1999; Hardaker et al., 2004). 
There are different types of risks to which a farmer is regularly exposed, among which 
production/yield and price risks. Production risk originates from supply shocks often related to 
weather conditions, such as insufficient or excessive rainfall and precipitation, extreme temperature, 
or from pest infestations.  On the other hand, price risks are usually related to fluctuations caused by 
changes in both demand and supply conditions (Coyle, 1992, 1999; Just and Pope, 2001; Isik, 
2002).  
Different management tools may help the farmers protect themselves ex-ante against production 
and price uncertainties
48
 or mitigate ex post their adverse consequences. These strategies range from 
crop insurance, production or futures options contracts, hedging in futures, to enterprise 
diversification (Harwood et al., 1999). While many of these options may mitigate the extent of 
production and price risks, their applicability in developing countries is quite limited due to various 
institutional and structural constraints, such as poor or absence of well-organized formal insurance 
and credit markets, the apparent complexity of such coping mechanisms for most farmers, often 
under-educated, or simply the lack of confidence and interest in those management tools. As an 
alternative, most farmers in developing countries rely on self-insurance measures to cope with 
agricultural risks and market fluctuations. They often make different adjustments in the cropping 
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 The terms risk and uncertain are used interchangeably in the study 
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pattern across both crops and agricultural seasons when they anticipate important changes in 
weather or market conditions.  
Understanding and evaluating the impact of both yield and/or price expectations and their 
variability on crop choices and acreage allocations have thus become the focus of attention of many 
applied agricultural economics’ studies. These studies, some dating back many decades, have 
developed both theoretical and empirical models of farmers’ responses in presence of price and 
yield uncertainties. In one of the early attempts to study acreage decisions under multivariate risk, 
Chavas and Holt (1990) estimated a system of acreage equations for corn and soybean in the United 
States and found that both risk and wealth variables were significant determinants of corn-soybean 
acreage allocation decisions. Also, Fafchamps (1992) showed that, in developing countries, crop 
diversification is generally preferred by small farmers as a response to high price variance in the 
absence of formal insurance mechanisms. Recently, the swing in commodity prices in 2008, to 
levels not seen since the early 1970s, led to abundant empirical studies questioning the adjustement 
of land uses to these price changes (Hausman et al., 2012, and Livingston et al., 2008, 2014 for the 
United States; Weersink et al., 2010 for Ontario in Canada; Lacroix and Thomas, 2011 for France).  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, several studies have been conducted on the determinants of land allocations. 
Among them, Chibwana et al. (2011) and Mponela et al. (2011) reported that household 
characteristics (age, education, sex, land ownership, and non-farm incomes) were the main drivers 
of changes in land distribution patterns in Malawi. Constructing farmers’ risk indices from 
Ethiopian data, Bezabih et al. (2011) found that crop portfolio choice was essentially influenced by 
rainfall variability and that farmers were likely to choose less risky crops at the expense of high 
returns. In Uganda, Mwaura (2014) concluded that access to infrastructure, households’ stock of 
education and cultivated area were the key factors that affect land allocations.  
Methodologically, different approaches have been applied to estimate acreage response functions. 
They range from the estimation of structural models of multi-output profit function, input 
allocations and land use (Carpentier and Letort, 2009; Fezzi and Bateman, 2011; Lacroix and 
Thomas, 2011; Kaminski et al., 2013) to reduced-form crop choice models (Bezabih et al., 2011; 
Anderson and Wang, 2012; Allen, 2012). 
Built on these studies, this third essay aims at modeling and estimating the responsiveness of 
agricultural land allocations to changes in agro-climatic and economic conditions, with a particular 
emphasis on price and yield risks and farmers’ expectations of their levels. The study revisits 
acreage response models based on the theoretical framework of Chavas and Holt (1990), Coyle 
(1992), and Holt (1999) in order to investigate the main drivers of crop portfolio decisions by 
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farmers in developing countries under risks and unobserved farm and crop heterogeneity. It makes 
several contributions to the existing empirical studies on farmer’s acreage responses.  
First, it explores two intertwined dimensions related to acreage decisions that are often emphasized 
in the literature, namely a multivariate crop selection and the allocation of land area to each 
potential crop. To take account of this interdependence, farmers’ acreage responses are modeled as 
a two-step procedure. During the first step, farmers determine which crop(s) to grow given their 
expectations of end-of-season prices and yields, their volatility, and other control variables (weather 
volatility, farmer and land characteristics…). Conditional on the selected crops, farmers then decide 
how to share out their land.  
Second, while the majority of the previous studies are essentially based on static models and 
therefore ignore the dynamic nature embodied in agricultural activities, this essay models farmers’ 
decisions as a dynamic process, thereby capturing the possibility of both own and cross state 
dependencies as well as distinguishing between genuine and spurious state dependencies.  
Third, most of the existing studies have centered their attention on aggregated or county-level 
estimations of land use allocations. Although aggregated data are generally easily accessible and 
substantially minimize the presence of corner solutions, they present the downside of ignoring farm 
heterogeneity within counties or regions (Fezzi and Bateman, 2011). In this study, farmers’ acreage 
decisions are modeled and estimated using farm- and plot-level data. These data are often very 
comprehensive and provide complete information on input uses at plot level, land use allocations, 
farmers’ revenues, costs, and capital likely to improve the empirical analysis of farmers’ crop 
decisions. Furthermore, the panel nature of the data allows to control for unobserved farm 
heterogeneity which is often a major component in land-use models (Wu et al., 2004; Lacroix and 
Thomas, 2011).  
Fourth, although farm-level data permit direct estimations of acreage share responses to exogenous 
shocks, the presence of important amount of zero observations in land-use allocations and the 
bounded nature of the land shares complicate the econometric analysis. To deal with these issues, 
most studies estimate crop share models using essentially multivariate Tobit specifications. The 
main drawback of these specifications is that they wrongly treat zero observations as a result of 
censoring and cannot ensure that the predicted crop shares will lie between 0 and 1 or sum up to 1 
for each farmer. As an alternative specification which assures that the above conditions are met, this 
study uses a multivariate generalization of the fractional regression model
49
 proposed by Papke and 
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 In her study of land allocations in Uganda, Mwaura (2014) also used a fractional multinomial logit model. However, 
the model presented here fundamentally differs from hers in many aspects. First, she only made use of  2 survey 
rounds (2005/6 and 2009/10)  while the present study takes advantage of the last four household surveys in Uganda 
and therefore  generalizes her results and provides much more robust estimates and interpretation. Second, her 
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Wooldridge (1996, 2008) and recently applied by Sivakumar and Bhat (2002), Mullahy and Robert 
(2010), Lopez-Garcia and Montero (2010), Wagner (2010), Koch (2010 ), and Mullahy (2011). The 
estimation approach is applied to six crops or crop groups (matooke, cassava, maize, potatoes, 
beans, and other cereals) using a four-wave balanced panel of 1,598 agricultural households in 
Uganda using data collected between 2005 and 2012 by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBoS) as 
part of the Living Standards Measurement Study-Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) of 
the World Bank. 
The results indicate that incorporating past farmers’ crop choices and accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity significantly improve the predictability performance of the land use models, thereby 
highlighting the importance of modeling crop choice decisions as a dynamic process. They also 
shed light on the presence of both strong inertia (positive own state dependence) for all crops but 
moderate spillover effects (significant cross-state dependence) for most crops. Moreover, farmers 
are found to be more sensitive to changes in expected yield levels than in expected end-of-season 
output prices, and yield risks, temperature and rainfall volatility have more impact on crop choices 
and acreage share allocations than market price risks.  
The remainder of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the conceptual model and its 
theoretical predictions. Section 3.3 discusses both the empirical implementation of the theoretical 
model and the related econometric issues. Section 3.4 describes the data used in the estimation of 
crop choice and acreage share models and further details the construction of some key variables and 
presents their descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 presents and discusses the main econometric results. 
Section 3.6 evaluates the prediction performance of the models and finally, section 3.7 gives some 
concluding remarks. 
3.2 Theoretical model 
 
In this section, I outline the theoretical model and the main assumptions made. Some of them are 
justified by the specificities of the Ugandan agricultural economy and the focus of the present study 
on price and yield risks, and land allocation constraints, while others mainly respond to the 
necessity to render the empirical models as tractable as possible and to minimize data requirements 
(Bonfatti, 2010). To motivate the econometric analysis, I develop a conceptual model in which a 
representative farmer has land as the only fixed allocation input. That is crops compete for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
model is essentially static and does not take account of unobserved heterogeneity among farmers or crops. Last but 
not least, her analyses leave aside the influence of risks (production, price, and weather risks) in driving farmers’ 
acreage decisions. 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
 
 
86 
 
allocations of a fixed amount of land, and consequently increases in the land share of one crop in 
the short run implies inevitably the adjustments in the land allocations of other crops. 
Consider a farmer that grows K different crops subject to the total land available L . Furthermore, let 
y be a 1K  vector of end-of-season yields (per acre) for the K crops, with elements ky ; p  a 1K  
vector of end-of-season output prices, with elements kp ; w a 1K  vector of per-acre production 
costs, with elements kw ; a a 1K  vector of acreages allocated to the K crops, with elements ka ; 
and as *)/1( L  a 1K  vector of acreage shares for the K crops, with elements ks . While 
production costs are generally known during the planting season, end-of-season outputs and crop 
prices are unobserved by the farmer at the time the production decisions are made because of 
various factors generally beyond the farmer’s control (rainfall variability, loss of all or part of 
production due to pest infestations,…) and must therefore be based on farmers’ expectations. 
Following Coyle (1999), I adopt a mean-variance approach which expressed the utility to be 
maximized   U  in terms of the first two moments of the farmer’s profit (expected profit  E  
and profit risk 2 ). The objective of the farmer is to maximize the expected utility of profit given 
the fixed land allocable constraint. Under both price and yield risks, the problem can be stated as: 
       
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where E is an expectation operator; kkkk wypr   is the per-acre net return of crop k. 
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kk wypyprrE  ,cov  is the per-acre expected net return of crop k, with 
e
kp  and 
e
ky  the 
expected price and per-acre yield of crop k; ks  is the acreage share devoted to crop k;  is the 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion which indicates risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-
seeking attitude if 0and,0,0   , respectively50.  Equation (3.1) sheds light on the 
role of both risks (price and output) and farmer’s risk attitude on the acreage allocation process.  
From equation (3.1), the K + 1 first-order conditions to the farmer’s optimization problem are given 
by: 
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 Throughout this essay, farmers are assumed to present some degree of risk aversion, as consistently outlined in 
many empirical studies (Binswanger, 1980 and 1981; Chavas and Holt, 1990; Pope and Just, 1991). 
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The solution to these FOCs gives a system of K optimal acreage share equations   ,,,,* Lrwps  
and the optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the land constraint   ,,,,* Lrwp
, with r , the variance-covariance matrix of crop returns. 
To see how these optimal acreage shares are modified by changes in price or yield risks, let us 
assume that the farmer only grows two competing crops, j and k
51
 and that 1 . Under the above 
model assumptions, the FOCs can be expressed as follows: 
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The system of optimal acreage shares and Lagrange multiplier associated with this model is then 
given by: 
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where   jkkjkj rr  2var 22  ; )var(2 kk r ; )var(2 jj r ; ),cov( kjjk rr  
Equation (3.5) reflects implicitly the patterns of both crop substitution and complementarity as it 
asserts that the optimal acreage share allocated to the first crop will depend on the differential in 
expected net returns, the total land available and the price and yield risks of each crop (through the 
variance and covariance of their net returns).  
How will the farmer react to a change in each of these variables? For simplicity, consider the case 
of statistical independence between end-of-season price and yield. In this case, the variance and 
covariance of the net returns are: 
      222222)var(var kekkekkkkkk ypypr    
and 
    jkekejekejjkjkkkjjkj yyppypypErr   ),(,cov  
where )var(2 kk p ; )var(
2
kk y ; ),cov( kjjk pp ; ),cov( kjjk yy  
The sensitivity of the acreage shares to changes in price and yield risks ( 2j ,
2
j ) and expected 
output prices ( ejp ,
e
kp ) can then be summarized as follows: 
                                                          
51
 The analysis can be readily generalized in case of K (>2) competing crops. See Holt (1999). 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
 
 
88 
 
   
   
     
      






























Drsrs
D
NppLDppLy
ps
Nif
D
NppLDLpy
ps
Nif
D
N
pLs
Nif
D
N
yLs
e
jk
e
kj
jk
e
jk
e
k
e
jjkk
e
k
e
ke
kj
jk
jk
e
kj
e
j
e
kjk
e
je
jj
e
jjjj
e
jjjj
/1//
22
ˆ/
0and00
2
/
00/
00/
**
2
22
*
2
2
*
2
222*
2
222*





 
 
with )var( kj rrLD   and    jkkekej LrrN   2  
In equations (3.8a) – (3.8d), optimal acreage share responses of crop j to changes in various 
exogenous variables are essentially driven by the differential in the expected net returns of the 
crops,  ekej rr  , the net return variance of the competing crop k, and the covariance between the net 
returns of j and k. For example, under the model assumptions, relation (3.8a) states that a risk-
averse farmer will reduce the acreage allocated to a crop j in response to increases in its price 
variance only if its expected net return exceeds that of crop k ( ek
e
j rr  ) and the expected net returns 
of k and j are either uncorrelated or negatively correlated ( 0jk ) . With regards to crop prices, 
equations (3.8c) and (3.8d) indicate that the responses of acreage shares to changes in expected 
prices are not straightforward. Hence, if the farmer anticipates a positive shock to the expected 
own-price of crop j, then the theoretical model predicts that he will allocate more land to that crop 
only if both yield and net return covariances are zero or negative, and that ek
e
j rr  . When it comes to 
the changes in the price of the competing crop, the model fails to predict an unambiguous sign even 
if one assumes that the expected prices, yields, and net revenues change in opposite directions. The 
sign will ultimately depend on the relative importance of each component.  
Finally, by using the symmetry condition in (3.8e), the relation between price elasticities of acreage 
shares of j and k is given by: 
   y
kj
y
jk
p
jk
e
k
e
j
p
kj
  /  
where   ** // kejejkpkj spdpds  and   ** // jekekjpjk spdpds  are land shares’ elasticities of k and j to 
changes in expected prices of j and k;   ** // jekekjyjk sydyds  is the land share elasticity of j to 
changes in expected yields of k; Lrs ejj
e
j  and Lrs
e
kk
e
k   are expected profits of crops j and k. 
From (3.9), the cross-price acreage share elasticities of crops j and k would be equal  pjkpkj    only 
(3.8d) 
(3.8e) 
(3.8c) 
(3.8b) 
(3.8a) 
(3.9) 
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when both the crop-specific expected profits are equal  ekej    and yield elasticities of land shares 
are equal    ykjyjk   . 
 
3.3 Empirical specification 
 
The empirical specification is guided by the two main objectives of this third essay: on the one 
hand, understand how farmers decide which crops to grow given agricultural and market-related 
risks, farmers’ expectations, and household characteristics; and on the other, what proportion of 
land should be optimally allocated to the selected crops. It follows that a farmer’s acreage decisions 
can be modeled as a two-step decision process. Firstly, the participation or selection step during 
which the farmer chooses the crops to grow. Secondly, the conditional acreage allocation step 
wherein the farmer derives the optimal acreage share for each selected crop. As pointed out by 
Lacroix and Thomas (2011: 785), this is a case of multivariate crop selection problem since “(…) 
unobserved components may affect the choice of several crops by the farmer while influencing the 
final outcome in terms of land for crop (…)”. Each above model allows farmers’ land decisions to 
be determined by both current farm, farmer (un)observed characteristics and past land use 
decisions, leading to a dynamic crop allocation model. The estimation of these dynamic models 
seeks to verify a possible state dependence in farm acreage decisions and support for adjustment 
effects in farmers’ land use, i.e. on the one hand, if farmers tend to continue to grow a crop once 
they have grown it previously or instead support for crop rotational effects; and on the other, if 
farmers maintain the same land share profile over time.   
Referring to the notation used in the previous section, let *hktI  and 
*
hkts  denote respectively the latent 
response variable and latent acreage share corresponding to the kth crop in the hth farm at time t, for 
,,...,1;,...,1 NhKk   and Tt ,...,1 ; let also 
hkt
I  and hkts  represent their observable counterparts. 
The latent dependent variables in the selection and acreage share models associated with each crop 
k at time t can be expressed as follows: 
tkhs
tkhI
hkthkt
hkthkt
,,,'
,,,'
*
*




k2
k1
γV
βV
 
where 1V  and 2V  are vectors of independent variables, sharing some common elements. In 1V is 
also included a vector of lagged dependent variables 1, thkI , for Kk ,...,1 , taking 1 if the farmer h 
grows crop k at time t – 1 and 0 otherwise. 2V  also contains the vector of lagged acreage shares 
(3.10) 
 
 
 
(3.11) 
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1, thks , for Kk ,...,1 , which allows current farmers’ decisions about a particular crop k to be 
influenced by previous allocation decisions on all competing crops.  
  and   are time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity which may exist at both the household level 
(for example unobserved farmer’s ability) and the crop level (for example, suitability of a particular 
crop to specific types of land).  hkt  and hkt  are error terms, assumed identically and independently 
distributed.  
The dynamic structure in both (3.10) and (3.11) creates two theoretical and methodological 
problems: the initial conditions’ problem and the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. The well-
known initial conditions’ problem stems from the fact that the start of our observational period may 
not necessarily coincide with the start of the stochastic process underlying farmers’ choices 
(Heckman, 1981a, b; Wooldridge, 2005a). In other words, crop and acreage decisions at time t = 1 
(our first observational time period) depend on farmers’ data at time t = 0, unavailable to the 
econometrician. As suggested by Wooldridge (2005a), one way of preventing estimators from being 
biased and inconsistent under the initial conditions’ problem is to include as an additional regressor 
the value of the dependent variable at time t = 1 (initial crop choice or initial acreage share, 
depending on the model). The second problem is related to the treatment of unobserved 
heterogeneity. A within-transformation procedure cannot be applied to get rid of   or   due to the 
nonlinearity of the models. Also, introducing 1K  dummy variables to estimate the unobserved 
heterogeneity will result in biased estimation of parameters in (3.10) and (3.11), unless T , the 
so-called incidental parameters problem (Wooldridge, 2005a). Following Papke and Wooldridge 
(2008) and Lacroix and Thomas (2011), I thus apply the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach which 
consists in writing   and   as a linear function of individual averaged values of time-varying 
covariates
52
. A similar approach has been applied by Erdem and Sun (2001), Devicienti and Poggi 
(2007), and Buddelmeyer and Wooden (2008).  Taking account of both the initial conditions’ and 
incidental parameters’ problems, the unobserved individual heterogeneity in each crop equation k is 
expressed as follows: 
Kkahkkk ,...,1,'  2hkk1h1 υυ'Δ  
      Kkwith ,...,1,,,,, ,2,1  hkhkhkh1h1h1 V,VsIΔ  
                                                          
52
 The Mundlak-Chamberlain approach relies on the assumption that   and  are normally distributed. Although this 
seems restrictive, it is easier to implement. To allow for a more flexible functional form, a non-parametric strategy, 
similar to that of Heckman and Singer (1984) could be adopted. However, the flexibility it allows comes at cost, like 
the non-convergence of the estimator or the impossibility to inverse the Hessian to get standard errors (Bigsten et al., 
2006).  
(3.12) 
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where   are individual random effects, assumed to be K-variate normal with variances 2k  and 
covariance between k and j  given by jkjk   . h1I  and h1s  are the vector of first observations of 
farm choice and acreage shares in farm h, respectively;   
T
tT 1
1
hkthk ;  hk2,hk1,hk V,V . hka  
is a random component assumed distributed  2,0 aktN  .  
These models are estimated for six main crops or crop groups: matooke ( 1k ), cassava ( 2k ), 
maize ( 3k ), potatoes53 ( 4k ), beans ( 5k ), other cereals54 ( 6k ), and a residual category 
defined as “other”55 ( 7k ). In what follows, I describe more in detail the estimating equations for 
the selection and acreage share models and the econometric issues they raise. 
 
3.3.1 Dynamic multivariate selection model  
In this model, farmers are not restricted to choosing only one crop among the K possible 
alternatives
56
. Indeed, farmers in developing countries are often poorly insured against agricultural 
and market-related risks (price and yield variability, weather shocks…). To cope with such risks, 
they generally engage in crop diversification (Fafchamps, 1992; Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2001; 
Mukherjee, 2010) by adopting a multi-cropping system with the hope that crops with relatively 
stable prices will compensate revenue variability caused by crops with more volatile prices. 
Furthermore, due to potential complementarity or substitutability between the crops to grow, it is 
most likely that the error terms in each crop selection model will be correlated with one another, 
advocating therefore for a simultaneous estimation of farmers’ crop selection decisions. To allow 
for a possible multi-cropping strategy among farmers and the presence of both unobserved 
heterogeneity and state dependency, I estimate the multivariate selection model using a dynamic 
multivariate probit (Dynamic-MVP) regression: 
tkhIII hktk
K
j
hjjk
K
j
thjjkkhkt ,,,''
1
1
1
1,
*   

  2hk υZβZ  
with  
 TtKkNhII hkthkt ,...,1;,...,1;,...,1,01 *   
                                                          
53
 Irish and sweet potatoes 
54
 Rice, millet, and sorghum 
55
 Crops and/or land uses included in this « other » category are farm-specific. They include crops such as groundnuts, 
wheat, or soybeans. 
56
 It is theoretically possible to ensure that alternatives will be mutually exclusive even when the farmer can choose 
more than one crop (Train, 2003). However, when K is large, there is 12 K  possible crop combinations (excluding 
the one where no crop is grown) which represents 63 alternatives in a 6-crop choice model, as in this study (See 
Appendix  C.1).  
(3.13) 
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The error terms hkt  jointly follow a K-variate normal distribution with zero conditional mean and 
variance of 1, and a symmetric  KK   covariance matrixΣ . In this dynamic setting, true state 
dependence effects are captured through the dummies of the lagged dependent variables. The model 
also helps test for the presence of dynamic spillover effects in farmers’ decisions by including 
cross-lagged values.  
Let MhktΩ  denote the vector of all right-hand side (RHS) variables in the dynamic multivariate crop 
selection model and Mθ  be the vector of all parameters to be estimated. To derive marginal 
probabilities, let  MMjjj cw θΩ '  and  12  jj Ic , for Kk ,...,1 , where the subscripts h and t 
have been suppressed for convenience. In this case, the probability of observing a particular crop 
choice j among all possible combinations is given by (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003): 
   
 
 
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where  .K  and  .K  are K-variate normal density and probability distribution functions, 
respectively.  jjj RR   with jR  is a K x K diagonal matrix with diagonal elements jc  et zeros 
elsewhere. In this K-variate probit model, it is straightforward to show that the log-likelihood 
function is (Greene, 2003): 
 


 

N
h
K
k
T
t
jKjKtkh wwwIL
1
1
1 1
1,, ;,...,,...,lnln  
The estimation of this dynamic-MVP model was done using the Simulated Maximum Likelihood 
(SML) method with the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator. The dynamic-MVP 
regression framework has previously been applied in various studies, including Seo and 
Mendelsohn (2007) for a multi-country analysis of African farmers’ livestock choice under climate 
change scenarios, Oparinde and Hodge (2011) for households’ adoption of coping strategies against 
health shocks in rural Nigeria, or Fleming (2014) for the adoption of management practices among 
Maryland farmers. 
 
3.3.2 Dynamic acreage share model 
An important aspect in farming activities consists usually in deciding how much of the available 
land to allocate to different crops. As discussed early, this decision can be affected by both current 
and past allocation decisions. Otherwise stated, I seek to evaluate the expected value of *hkts , given 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
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the covariate vector hktX , unobserved farm- and crop-specific effects  , and past acreage shares 
1, thks , .,...,1 Kk   
To deal with potential sample selection in a multivariate setting, I apply a generalization of the 
Heckman two-step method proposed by Tauchmann (2005, 2010). The main virtue of this approach 
is that rather than restricting the estimation procedure to the subsample of farmers with positive 
crop selection as is commonly done, each element of the RHS is weighted by hktI  so that the 
estimation is based on the full sample and conditioned on hktI .
57
 Therefore, the second-step 
estimation of (3.11) is based on the conditional expectation: 
 
   khkkkhkthkt ζ'ZγZ'βX'X  kkhkthkhkthkthkthkhkt IIIIsE  ,, , tkh ,,  
 
In each equation k, the inverse Mills ratio  khkk ζ'ZγZ' k  from the first-step multivariate crop 
selection model is included as an additional covariate with k , its parameter to be estimated. 
Given equation (3.11) and the procedure in (3.16), the dynamic crop acreage model has the 
following form: 
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 k2hk υXγX , thk ,,   
In (3.17), the coefficients Kkjk ,..,1,   capture own- and cross-true state dependence effects. 
Hence, the acreage share of crop k at time t hkts  is assumed to depend on both its previous acreage 
share ( 1, thks ) and acreage shares allocated to alternative crops 1, thjs , kj  . This enables to test for 
the present of dynamic spillover effects in farmers’ crop decisions. 
In estimating equation (3.17), we need to take account of the fact that the dependent variables 
(acreage crop shares) and their predicted values have two-corner outcomes, 0 and 1, with non-trivial 
probabilities and continuous values between 0 and 1. This relates to fractional dependent variables 
(Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, 2008) and implies that 0, thks  if 0
* hkts ; 
*
,, thkthk
ss   if 10 *  hkts ; 
and 1, thks  if 1
* hkts .  
There is a long tradition in econometrics of estimating share or fractional models. Their applications 
include modeling time use, optimal portfolio shares, consumer budgets, or land use allocations. 
Various estimation strategies have been proposed in the literature to account for the bounded nature 
                                                          
57
  See Tauchmann (2005, Appendix A) for details. The estimation of the second step on the subsample of farmers for 
which 1hktI  would lead to severerly unbalanced panel. Hence, this approach is particularly useful in the present 
study since the Woodridge’s method of handling the initial observations’ problem requires a balanced panel. 
(3.17) 
(3.16) 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
 
 
94 
 
of the dependent variables. Early econometric attempts were applied in demand analysis for the 
estimation of systems of food consumption under censoring (Christensen et al., 1975; Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980; Banks et al., 1997; Yen et al., 2003). Recently, Fezzi and Bateman (2011) and 
Lacroix and Thomas (2011) estimate land use shares using a system of two-limit Tobit models via 
quasi-maximum likelihood. Despite the widespread use of uni- or multivariate Tobit models on 
fractional data among researchers, the estimated results do not guarantee that the fitted values will 
lie between 0 and 1
58
.  In their seminal paper, Papke and Wooldridge (1996) develop a robust 
Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) model, as in Gouriéroux, Monfort and Trognon (1984) for the 
estimation of a univariate fractional regression model through a Bernoulli log-likelihood function. 
Papke and Wooldridge (2008) extend their previous model to panel data and develop a QML 
estimation method to account for endogeneity. Several generalizations of Papke and Wooldridge 
works to the multivariate setting have been recently proposed to model various issues, from 
commodity flows (Sivakumar and Bhat, 2002) to transportation time (Ye and Pendyala, 2005), 
expenditure shares (Koch, 2010), household time use (Mullahy and Robert, 2010), financial asset 
portfolio (Mullahy, 2011), corporate capital structure choices (Ramalho, Ramalho, and Murteira, 
2013) and education tests (Nam, 2012). 
Along the lines of Mullahy and Robert (2010), and Mullahy (2011), I use a dynamic multivariate 
fractional logit (dynamic-MVFL) model to estimate equation (3.17). Indeed, one way of ensuring 
that the conditional mean  1,0



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hkt
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1
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functional form:  
   
 
   
 
KkQ
KlQsE
K
l
S
l
S
S
k
S
S
k
S
k
K
l
S
l
S
S
k
S
S
k
SS
k
S
hkt













,
'exp1
'exp
'
,...,1,
'exp
'exp
';
1
1
1
θΩ
θΩ
θΩ
θΩ
θΩ
θΩθΩ
 
where SΩ  denote the vector of all RHS variables in the dynamic-MVFL model and Skθ  the vector 
of all parameters to be estimated in the kth equation. Similarly to standard multinomial logit 
models, identification of the multivariate fractional logit requires the normalization of one of the 
parameters. In this essay, I chose the share of “other crops” (k = 7) (equation (3.18b), implying that
07 
SS
K  .    
                                                          
58
 Another reason of the inappropriateness of the use of Tobit models is simply because the dependent variables are 
not actually censored since values outside the 0-1 interval are not feasible (Baum, 2008). 
(3.18a) 
(3.18b) 
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Assuming that the functional form in (3.18a) is correct and given the identification assumption in 
(3.18b), the multivariate fractional likelihood log-function is given by:  
 SSk
N
h
K
k
T
t
tkh QsL θΩ 'lnln
1
1
1 1
,,


 
  
The estimated parameters are then obtained from the first order conditions applied to (3.19)
59
. As is 
well known in any two-step estimation procedure, second-stage standard errors of parameter 
estimates will be incorrect because they are derived from the first-stage participation model. In the 
empirical estimation, I rely on bootstrapping methods
60
. However, the normalization required by the 
adding-up restriction renders difficult the interpretation of point estimates derived from the 
maximization of (3.19).  To obtain results that are invariant with the type of normalization selected, 
the estimates of interest are acreage elasticities computed at sample average, and defined as the 
relative effect of a covariate jx on the expected conditional means  hktXtkhsE ,, . For continuous and 
discrete exogenous variables, these effects are given respectively by equations (3.20a) and (3.20b) 
(Mullahy and Robert, 2010): 
 
 
    jkjhtKkjjkjhtK
N
i
T
t
ijt
N
i
T
t
K
l
lljkjijt
tkh
j
j
tkh
jk
XQXQx
NT
Qx
NTsE
x
x
sE

 
 
















 
,,,,
1 1
1 1
1
1,,
,,
,
ˆˆˆ
1
ˆˆ
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ


hkt
hkt
X
X
 
where jk ,ˆ  stands for the estimated expected acreage elasticity of crop k with respect to changes in 
the covariate jx . Due to the adding-up restriction,   
K
j jk1 ,
0ˆ , which implies that the effect  of a 
covariate will lead to a reallocation of land across crop alternatives. ˆ  is the estimated parameter; 
tkhs ,,ˆ  is the estimated share of land allocated to crop k by household h in year t. jhtX ,  is the 
covariate vector for the h-th observation, excluded the j-th element.  
To investigate the causal factors of both multivariate crop choices and crop acreage shares, I include 
in hktX  and hktZ six categories of explanatory variables, namely expected output prices (
e
ktp ) and 
                                                          
59
 The estimation of the multivariate fractional logit model was done using a Quasi-maximum likelihood function 
programmed in Stata’s Mata language written by John Mullahy who kindly provided the author with the codes. 
Although his approach was primarily intended for cross-sectional data, it can be readily extended to the panel data 
case by appealing to the Correlated Random Effects approach to estimation (Chamberlain, 1980 and Mundlak, 1978) 
and specifying the conditional mean of the unobserved effect as a parametric function of the time-averages of the 
independent variables as in (3.12). 
60
 The number of replications used was chosen following the approach proposed by Andrews and Buchinsky (2000).  
Each crop share was estimated separately to derive the optimal number of bootstrap replications which were then 
averaged out in the multivariate fractional logit estimation. 
(3.19) 
(3.20a) 
(3.20b) 
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yields ( ekty ), their respective risk measures (
e
ktvp  and 
e
ktvy ), farm or land characteristics, climatic 
variables, and farmer’s characteristics. Referring to land characteristics, I control for total land size 
( tld ), land quality ( ldq ), type of land irrigation ( tdir ), and the nature of land slope ( ldsp ).  ldq
measures the proportion of fertile plots (land of good quality) in the total plots cultivated by the 
farmer; ldir , the proportion of rain-fed plots, and ldsp , the proportion of plots with flat or gentile 
slopes. Climatic variables include the average expected monthly rainfall ( mar ), its coefficient of 
variation ( marcv ), the temperature deviation ( dmt )
61
 and its coefficient of variation ( dmtcv ).  
Farmer’s characteristics contain the years of education ( educ ), age ( age ), and gender ( sex ) of the 
household head, as well as the household size ( hsz ). I impose exclusion restrictions by including in  
hktZ  adult ratio ( adr )
62
, non-farm income ( nfi ), and regional dummies variables. 
 
3.4 Data and construction of variables 
 
The implementation of the acreage allocation model described in the previous section requires a 
substantial amount of data regarding crop choices, farmers’ expectations of output prices and yields, 
farm and farmer characteristics, and climatic variables. Data on crop choices, land use and size, 
variable input prices and quantities (labor, seeds, pesticides, fertilizer,…), farm and household 
characteristics are obtained from a four-wave panel dataset of the Uganda National Panel Surveys 
(UNPS) conducted in 2005/6, 2009/10, 2010/11, and 2011/2012
63
 by the Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics (UBoS). For this study, each wave contains information on 1,598 balanced agricultural 
households, located in all the geographical regions of the country. Pooling these time series and 
cross-sectional data gives 6,392 observations for the crop choice and acreage allocation models 
(1,598 farmers x 4 years).  
 
3.4.1 Plot size 
The surveys report two measures of land size: GPS measures and farmer’s own estimation. 
However, while area measures from farmers’ own assessments are available for almost all plots, 
GPS-based area measures suffer from important missing values due to various constraints such as 
                                                          
61
 The difference between monthly maximum and minimum temperatures (in degrees Celsius). 
62
 Defined as the ratio between the number of household members above 18 and the total household size 
63
 The first wave (2005/6) collected agricultural information for the second cropping season of 2004 (July-December 
2004) and first cropping season of 2005 (January-June 2005). The remaining waves gathered information for the two 
cropping seasons (January-June and July-December) of 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively. Hence, to avoid confusion 
from the reader between the timing of the surveys and the periods they actually covered for the agricultural module, I 
will subsequently refer to the panels in terms of waves 1 to 4. 
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“[…] reducing survey costs, […] keeping household interview durations within reasonable limits, 
and […] the difficulty of asking respondents to accompany enumerators to agricultural plots that are 
situated far from dwelling locations […]” (Kilic at al., 2013: 3). To deal with these missing GPS-
based data, I apply a multiple imputation approach initiated by Rubin (1987).
64
 Hence, in all the 
subsequent analyses, land size will refer to multiply imputed land areas. 
The persistent or transitory nature of distributional land patterns can be analyzed using transition 
matrices for successive panel waves
65
. Results presented in table 3.1 indicate unequal land 
dynamics during the sample period.   
 
Table 3.1 Bivariate transition matrices of changes in the distribution of total land holdings 
 Land size in 2011/12 (acres)  
]0 ; .6[ [.6 ; 1.25[ [1.25 ; 2.5[ [2.5 ; 7[ [7 ; 10[ >=10 N. obs. 
 
Land size in 
2005/6 
(acres) 
]0 ; .6[ 46 23.9 17.2 10 1.4 1.5 402 
[.6 ; 1.25[ 19.2 26.1 25.8 25.3 1.5 2.1 395 
[1.25 ; 2.5[ 8.1 15.7 29.4 36.5 6.1 4.2 394 
[2.5 ; 7[ 6 7.3 19.3 49.1 8.5 9.8 316 
[7 ; 10[ 2.9 5.7 0 57.1 17.1 17.2 35 
>=10 3.8 8.9 12.5 26.8 7.1 41.1 56 
         
 Land size in 2009/10   
]0 ; .6[ [.6 ; 1.25[ [1.25 ; 2.5[ [2.5 ; 7[ [7 ; 10[ >=10 N. obs. 
 
Land size in 
2005/6 
 
]0 ; .6[ 60.2 22.4 10.2 5.7 0 1.8 402 
[.6 ; 1.25[ 24.1 40.8 22.8 9.9 1.5 .9 395 
[1.25 ; 2.5[ 8.9 28.4 36.3 21.3 2 3.1 394 
[2.5 ; 7[ 7.6 11.4 22.2 44.9 5.1 8.8 316 
[7 ; 10[ 2.9 14.3 8.6 45.7 11.4 17.1 35 
>=10 5.4 8.9 8.9 25 8.9 42.9 56 
         
 Land size in 2010/11   
]0 ; .6[ [.6 ; 1.25[ [1.25 ; 2.5[ [2.5 ; 7[ [7 ; 10[ >=10 N. obs. 
 
Land size in 
2009/10  
]0 ; .6[ 55.3 25 11.8 5.8 .8 1.5 400 
[.6 ; 1.25[ 16.6 32 29.6 17.6 .7 3.5 409 
[1.25 ; 2.5[ 5.1 19.6 35.5 32.7 3.4 3.7 352 
[2.5 ; 7[ 3.5 5.3 18.2 54.1 7.9 11 318 
[7 ; 10[ 2.6 2.6 5.1 33.3 25.6 30.8 39 
>=10 8.8 1.3 7.5 22.5 8.8 51.3 80 
         
 Land size in 2011/12   
]0 ; .6[ [.6 ; 1.25[ [1.25 ; 2.5[ [2.5 ; 7[ [7 ; 10[ >=10 N. obs. 
 
Land size in 
2010/11 
]0 ; .6[ 54.6 19.9 13.8 8.9 1.2 1.6 326 
[.6 ; 1.25[ 23.2 40.4 23.5 10.7 1.6 .6 319 
[1.25 ; 2.5[ 10.9 15.3 39 31.5 1.9 1.4 359 
[2.5 ; 7[ 3.9 8.7 17.4 58.1 7.3 4.6 413 
[7 ; 10[ 1.7 3.3 15 36.7 26.7 16.7 60 
>=10 5.8 5 11.6 29.8 8.3 39.7 121 
Note: Each cell gives the row percentage. 
 
                                                          
64
 The Stata’s mi impute command has been used to impute these missing values. (See Appendices C.2 – C.4). 
65
 The intervals were constructed from the pooled distribution of land sizes. Farms were divided into 2 broad 
categories: small farms (<10 acres) and large farms (>=10 acres). Small farms were then subdivided into 4 groups using 
respectively the 25th percentile, the median, the mean, and the 75th percentile as bounds. For each survey, extreme 
or outlier values were defined as those beyond the 99
th
 percentile and replaced by values observed at that percentile. 
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Between the first and last wave (part one of the table), important transitions are observed but state 
persistence is relatively mitigated: for example, only 46% of farms with less than 0.6 acres 
remained in the same state in the last wave and 1.5% increased their land size up to more than 10 
acres. However, between successive waves, the table uncovers very high persistence, particularly 
for states 1 and 4. For example, although there is a significant decrease over time in the persistence 
rate within state 1 (from 60.2 to 55.3 and 54.6%), persistence in state 4 shows instead a significant 
increase (from 44.9 to 54.1 and 58.1%), suggesting that likelihood of moving from state 1 (very 
small farms) to other states (medium or large farm sizes) increased over time.   
3.4.2 Representation of price expectations and risks 
At the time production decisions are made, a farmer ignores what will be the end-of-season output 
prices. The empirical implementation of crop choice and acreage share models thus requires a 
statement on how farmers form their expectations about future prices and their related risks.  There 
is no consensus as to how variables representing riskiness in prices should be formulated in 
econometric models. Various models of price expectations tested for agricultural commodities 
include: naive expectations (Houck and Gallagher, 1976; Shumway and Chang, 1980; Chavas and 
Holt, 1990), adaptive expectations (Nerlove, 1958), rational expectations (Muth, 1961; Goodwin 
and Sheffrin, 1983; Shonkwiler and Emerson, 1982; Beach et al., 1995, among others), futures 
prices (Schroeder and Goodwin, 1991), or a combination of the previous models (Lopez, 1986; 
Tada, 1990). The naive expectations model states that today’s price is simply the most recently 
observed (or previous) price; the adaptive expectations model argues that the expected price is the 
weighted average of the previous price and the previous expected price, with geometrically 
declining weights; the rational expectations model assumes that expectations are formed based on 
the relevant structure of the economic system given all relevant information available to the farmers 
when planting decisions are made. Finally, the composite expectations model considers the 
expected price as a weighted average of prices based on adaptive and rational expectations.  
These expected prices were computed using monthly real food prices
66
 from time series’ prices 
collected by the Foodnet market price information project of the International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA). The Foodnet dataset consists of weekly wholesale price series for 23 Ugandan 
                                                          
66
 For each series, nominal prices were deflated by the UBoS all items’ consumer price index (2005/06=100) to take 
account of potential changes in the purchasing power of Ugandan households.  
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markets
67
 and more than 20 staple foods from September 1999, week 40 to December 2012, week 
52
68
.  
Let tMp ,  be the market price of crop i at time t and
e
tNp , ,
e
tAp , ,
e
tRp , , and 
e
tMXp ,  denote its expected 
value derived from the naive, adaptive, rational, and composite expectations models, respectively. 
Following Chavas et al. (1983), Chavas and Holt (1990), and Tada (1990), e tNp ,  and 
e
tAp ,  can be 
written as: 
1,,  tM
e
tN pp  
     jtMjt
n
J
j
jntM
ne
tAtM
e
tA
e
tA pEppppp 

 


   ,1
1 1
,
1
1,1,1,, ω1   
where 1 jtE  is the expectation, when crop i is planted at time t – j , of the end-of-season price in 
year t – j and    .1,1   jtMjtjt ppE  jω  are declining weights as we go back in time and are 
expressed as 
 
 1
12
ω



JJ
jJ
j , with J the number of lags (Hommes, 1998). For simplicity, I only 
consider the case where J = 3 (i.e the past three observed market prices)
69
. Given  e tNp ,  and 
e
tAp , , the 
expected price variances are defined as a weighted sum of the squared deviations of the past 3 
market prices from their respective expected values. Formally, the expected price variance of crop 
k, 2kt , and expected price covariance of crops j and k in time t, jkt , are expressed as follows: 
 
23
1
1,,,
2 ω

 
i
e
itkitkikt pp  
     e itAe itNe ite itkitke itjitj
i
ijkt ppppppp 1,1,1,1,,,1,,,
3
1
,with,ω 

  
In regards to the rationally expected prices
e
tRp , , I draw on the work of Feige and Pearce (1976) and 
Nerlove et al (1979) who have shown that rational expectations can fundamentally be approximated 
using ARIMA specifications. I test the order of integration of each price series allowing for the 
                                                          
67
 Arua, Gulu, Kitgum and Lira in the Northern region; Luwero, Masaka, Rakai, Kiboga, and Kampala (Kisenyi, Owino, 
Nakawa, Kalerwe) in the Central region; Iganga, Mbale, Jinja, Soroti, and Tororo in the Eastern region; and Jinja, 
Kabale, Kibale, Kasese, Hoima, and Mbarara in the Western region 
68
 The use of market-level data to derive price expectations of economic agents is not exempt from criticisms. Overall, 
the main criticism is the assumption of homogenous information set for all market participants (Pesaran, 1987).  
Therefore, in the absence of data on farmer-level expectations over output prices, the analysis carried out in this third 
essay should be considered as an indirect approach of deriving price formation in Uganda.  
69
  In this case, the weights are given by 5.ω1  , 33.ω2  , and 17.ω3   
(3.21a) 
(3.21b) 
(3.22a) 
(3.22b) 
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possibility of structural breaks using Bai and Perron (2003) tests
70
. Appendix C.5 reports the 
ARIMA estimates for the selected price series
71
. The same procedure is applied to derive expected 
price variances of each price series.   
Knowing
e
tRp , , the composite expected price is given by  
e
tR
e
tA
e
tMX ppp ,,, 1   , where 
10  
72
. Crop price risks ( e iMX
e
iR
e
iA
e
iN vpvpvpvp ,,,, ,,, ) are thus defined as the square root of the 
expected price variances derived from different expectations models. 
To identify which expectations model best describes the price formation process, I use a simple 
unbiasedness test from the estimation of the following relationship: 
 
t
e
ttM pp   ,, * ,  with  e tMXe tRe tAe tNe t ppppp ,,,,, ,,,  
In order for price forecasts to be consistent with observed prices, they should be unbiased predictors 
of the actual market prices. This implies that the intercept 0  and the slope 1  at 5% 
significant level (Beach et al., 1995). Appendix A.6 contains the results of the unbiasedness tests. 
They suggest that the null hypothesis of unbiasedness is rejected for all commodities in the naive 
(except for other cereals), adaptive, and rational (except for maize) expectations models. However, 
when we combine the adaptive and rational expectations models using the   values that offer the 
best statistical fits (Adjusted R – squared)73 for the price expectation model (3.23), we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of unbiasedness for all selected commodities. In other words, at the market 
level, the estimated results advocate for a mixed expectations model rather than a pure naive, 
adaptive, or ARIMA models. Consequently, all expected prices and price risks used in the crop 
choice and acreage share estimations will refer to the composite expectations model. Lopez (1986), 
Tada (1991), and Chembezi (1994) have also demonstrated the high capacity of the composite 
models in explaining price expectations behavior.    
3.4.3 Expected yields and yield risks 
To obtain the expected yields ( eky ), we need to identify the set of weather variables likely to 
influence the level of end-of-season yields. It is well-established for example that the levels of 
                                                          
70
 In the case of structural breaks or shifting trends in price series, the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981), 
Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root tests become biased because of their potential confusion of structural breaks in the 
series as evidence of non-stationarity (Ghoshray, Kejriwal, and Wohar  (2012). See essay I, section 1.4.1. 
71
 Results of the unit root tests (not presented here) indicated that all price series were I (1). Hence, in the 
 qdp ,,ARIMA estimation results, the price series were first-differenced (d = 1).  
72
 In the extreme case where 0 , producers are assumed to form their expectations based solely on the ARIMA 
specification. On the opposite side  1  implies price expectations according to the adaptive model. Finall, when 
10   , both adaptive and rational models are accounted for in farmers’ price expectations. 
73
 0.3 for cassava and beans; 0.4 for matooke and potatoes; 0.5 for maize and 0.6 for other cereals. 
(3.23) 
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rainfall, precipitation, and temperature are important factors in determining crop yields (Mitchell et 
al., 1990; Porter and Semenov, 2005; Lobell et al., 2007). To derive farmers’ expected yields, I 
follow the specification proposed by Chavas and Holt (1990) and applied in numerous empirical 
studies (see, for example, Lin and Dismukes, 2007; Weersink, et al., 2010; Liang et al., 2011): 
 
hkdtkddtdthkdt ty   'W  
 
where hkdty  is the current yield of crop k for a farmer h living in cluster/district d at time t. W is a 
vector of weather variables
74
 in district d at time t (expected monthly rainfall mar  and deviation in 
temperature dmt and their coefficients of variation marcv  and  dmtcv ) and their quadratic terms to 
allow for non-linear effects of weather factors (Porter and Semenov, 2005); kd is district-level fixed 
effect, and t denotes a linear time trend. Equation (3.24) was then estimated separately for each crop 
k.  
Given that data on yields are left-censored at 0, I used a panel Tobit regression and take out the 
predicted values as expected yields. Crop yield risk ( ektvy ) was then measured as the standard 
deviation of the estimated residuals from the Tobit model.  
Appendix C.7 defines key variables and presents their descriptive statistics. 
3.5 Empirical results 
 
3.5.1 Dynamic multivariate crop selection model  
 
The estimated coefficients of the dynamic multivariate crop selection model reported in table 3.2 
are derived from the empirical specification elaborated in equation (3.13).  The model was 
estimated using the Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) method and the GHK simulator, with 
initial conditions a la Wooldridge. As suggested by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003), I choose the 
                                                          
74
 I obtain data on climatic characteristics from various annual issues of the Statistical Abstracts of the UBoS. These 
data contain monthly information on temperature (degree Celsius) and rainfall (mm). Although yield data are at farm 
level, data on temperature and rainfall were only available for 12 meteorological stations covering all the geographical 
regions of the country: Arua, Gulu, and Lira in the Northern region; Entebbe and Kampala in the Central region; Jinja, 
Soroti, and Tororo in the Eastern region; and Kabale, Kasese, and Mbarara in the Western region. These data were 
then merged with farm survey data for the respective years. Similarly to Coyle (1999), mean and variance of weather 
variables in station s at time t were first computed as: 1,  tsst   and  
2
,,
3
1
ω)var( itsits
i
ist 

  , with the 
weights iω being defined as in (3.22). For each region, these means and variances were then averaged over their 
respective stations. 
(3.24) 
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number of draws (100)
75
 greater than the square root of the sample size (80) to reduce the 
simulation bias. I also derived starting values from univariate random-effects probit regressions 
(Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006; Fezzi and Bateman, 2011) and dropped from the final model 
variables that presented a high collinearity, particularly covariances between expected prices.  
We first note that all coefficients of pairwise correlations between error terms ( ij ) are statistically 
significant, supporting the hypothesis of interdependence of farmers’ crop choices and the 
appropriateness of a joint estimation of the crop selection equations. Moreover, the likelihood ratio 
test rejects at a high significance level the hypothesis that all pairwise correlations of error terms are 
simultaneously zero. The model prediction also appears satisfactory since the marginal predicted 
probabilities of success for each crop choice  1Pr kI  are in all cases greater than 50%.  
Globally, the signs of the explanatory variables are in line with our predictions and most variables 
of interest are significant at least at 5% level. The coefficients of lagged dependent variables 
highlight the existence of a great degree of true state dependence in crop choices. Put differently, 
after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, past crop choices significantly and 
positively influence current farmers’ decisions. This crop persistence over time may be explained 
by both farmers’ preferences and specific constraints. For example, the costs of transitioning from 
one crop to another may be sufficiently high due to differences in input requirements or agronomic 
constraints that a farmer may simply decide to maintain this past land allocation pattern.  
In addition, there is evidence of cross-persistence in farmers’ choices for most crops, as suggested 
by the coefficients of lagged variables of alternative crops. Most of these coefficients are negative, 
implying crop rotational effects. Indeed, it is well documented that growing the same crop year after 
year on the same plot may result in low yields and high costs, while cultivating a sequence of 
different crops over several planting seasons could ultimately increase land profitability (Choi and 
Sohngen, 2003; Livingston et al., 2008). Alternatively, changes in profitability due to expected 
changes in relative prices of different crops may convince a farmer to adjust his future land 
allocations. Similarly to lagged variables, own initial observations significantly increase the chances 
of growing crops, contrarily to most initial values of competing crops.  
With respect to price expectations, all estimated coefficients of own-expected prices are not only 
significant but also have the expected signs: farmers’ anticipations of an increase in expected 
market prices positively affect the likelihood of selecting and growing crops. Conversely, the more 
volatile the expected crop prices, the lower the likelihood of crop selection, as implied by the 
negative and significant sign of all expected own price risks.  
                                                          
75
 I also tried alternative numbers of draws (150, 200, and 500) but final results did not significantly improve. 
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Table 3.2 Coefficient estimates-Dynamic Multivariate Probit model 
 
 Coefficient estimates 
 matooke cassava maize potatoes beans Ot. cereals 
State dependence variables 
 
1,1 tI  1.261 (0.073)*** -0.068 (0.069) -0.164 (0.065)** -0.033 (0.065) 0.203 (0.069)*** -0.154 (0.066)** 
1,2 tI  -0.017 (0.063) 0.755 (0.057)*** 0.045 (0.056) 0.157 (0.057)*** -0.051 (0.066) -0.239 (0.061)*** 
1,3 tI  -0.025 (0.065) 0.066 (0.055) 0.499 (0.056)*** 0.021 (0..053) 0.050 (0.057) -0.006 (0.054) 
1,4 tI  -0.146 (0.057)** 0.108 (0.055)** -0.038 (0.055) 0.569 (0.052)*** -0.065 (0.054) -0.044 (0.052) 
1,5 tI  0.266 (0.071)*** -0.107 (0.065)* 0.212 (0.061)*** -0.005 (0.058) 0.717 (0.061)*** -0.188 (0.061)*** 
1,6 tI  -0.187 (0.064)*** -0.083 (0.038)** -0.112 (0.056)** -0.053 (0.056) -0.145 (0.059)** 0.813 (0.057)*** 
Initial observations 
 
1,1I  0.372 (0.072)*** -0.119 (0.073)* 0.026 (0.073) 0.105 (0.064)* 0.206 (0.076)*** -0.113 (0.054)* 
1,2I  -0.060 (0.065) 0.527 (0.055)*** -0.024 (0.061) 0.037 (0.055) -0.037 (0.063) -0.018 (0.063) 
1,3I  0.145 (0.073)** -0.047 (0.063) 0.398 (0.058)*** 0.008 (0.058) -0.045 (0.065) -0.096 (0.062) 
1,4I  0.035 (0.064) 0.040 (0.056) 0.075 (0.057) 0.303 (0.051)*** -0.026 (0.059) 0.025 (0.059) 
1,5I  0.266 (0.073)*** -0.002 (0.068) -0.171 (0.065)*** -0.071 (0.029)*** 0.460 (0.063)*** -0.099 (0.053)* 
1,6I  -0.133 (0.067)** -0.139 (0.060)** -0.078 (0.056) 0.022 (0.054) -0.197 (0.062)*** 0.561 (0.059)*** 
Expected output prices and price risks 
 
ep1  
0.413 (0.024)*** -0.066 (0.030)** -0.016 (0.030) -0.036  (0.029) -0.043 (0.039) -0.016 (0.029) 
ep2  
-0.008 (0.009) 0.328 (0.011)*** 0.016 (0.007)** 0.001 (0.007) 0.015 (0.011) 0.007 (0.008) 
ep3  
-0.002 (0.001)* -0.001 (0.002) 0.429 (0.004)*** 0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.000)*** 
ep4  
-0.018 (0.018) 0.026 (0.023) 0.025 (0.019) 0.071 (0.035)* -0.066 (0.029)** -0.039 (0.021)* 
ep5  
-0.020 (0.001)*** 0.008 (0.019) -0.032 (0.022) -0.031 (0.023) 0.151 (0.030)*** -0.056 (0.021)*** 
ep6  
-0.038 (0.037) 0.063 (0.035)* 0.028 (0.049) -0.024 (0.056) -0.129 (0.050)*** 0.202 (0.112)* 
evp1  
-0.355 (0.049)*** -0.001 (0.037) 0.077 (0.035)** -0.033 (0.033) 0.049 (0.045) 0.006 (0.035) 
evp2  
-0.048 (0.052) -0.469 (0.075)*** -0.106 (0.043)** -0.047 (0.043) 0.009 (0.051) -0.040 (0.043) 
evp3  
0.046 (0.055) -0.037 (0.048) -0.513 (0.131)*** 0.071 (0.035)* 0.021 (0.063) -0.041 (0.049) 
evp4  
-0.013 (0.060) -0.108 (0.057)* 0.012 (0.052) -0.571 (0.091)*** -0.015 (0.056) 0.054 (0.052) 
evp5  
0.093 (0.051)* 0.022 (0.045) 0.027 (0.044) -0.008 (0.040) -0.291 (0.066)*** -0.067 (0.038)* 
evp6  
0.004 (0.040) -0.021 (0.039) -0.051 (0.041) 0.013 (0.038) -0.014 (0.044) -0.083 (0.042)* 
Expected yields and yield risks 
 
ey1  
1.005(0.173)*** -0.149 (0.105) 0.067 (0.011)*** 0.085 (0.109) -0.190 (0.112)* 0.098 (0.057)* 
ey2  
-0.160(0.068)** 0.613 (0.025)** -0.004 (0.024) 0.039 (0.031) -0.044 (0.025)* 0.083 (0.062) 
ey3  
0.107 (0.097) 0.015 (0.169) 0.624 (0.011)*** 0.109 (0.045)** -0.007 (0.009) 0.203 (0.108)* 
ey4  
0.063 (0.151) 0.152 (0.152) 0.138 (0.149) 0.259 (0.154)* - 0.056 (0.149) 0.229 (0.159) 
ey5  
-0.193 (0.208) -0.297 (0.213) -0.318 (0.211) -0.342 (0.212)* 0.475 (0.021)*** 0.099 (0.237) 
ey6  
0.109 (0.173) 0.088 (0.006)*** 0.278 (0.171)* 0.176 (0.196) 0.104 (0.198) 0.583 (0.240)** 
evy1  
-0.589(0.266)** -0.630(0.466) -0.557(0.462) -0.505(0.463) -0.630(0.464) -0.703(0.507) 
evy2  
-1.314(0.339)*** -1.210(0.330)*** -1.241(0.322)*** -1.289(0.330)*** -1.174(0.330)*** -0.956(0.437)** 
evy3  
-0.532(0.332)* -0.604(0.306)** -0.684(0.299)** -0.611(0.309)** -0.675(0.299)** -0.096(0.452) 
evy4  
0.478(0.721) 0.019(0.701) 0.109(0.699) -0.411(0.179)*** 0.189(0.703) -0.095(0.726) 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
 
 matooke cassava maize potatoes beans Ot. cereals 
       
evy5  
0.547(0.688) 0.048(0.679) 0.009(0.684) 0.066(0.688) -0.470(0.027)** -0.159(0.698) 
evy6  
-0.486(0.296)* -0.440(0.266)* -0.484(0.273) -0.411(0.279) -0.495(0.282)* -0.323(0.150)** 
Climatic variables 
 
mar  -0.073 (0.004)*** -0.014 (0.005)*** -0.010 (0.005)** -0.029 (0.004)*** -0.063 (0.005)*** -0.031 (0.006)*** 
marcv  -1.230 (0.438)*** -1.386 (0.423)*** -0.446 (0.042)*** -0.629 (0.057)*** -1.036 (0.413)*** -0.417 (0.048)*** 
dmt  -0.416 (0.102)*** -0.381 (0.102)*** -0.045 (0.011)*** -0.327 (0.094)*** -0.033 (0.104) -0.212 (0.092)** 
dmtcv  -1.530 (0.494)*** -1.897(0.805)** -0.308 (0.076)*** -1.758 (0.988)*** -0.101 (0.008)*** -0.431 (0.079)*** 
       
Land characteristics 
 
tld  0.142 (0.040)*** 0.085 (0.033)** 0.120 (0.035)*** 0.081 (0.032)*** 0.179 (0.039)*** 0.147 (0.034)*** 
ldq  0.143 (0.017)*** 0.064 (0.015)*** 0.290 (0.140)** 0.060 (0.032)* 0.011 (0.006)*** 0.061 (0.006)*** 
ldir  0.013 (0.068) 0.041 (0.059) 0.031(0.053) 0.051 (0.131) 0.004 (0.147) 0.042 (0.163) 
ldsp  -0.225 (0.117)* -0.055 (0.093) 0.082 (0.092) -0.223 (0.092)** 0.031 (0.103) -0.191 (0.096)** 
 
Household characteristics 
 
educ  0.087 (0.001)*** 0.148 (0.076)** 0.082 (0.048)** 0.090 (0.039)** 0.034 (0.013)*** 0.023 (0.016)* 
age  0.719 (0.278)** -0.031 (0.317) 0.281 (0.0259) -0.103 (0.284) -0.493 (0.317) 0.026 (0.304) 
sex  0.112 (0.060)** 0.056 (0.054) 0.011 (0.053) -0.023 (0.049) -0.042 (0.058) 0.031 (0.056) 
hsz  0.278 (0.112)** 0.162 (0.096)* 0.101 (0.012)*** 0.089 (0.048)** 0.123 (0.069)** 0.131 (0.002)*** 
adr  0.163 (0.153) -0.030 (0.131) -0.255 (0.131)* -0.124 (0.121) 0.020 (0.144) -0.354 (0.138)*** 
nfi  0.008 (0.005)* -0.000 (0.004) -0.011 (0.004)*** -0.003 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 
Ctl  0.234 (0.092)*** -0.063 (0.784) 0.347 (0.693) -0.128 (0.707) 0.658 (0.418)** -0.619 (0.004)*** 
East  -0.027 (0.339) 0.121 (0.083)*** 0.648 (0.282)*** 0.471 (0.133)*** 0.029 (0.352) -0.899 (0.067)*** 
W est 0.092 (0.033)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 0.529 (0.312)* 0.208 (0.035)*** 0.886 (0.397)** 0.064 (0.007)*** 
Cons 3.791 (2.135)* 6.598 (1.937)*** 0.960 (2.083) 6.296 (2.101)*** 5.854 (2.369)** 5.453 (3.147)* 
ij   
j1  1 0.066 (0.038)* -0.048 (0.006)*** 0.042 (0.005)*** 0.087 (0.041)** -0.145 (0.038)*** 
j2   1 0.038 (0.002)*** 0.277 (0.029)*** 0.036 (0.016)** -0.106 (0.031)*** 
j3    1 0.107 (0.029)*** 0.297 (0.032)*** -0.025 (0.000)*** 
j4     1 0.152 (0.033)*** 0.041 (0.010)*** 
j5      1 -0.059 (0.034)* 
j6       1 
 1Pr kI  0.692 0.713 0.720 0.591 0.721 0.609 
Note: Robust standard errors into parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. ij  stands for the coefficient of the correlation between error term of crops i and j.  
Likelihood of all 0000.0,021.587,2:,0
2
33  valuepjiij   
 
 
This suggests that higher but more volatile expected prices of a specific crop may dissuade a farmer 
from growing it in favor of more stable crops in terms of prices, implying a price risk-averse 
attitude. Similarly to output prices, the estimated coefficients of expected yields are found to be 
positive and significant while increases in own yield risks are detrimental to crop selection.  
In terms of climatic variables, increases in expected monthly rainfall only have a very marginal 
effect on crop selection while changes in its volatility (measured by changes in coefficient of 
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variation) significantly and negatively affect current land decisions. Analogously, it is changes in 
volatility of temperature spreads (difference between average monthly maximum and minimum 
temperatures) rather than in their mean values that influence the most farmers’ crop choices. These 
results are consistent with findings by Wu et al. (2004) and Weersinsk et al. (2010). 
Land characteristics also diversely influence farmers’ crop selection decisions.  Whereas increases 
in the total agricultural land size and the proportion of good-quality plots positively increase 
farmers’ crop participation, the proportion of both rain-fed and flatted plots appears irrelevant in 
explaining farmers’ crop choices, probably because most agricultural plots (more than 90%) were 
only rain-fed or had flatted/gentile slopes (around 85%).  
In addition, most demographic variables do not significantly influence crop choices. Exceptions are 
household size and the level of education of the head. Household size increases the likelihood of 
growing all selected crops. This result is in accordance with the characteristics of the agricultural 
sector in most developing countries where not only agriculture is primarily of subsistence but also a 
large share of labor involves self-employment. In this context, increasing family size constrains the 
household to either increase farm production (through more land areas to cultivate or improved 
productivity) or seek off-farm labor opportunities. In all equations, the level of education attained 
by the farmer appears to have a positive and significant impact on crop selection. Finally, the 
estimated coefficients of most regional dummies variables are significant, suggesting important 
cluster and geographical effects due probably to agro-climatic specificities
76
.  
3.5.2 Dynamic acreage share model 
The second model is the selectivity-corrected dynamic acreage share model which specifies the 
factors affecting land area allocations by Ugandan farmers. Appendix C.8 presents the estimation 
results of the dynamic multivariate fractional logit models with (Model I) and without (Model II) 
unobserved heterogeneity accounted for. I discarded from the final results covariates with high 
collinearity, particularly covariances of expected prices and yields as well as some time-averaged 
variables from the Mundlak-Chamberlain transformation.  
Let us first take heed to the variables related to state dependence ( 1, thjs ) and initial conditions ( 1hjs
). At first glance, all crops exhibit significant own state dependence, whether I allow for individual 
heterogeneity or not. The share of each crop in the current period hkts  depends positively on the 
acreage share previously allocated to that crop 1, thks . The results further show that the initial land 
                                                          
76
 For example, matooke is generally consumed in western, central, and southern parts of the country. cassava is 
generally grown in northern, northwestern and eastern regions of Uganda. 
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allocation 1hks  is an important determinant of current acreage decisions, which suggests, according 
to the empirical framework, a significant correlation between farmers’ “pre-sample” and current 
characteristics. The results also reveal the presence of significant dynamic spillover effects among 
the acreage equations, implying a strong cross state dependence.  These estimated effects are 
negative and consequently the share of each crop in the current period is negatively influenced by 
the shares of alternative crops in the previous period. Thus, for a fixed, allocatable land size in a 
multicrop system, the acreage model reveals a competition among crops for area shares. It can also 
be noted that the coefficients of lagged dependent variables are mostly larger (in absolute values) in 
models II, where unobserved heterogeneity has been ignored, resulting in an overestimation of the 
effects of state dependence.  This feature is however expected because the effect of the uncontrolled 
unobserved heterogeneity is partly included in the coefficients of lagged outcome terms (Divicienti 
and Poggi, 2007).  
To check whether the addition of lagged dependent variables improves acreage model performance, 
I also estimated a static-MVFL (models without state dependency and initial observations problem). 
The comparison of the estimated coefficients (presented in Appendices C.8 and C.9) indicates that 
the magnitude of most coefficients tend to decrease (in absolute values) when we go from the static 
to dynamic models. These differential impacts can be attributed to the fact that the variables in the 
static models are absorbing parts of the effects otherwise captured by state dependency. 
However, these parameter estimates are not per se informative of the marginal effects of the 
covariates on the acreage shares. To analyze their partial effects, tables 3.3-3.5 show the expected 
acreage elasticities using equations (3.20a) and (3.20b) for both the static and dynamic models with 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Table 3.3 reports the estimated results of crop share elasticities with respect to expected prices and 
yields and their respective risk measures. The first result that is worth noting is that all own-price 
elasticities (values in bold) are positive and highly significant. For all the selected crops, the 
expected price effects are inelastic. For example, one percent increase to the expected prices of 
matooke, maize, and beans increases the expected land acreage shares of these crops by respectively 
0.35 (0.32%), 0.44 (0.38%), 0.37 (0.31%) in the static (dynamic) model. The cross-price elasticities 
are also significant at 1 percent level, all negative, and in most cases smaller than the own-price 
acreage responses, implying crop substitution among Ugandan farmers concerning crop land 
allocations. 
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Table 3.3 Acreage elasticities of expected prices and yields and their related risks- Static vs Dynamic models 
 Matooke Cassava Maize Potatoes Beans Other cereals 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Expected prices           
1p  0.354*** 0.322*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.059*** -0.047*** -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.055*** -0.047*** -0.021*** -0.012*** 
2p  -0.042*** -0.037*** 0.378*** 0.359*** -0.079*** -0.068*** -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.068*** -0.056*** -0.049*** -0.037*** 
3p  -0.047*** -0.039*** -0.068*** -0.072*** 0.439*** 0.382*** -0.042*** -0.046*** -0.075*** -0.066*** -0.035*** -0.033*** 
4p  -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.046*** -0.042*** 0.276*** 0.224*** -0.048*** -0.036*** -0.021*** -0.018*** 
5p  -0.071*** -0.096*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.010*** -0.068*** -0.040*** -0.048*** 0.368*** 0.308*** -0.028*** -0.027*** 
6p  -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.056*** -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.042*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.048*** -0.035*** 0.219*** 0.198*** 
Expected yields           
1y  0.524*** 0.505*** -0.180*** -0.092*** -0.206*** -0.137*** -0.139*** -0.121*** -0.162*** -0.138*** -0.178*** -0.103*** 
2y  -0.236 -0.198 0.698*** 0.469*** -0.148*** -0.104*** -0.108*** -0.088*** -0.155*** -0.069*** -0.125*** -0.116*** 
3y  -0.184 -0.115 -0.094*** -0.059*** 1.037*** 0.723*** -0.181*** -0.138*** -0.180*** -0.168*** -0.075*** -0.068*** 
4y  -0.177*** -0.150* -0.108*** -0.077*** -0.128*** -0.101*** 0.584*** 0.449*** -0.074*** -0.067*** -0.151*** -0.147*** 
5y  -0.183 -0.146* -0.140*** -0.119*** -0.185*** -0.104*** -0.090*** -0.046*** 0.876*** 0.659*** -0.108*** -0.096*** 
6y  -0.140*** -0.064* -0.073*** -0.055* -0.051*** -0.045** -0.045*** -0.037** -0.098*** -0.046* 0.756*** 0.640** 
Price risks           
1vp  -0.007*** -0.025*** -0.012*** -0.025*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
2vp  -0.011*** -0.089***   -0.011*** -0.045*** -0.012*** -0.044*** -0.011*** -0.049*** -0.013*** -0.041*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
3vp  -0.006*** -0.030***    -0.005 -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.010*** -0.004 -0.020*** -0.006*** -0.030*** -0.007*** -0.035*** 
4vp  -0.011*** -0.049*** -0.026*** -0.059*** -0.021*** -0.095*** -0.008*** -0.036*** -0.021*** -0.095*** -0.012*** -0.055*** 
5vp  -0.001***  -0.005 -0.001*** -0.004 -0.006*** -0.029 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005*** -0.024** -0.009*** -0.043 
6vp  -0.011***  -0.028 -0.015*** -0.026 -0.008*** -0.041 -0.010*** -0.026 -0.010*** -0.025 -0.009*** -0.023* 
Yield risks           
1vy  -0.087*** -0.102*** -0.052*** -0.094*** -0.050*** -0.074*** -0.042*** -0.077** -0.044*** -0.073*** -0.023*** -0.056** 
2vy  -0.098*** -0.115*** -0.047*** -0.063*** -0.048*** -0.058*** -0.325*** -0.053* -0.029*** -0.014* -0.027*** -0.073* 
3vy  -0.123**  -0.133* -0.190*** -0.129* -0.176*** -0.162*** -0.134*** -0.107* -0.155*** -0.090* -0.080*** -0.060 
4vy  -0.150*  -0.150**  0.047*** -0.134*** -0.045*** -0.109* -0.039*** -0.137***   0.037*** 0.036*  0.022*** 0.050* 
5vy  -0.020** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.039* -0.019* -0.019*   0.020 -0.019*  -0.024** -0.048*** -0.025* -0.014* 
6vy   0.045***  -0.015*   0.072 -0.026* -0.046*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.020* -0.069*** -0.010* -0.047** -0.020*** 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate coefficients statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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This inelastic reaction of acreage shares to expected prices may be partially explained by crop-
specific agronomic constraints (Wu at al., 2004), crop interdependence since changes in the prices 
of one crop also affect acreage decisions of other crops (Lacroix and Thomas, 2011), or market 
failures (de Janvry et al., 1991).  
Second, the impact of own expected yields on acreage shares is both positive and in all cases higher 
than the corresponding price elasticities. Similar to price elasticities, maize displays the largest 
coefficient (0.72), followed respectively by beans (0.66) and other cereals (0.64) in the dynamic 
model. Cross-yield elasticities are all negative, confirming the substitutability nature of the selected 
crops. These result patterns are consistent with the findings by Weersink et al. (2010) for Canadian 
farmers who showed that expected yields had much higher effects on land acreage than expected 
prices. The larger impact of yield expectations may be explained by the fact that most agricultural 
households in Uganda are subsistence farmers or net buyers (Benson et al., 2008; see essay II). 
Therefore, they place greater value on yields as large yields imply higher production and 
subsequently more room for home consumption, while increases in the expected end-of-season 
output prices are essentially more meaningful to farmers participating into food markets.   
Third, price and yield risks also appear to be relevant determinants of land allocation decisions: the 
more volatile the expected output prices or yields, the smaller the proportion of land the farmer will 
be willing to share out between the selected competing crops. And similarly to the case of expected 
values, farmers appear more sensitive to changes in yield risks than in price risks for all crops, 
regardless of the model specification. Estimated elasticities associated with price risks are in most 
cases less than 0.05% while yield risk elasticities are around 0.10%, reaching the highest levels for 
maize (-0.18 and -0.16% in the static and dynamic models, respectively). Similar patterns were 
found by Lin and Dismukes (2007), Weersink et al. (2010), Hung and Khanna (2010), and Liang et 
al. (2011).  
These various own- and cross- acreage elasticities can be further illustrated by simulating the effects 
of simultaneous shocks to the expected prices and yields and their volatility across all crops. Table 
3.4 shows these equiproportional elasticities computed by vertically summing the statistically 
significant own- and cross- elasticities in table 3.3. The table reveals that a positive shock to all the 
expected prices would increase the acreage shares of all selected crops in both the static and 
dynamic specifications, although the effects are relatively larger in the static models. When the 
simulated shocks originate from expected yields, the impacts are globally amplified. For instance, 
the acreage shares towards maize would increase by 2.32% and 1.15% in case of a 10% positive 
shock to the expected yields and prices of all crops, respectively. However, if a covariate shock 
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would simultaneously increase the volatility of both prices and yields, it would become unattractive 
to maintain previous cropping patterns given the shrinkage of the expected gross revenues. 
Consequently, the estimated results suggest that farmers would allocate away from all the selected 
crops. 
Table 3.4 Equiproportional elasticities - Static vs Dynamic models 
 Matooke Cassava Maize Potatoes Beans Other  cereals 
 S D S D S D S D S D S D 
 
ep  0.128 0.093 0.106 0.098 0.192 0.115 0.080 0.023 0.074 0.068 0.065 0.071 
ey  0.207 0.145 0.103 0.067 0.319 0.232 0.021 0.019 0.207 0.171 0.119 0.110 
evp  -0.047 -0.193 -0.065 -0.154 -0.074 -0.154 -0.032 -0.110 -0.062 -0.250 -0.055 -0.131 
evy  -0.433 -0.565 -0.292 -0.483 -0.384 -0.473 -0.593 -0.413 -0.284 -0.199 -0.180 -0.113 
Note: The letters S and D stand for the static and dynamic acreage share models, respectively. ep  and ey
represent the equiproportional price and yield elasticities, while evp  and 
evy  are their risk elasticity counterparts.  
In addition to expected prices and yields, climatic characteristics also play a key role in defining 
crop acreage allocations. As suggested by the first part of table 3.5, the effects of changes in 
average rainfall and temperature are mixed. Increases in average monthly rainfall positively affect 
the shares of maize, potatoes and beans, while extreme temperatures are significantly detrimental 
for all selected crops.  The results further emphasize that it is the changes in the volatility rather 
than in the mean values of the climatic variables that are more influential for land allocations. 
Indeed, the impact of increased volatility in rainfall and temperature is significant at 1% for all 
crops. Whereas the average temperature displays for instance a marginal effect in the dynamic 
model, its volatility reduces expected crop shares by 0.09% for both cassava and other cereals and 
0.16% for beans. These results are in line with findings by Arriagada (2005), Kurukulasuriya and 
Mendelsohn (2008), Seo and Mendelsohn (2007, 2008) and Kaminski et al. (2013) who reported 
that changes in climatic conditions push farmers to substitute away from agricultural activities. In 
regards to land characteristics, the second part of table 3.5 indicates that only changes in total land 
available and the proportion of good quality land positively and significantly influence the shares to 
be allocated to different crops. The largest (smallest) impact of land size concerns cassava (maize) 
with 0.14% (0.06%) and 0.11% (0.01%) in the dynamic and static models, respectively.  Finally, 
farmers’ characteristics have a negligible impact on acreage shares.  
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Table 3.5 Effects of agro-climatic variables and farmer’s characteristics 
 Matooke Cassava Maize Potatoes Beans Other cereals 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Climatic characteristics  
mar  -0.108 -0.089 -0.023*** -0.014**  0.023***   0.018**  0.024***  0.020*   0.018*** 0.015**   -0.014 -0.011 
marcv  -0.061***       -0.049*** -0.062*** -0.066*** -0.042*** -0.090*** -0.026*** -0.079*** -0.022*** -0.006***   -0.094*** -0.045*** 
dmt  -0.025*       -0.024*   -0.012* -0.011* -0.024* -0.180* -0.096* -0.068** -0.035*** -0.027**   -0.039* -0.034* 
dmtcv  -0.197*** -0.142 -0.138*** -0.089*** -0.179***  -0.103*** -0.189*** -0.157*** -0.158*** -0.160***   -0.087*** -0.089*** 
Farm characteristics 
tld   0.108***       0.082***  0.113*** 0.135***  0.007    0.058***  0.102*** 0.068***   0.054*** 0.087***    0.055 0.077*** 
ldq   0.008***  0.005*  0.033*** 0.006*  0.058***    0.002**  0.034*** 0.056*   0.039*** 0.010**    0.055*** 0.011* 
ldir   0.049       0.095   0.030 0.038  0.022    0.019  0.034 0.039   0.023 0.067   -0.099 -0.011 
ldsp  -0.017     -0.008   0.039 0.027  0.051    0.028 -0.011 -0.036   0.054 0.018    0.011 -0.027 
Farmer’s characteristics  
educ   0.000      0.001   0.000 0.000   0.001                     0.000   0.001 0.000   0.000 0.001    0.000 0.000 
age  -0.014     -0.021*   0.013 -0.005 -0.006                   -0.019   0.014 0.006   0.014 0.001    0.019 0.009 
sex   0.014      0.011   0.003 -0.004  -0.001            -0.004  -0.003 -0.009   0.000 -0.006    0.003 -0.004 
hsz   0.015*** 0.070*  0.019***  0.020*   0.002***      0.070*   0.007*** 0.009**   0.010*** 0.010*    0.011***  0.013* 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate coefficients statistically significant at 1% , 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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3.6 Predictability performance 
 
To assess the quality of the estimation results and their predictability performance, I compare for 
each farmer the actual and predicted crop shares obtained from acreage share models and test for 
the significance of these differences. Table 3.6 shows a comparison between observed ks  and 
predicted ksˆ acreage shares.  
 
Table 3.6 Observed versus predicted acreage shares 
   Static model Dynamic model 
  ks  ksˆ  ks  kk ss ˆ/  Equality 
test 
ksˆ  ks  kk ss ˆ/  Equality 
test 
 
 
 
 
 
2009/10 
1k  0.118 
(0.195) 
0.146 
(0.135) 
0.028 
(0.128) 
0.192 4.729 
[0.006]*** 
0.120 
(0.158) 
0.002 
(0.112) 
0.017 0.367 
[0.006)] 
2k  0.165 
(0.213) 
0.186 
(0.127) 
0.021 
(0.150) 
0.113 3.427 
[0.005]*** 
0.171 
(0.152) 
0.006 
(0.142) 
0.035 0.901 
[0.007] 
3k  0.144 
(0.186) 
0.157 
(0.113) 
0.012 
(0.129) 
0.076 2.264 
[0.005]** 
0.149 
(0.135) 
0.006 
(0.119) 
0.040 0.963 
[0.006] 
4k  0.092 
(0.142) 
0.114 
(0.090) 
0.021 
(0.101) 
0.184 5.067 
[0.004]*** 
0.096 
(0.104) 
0.004 
(0.095) 
0.041 0.935 
[0.004] 
5k  0.134 
(0.163) 
0.147 
(0.100) 
0.013 
(0.115) 
0.088 2.803 
[0.005]*** 
0.138 
(0.119) 
0.004 
(0.109) 
0.029 0.787 
[0.005] 
6k  0.100 
(0.175) 
0.128 
(0.122) 
0.027 
(0.114) 
0.211 5.179 
[0.005]*** 
0.104 
(0.143) 
0.004 
(0.108) 
0.038 0.672 
[0.006] 
 
 
 
 
 
2010/11 
1k  0.122 
(0.193) 
0.152 
(0.133) 
0.030 
(0.131) 
0.197 5.140 
[0.006]*** 
0.125 
(0.153) 
0.003 
(0.121) 
0.024 0.449 
[0.006] 
2k  0.164 
(0.201) 
0.196 
(0.129) 
0.031 
(0.144) 
0.158 5.147 
[0.006]*** 
0.174 
(0.147) 
0.008 
(0.144) 
0.046 1.341 
[0.006]* 
3k  0.113 
(0.157) 
0.136 
(0.099) 
0.023 
(0.116) 
0.169 5.053 
[0.005]*** 
0.121 
(0.114) 
0.009 
(0.109) 
0.074 1.816 
[0.005]* 
4k  0.083 
(0.125) 
0.108 
(0.085) 
0.025 
(0.088) 
0.231 6.550 
[0.004]*** 
0.088 
(0.094) 
0.005 
(0.086) 
0.057 1.371 
[0.004]* 
5k  0.123 
(0.152) 
0.147 
(0.097) 
0.024 
(0.112) 
0.163 5.245 
[0.005]*** 
0.128 
(0.108) 
0.005 
(0.108) 
0.038 1.001 
[0.005] 
6k  0.075 
(0.151) 
0.112 
(0.112) 
0.036 
(0.103) 
0.245 7.726 
[0.005]*** 
0.079 
(0.124) 
0.003 
(0.093) 
0.039 0.692 
[0.005] 
 
 
 
 
 
2011/12 
1k  0.120 
(0.182) 
0.150 
(0.126) 
0.030 
(0.121) 
0.200 5.430 
[0.006]*** 
0.122 
(0.149) 
0.002 
(0.114) 
0.016 0.407 
[0.006] 
2k  0.130 
(0.172) 
0.158 
(0.107) 
0.028 
(0.122) 
0.177 5.550 
[0.005]*** 
0.138 
(0.125) 
0.008 
(0.122) 
0.058 1.466 
[0.005]* 
3k  0.121 
(0.155) 
0.139 
(0.100) 
0.017 
(0.112) 
0.122 3.726 
[0.005]*** 
0.128 
(0.117) 
0.007 
(0.104) 
0.055 1.346 
[0.005]* 
4k  0.084 
(0.121) 
0.108 
(0.084) 
0.024 
(0.083) 
0.222 6.651 
[0.004]*** 
0.086 
(0.095) 
0.003 
(0.082) 
0.037 0.672 
[0.004] 
5k  0.132 
(0.152) 
0.149 
(0.093) 
0.017 
(0.112) 
0.114 3.779 
[0.004]*** 
0.136 
(0.111) 
0.005 
(0.110) 
0.035 0.989 
[0.005] 
6k  0.074 
(0.144) 
0105 
(0.108) 
0.031 
(0.096) 
0.295 6.947 
[0.005]*** 
0.076 
(0.122) 
0.003 
(0.088) 
0.039 0.692 
[0.005] 
Note: 1k , 2k , 3k , 4k , 5k , and 6k refer respectively to matooke¸ cassava, maize, potatoes, beans, and other cereals. The 
equality test is a t-test with unequal variances checking whether the mean predicted shares are significantly different 
from the mean observed shares. kkk sss  ˆ . Standard deviations and standard errors are reported into parentheses 
and into brackets, respectively. ***, **, and * indicate coefficients statistically significant at 1% , 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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The columns ks   and  kk ss ˆ/  give the absolute and relative differences between the two sets of 
acreage shares for panel waves 2009/10, 2010/11, and 2011/12.  
The first conclusion is that the static share model performs poorly in terms of prediction of the 
acreages to allocate to different crops. All the expected shares are significantly overstated for each 
crop and in each panel wave. The mis-prediction occurs mostly with regards to potatoes and other 
cereals. For example, in 2009/10, the differences were the smallest for maize (7.6%) and beans 
(8.8%) but very large for other cereals (21.1%) and potatoes (18.4%). Second, when past crop 
choices and initial conditions are accounted for, the predictability performance of the model is 
significantly improved. Indeed, in the dynamic model, the acreage shares are remarkably well 
predicted with the deviations from the actual shares being on average of less than 5% and globally 
not significant. In general, the dynamic share model appears more accurate for matooke and beans. 
The second performance test consists in analyzing how well the estimated results predict the 
optimal crop choice. To that end, I define for each farmer in a given year the optimal crop choice as 
the crop yielding the highest expected profit using the predicted shares. However, in the surveys, 
data on input values and quantities are collected at the plot/parcel level, with no details on how they 
are allocated to different crops. To obtain crop-specific input allocations, I follow the behavioral 
approach proposed by Just et al. (1990) to estimate input allocations in multicrop farms. It consists 
in estimating a system of input allocation equations as a function of crop acreage shares, regional 
and time dummies. More specifically, I estimate the following linear model with Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR): 
Iiisx
K
k
ihthkthktiht ,...,,
1


 Zγ'D'βD'β 2211 , 
where ihtx  is the total expenditure on variable input Iii ,...,1,   by farmer h at time t. ihtx  contains 
farmers’ real expendiures on hired labor, seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides. hkts  is the acreage share 
allocated to crop k; 1D  and 2D  are vectors of regional and time dummies; Z is a vector of farmers’ 
characteristics (such as age, sex, and education of the household’s head). hkt , 1β , 2β , and γ  are 
unknown parameters to be estimated; iht  is the error term assumed normally and identically 
distributed. The estimated parameters hktˆ are then multiplied by the land allocated by the farmer to 
each crop hthkt Ls *  to get crop-specific allocation of input i. 
In table 3.7, the third column (“obs.”) gives for each crop the number of farmers whose optimal 
crop choice is actually 6,...,1, iki . Each cell in the static and dynamic models provides the 
percent of (in)correct predictions, with the main diagonals (values in bold) showing the proportion 
(3.25) 
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of correct predictions. For example, in 2009/10, among the 167 farmers whose matooke  ( 1k ) was 
actually the optimal crop choice, the static share model correctly identifies 25.7% of them (43 
farmers) and erroneously predicts that 43.7, 10.8, and 19.8%  of them will have maize, potatoes, 
and beans as optimal choices.   
 
Table 3.7 Comparison between predicted and observed optimal crop choice 
 Observed 
optimal crop 
Predicted optimal crop choice 
 Static model Dynamic model 
 crop Obs. 1k  2k  3k  4k  5k  6k  1k  2k  3k  4k  5k  6k  
 
 
 
2009/10 
1k  167 0.257 0.000 0.437 0.108 0.198 0.000 0.431 0.012 0.323 0.048 0.186 0.000 
2k  256 0.004 0.379 0.527 0.070 0.016 0.004 0.000 0.508 0.379 0.066 0.047 0.000 
3k  598 0.000 0.002 0.987 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.968 0.007 0.010 0.000 
4k  242 0.008 0.020 0.446 0.512 0.012 0.000 0.049 0.033 0.306 0.591 0.020 0.000 
5k  276 0.011 0.011 0.536 0.101 0.341 0.000 0.029 0.014 0.377 0.065 0.511 0.004 
6k  52 0.000 0.058 0.481 0.250 0.115 0.096 0.019 0.058 0.327 0.135 0.173 0.288 
 
 
 
2010/11 
1k  56 0.036 0.071 0.732 0.107 0.054 0.000 0.643 0.054 0.107 0.107 0.089 0.000 
2k  406 0.000 0.527 0.461 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.613 0.352 0.005 0.029 0.000 
3k  696 0.000 0.007 0.993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.980 0.001 0.006 0.000 
4k  140 0.000 0.086 0.550 0.264 0.100 0.000 0.007 0.107 0.343 0.543 0.000 0.000 
5k  279 0.000 0.122 0.452 0.011 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.330 0.025 0.563 0.000 
6k  18 0.000 0.778 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.611 
 
 
 
2011/12 
1k  62 0.032 0.032 0.290 0.048 0.597 0.000 0.629 0.065 0.065 0.249 0.000 0.000 
2k  322 0.000 0.422 0.466 0.022 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.612 0.298 0.012 0.078 0.000 
3k  648 0.002 0.009 0.969 0.005 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.971 0.003 0.017 0.000 
4k  169 0.000 0.047 0.485 0.207 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.266 0.692 0.000 0.000 
5k  365 0.000 0.019 0.384 0.005 0.592 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.285 0.011 0.660 0.000 
6k  27 0.000 0.148 0.786 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.778 
Note: 1k , 2k , 3k , 4k , 5k , and 6k refer respectively to matooke¸ casssava, maize, potatoes, beans, and other cereals 
 
From table 3.7, it appears that the overall predictive power of the static model is relatively weak. 
The model performs exceptionally well only with respect to maize ( 3k ) with nearly 100% of correct 
predictions. For the remaining crops, the proportions of exact predictions are globally low. In 
2010/11 and 2011/12, the static model even falls to correctly identify a single farmer concerning the 
choice of other cereals. In contrast, the dynamic model presents a relatively improved prediction 
power for all crops. On average, its predictions are accurate in more than 50% of cases and are 
greater than those from the static model. The differences between these two models are particularly 
striking with respect to matooke and other cereals (in 2010/11 and 2011/12). 
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3.7 Conclusions 
 
This study has used farm- and crop-level data of Ugandan agricultural households to understand the 
relative importance of perceived agricultural and market risks on farmers’ crop choices and acreage 
decisions. It proposes a theoretical model in which a representative farmer optimally chooses the 
land shares to allocate to different crops in order to maximize the expected utility of profit. The 
underpinning theoretical model is then translated into two related specifications of farmers’ crop 
decisions: a multivariate selection model and an acreage share model. The former describes how the 
farmer decides which crop(s) to grow while the latter models how he allocates his land area to 
different crops conditional on crop selection. All these models take account of two important facets 
of the farmer’s behavior: the possibility of state dependence and spillover (or rotational) effects 
through the incorporation of past crop choices and land allocations, and the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity in the farmer’s decision process. The models are applied to a balanced panel of 1,598 
farmers, first interviewed in 2005/6 by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBoS) and then followed 
successively in 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12.  
The results provide evidence of both strong state dependence and significant spillover effects in 
farmers’ crop choices and area allocations. This means that, although Ugandan farmers tend to 
reproduce their previous land distributional patterns (positive own state dependence), they are also 
likely to adjust their choices to take advantages of rotational effects (negative cross-state 
dependence) or changes in relative crop profitability. In terms of risks and expectations, both the 
multivariate crop selection and acreage share models agree on the crucial role played by farmers’ 
expectations of market prices, yield levels and their variability (captured by price and yield risks), 
on the one hand, and rainfall and temperature variability, on the other. They suggest that expected 
own prices and yields positively influence the likelihood of crop selection and land shares while 
their variability stresses a risk-averse behavior from Ugandan farmers. They finally show that 
changes in weather variability (in terms of coefficients of variation of rainfall and temperature) are 
likely to impact more on crop selection and land allocations than changes in their average values.   
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Essay IV 
 
Welfare growth, poverty traps, and differential exposure to food price 
shocks 
Evidence from Uganda 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Eradicating poverty has always been one of key challenges for and earliest objectives of national 
policymakers and international agencies. Although at the global level, the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) of halving extreme poverty (proportion of people living with less than 1$ a day) has 
been achieved since 2010 (UN, 2014), some regions, particularly in Southern Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), are still lagging behind and will not probably meet the target by 2015 (World Bank, 
2013). More than in any other regions of the world, populations in SSA are not only among the 
most vulnerable to shocks and stressors (such as droughts, floods, or livestock and other asset 
losses) but also face multiple failures in land, credit, and insurance markets (Barrett and Carter, 
2013) which make them largely dependent on donor and humanitarian assistance to make their ends 
meet. Recent research on poverty has thus advocated the need to study the underlying welfare 
dynamics in order to better understand the process through which some individuals or households 
may fall into or climb out of poverty (Naschold, 2005, 2013).  
Particularly, a bourgeoning empirical literature on the intertemporal dynamics of poverty focuses on 
the existence of poverty traps, broadly defined as “(…) any self-reinforcing mechanism which 
causes poverty to persist” (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005: 326). At the core of the poverty trap’s 
literature lie three interrelated concepts, namely the presence of critical thresholds preventing 
people to move from one welfare path onto another (Barrett and Carter, 2013), the occurrence of  
shocks, either permanent or temporary, likely to push people at a low-level stable equilibrium  from 
which they cannot escape without an important positive shock to their welfare (Van Campenhout 
and Dercon, 2012), and the existence of a single or multiple equilibria (Carter and Barrett, 2006). 
The existence of these traps of poverty is an empirical matter. While some studies (Lybbert et al., 
2004; Adato et al., 2006; Barrett et al., 2006; Amare and Waibel, 2013) find evidence in support for 
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poverty traps, the results of others (Jalan and Ravallion 2002; Lokshin and Ravallion 2004; Antman 
and McKenzie 2005; Naschold, 2013, among others) suggest the absence of any poverty trap. If 
poverty traps do exist, then their identification and location become crucial for the implementation 
of appropriate policies likely to lift households from persistent poverty zones to desirably higher 
and self-sustained well-being equilibrium (Dutta, 2014).  
Accordingly, the last essay examines households’ welfare pathways to identify the links between 
shocks’ occurrences and poverty traps. More precisely, it studies traps and identifies potential 
critical thresholds to determine whether households’ welfare dynamics are characterized by a single 
or multiple equilibria. In the analysis, the emphasis is put on household consumption and assets, 
rather than on income, which generally suffers from important measurement errors, particularly in 
developing countries, and is more prone to stochastic movements and sensitive to transitory 
disturbances likely to generate false positives and false negatives in regards to poverty traps (Barrett 
et al., 2006). This choice has also the advantage of enriching welfare analyses by decomposing poor 
into subgroups of stochastically and structurally poor - depending on the levels of household assets 
and their consumption levels - and by investigating whether these two groups are significantly 
different in their likelihood of being trapped into poverty. 
The evidence shown in this study contributes to the existing literature on shocks, welfare dynamics, 
and poverty traps in two ways. First, I lay emphasis on and investigate the link between instabilities 
in commodities’ prices and the existence of poverty traps. Indeed, in many SSA countries, the 
majority of the population earns their income from agricultural activities, intrinsically very sensitive 
to changes in crop market prices. While numerous studies have raised widespread concern that the 
recent global food price crisis might have pushed millions of population into poverty (Cudjoe et al., 
2008; Headey and Fan, 2008; Ivanic and Martin, 2008; Boysen, 2009; Hella et al., 2011; Vu and 
Glewwe, 2011; Ferreira et al., 2011), they all fall short of evaluating the extent to which some 
households have fallen into chronic poverty or have been caught into poverty traps as a result of 
such price shocks. Built upon a modified standard optimal growth model (Geromini et al., 2006) 
allowing for reference-dependent preferences (Köszegi and Rabin, 2006) and a measure of 
household’s exposure to food price instabilities (Collier and Dehn, 2001; Dehn, 2001; Combes et 
al., 2012), I show that food price shocks may lead to a lower equilibrium and therefore reinforce the 
persistence of poverty for those already thrust into a trap.  
The Ugandan context is particularly germane for this empirical analysis for two main reasons. On 
the one hand, its poverty profiles are heterogeneous across regions and between rural and urban 
areas. In fact, although Uganda is generally praised for its economic performance characterized by a 
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growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) well above that of the SSA
77
, its economy has been 
accompanied by rising inequality between rural and urban areas and across different geographical 
regions. For instance, while the share of poor households living in rural areas increases from 26.7% 
in 2009/10 to 31.2% in 2010/11, the proportion of urban poor decreased from 11% to 7% during the 
same period (UBoS, 2013). Spatially, poverty rates were the highest in the Northern and Eastern 
regions with respectively 38.9 and 36.8% in 2010/11 against only 1% in Kampala (UBoS, 2013). 
On the other hand, the household panel dataset used in this study not only includes a large number 
of observations (around 2,200 households per survey), has detailed information on assets, income, 
or consumption expenditures, but also covers periods of stable and large food price changes, 
suitable for analyzing the impact of price instabilities.  
Second, the paper uses a battery of econometric techniques to check whether the identified welfare 
pathways are genuine dynamics or instead an artifact of the specific estimation method used 
(Naschold, 2013). By means of parametric methods (System-GMM and cubic polynomial 
regression models), non-parametric methods (locally weighted scatterplot smoother (LOWESS) and 
local polynomial regression with Epanechnikov kernel weights), and semi-parametric methods 
(Ruppert et al.’s penalized splines estimators), I identify critical welfare thresholds, test for the 
presence of poverty traps in Uganda, and check for their robustness to model specifications.  
This study is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief literature review on the links 
between shocks, welfare dynamics and poverty traps. Section 3 summarizes existing empirical 
evidence pertaining to micro-level poverty traps. In Section 4, a modified consumption growth 
model is presented and its theoretical implications are discussed. Section 5 describes the dataset 
used for the empirical analysis with a particular emphasis on the construction of a food price shock 
variable and household’s asset index. In section 6, different estimation methods are discussed and 
empirical results are presented.  Section 7 concludes the study. 
4.2 Literature review: shocks, welfare dynamics, and poverty traps 
 
In recent years, the analysis of welfare dynamics over time has gained prominence in development 
economics’ circles. The heed has been particularly put on the reasons why some individuals or 
households manage to lift themselves permanently out of poverty, while others still remain mired 
into poverty for an extended period of time.  Of particular interest is the vulnerability of individuals 
or households to idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Indeed, researchers have explored the 
mechanisms through which the occurrence of such shocks may induce a profound modification of 
                                                          
77
 The Uganda’s GPD grew from 5.9 percent in 2009/10 to 6.7 percent in 2010/11 (UBOS, 2012), while that of Sub-
Saharan Africa decreased from 5.2 to 3.9% during the same period. 
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the welfare accumulation dynamics (in terms for example of income, consumption, or assets) and 
potentially lead to poverty persistence and poverty traps. For example, climate shocks, associated 
with extreme weather conditions (e.g., droughts, floods, cyclones) may overnight bring households’ 
assets to a level below which accumulation growth becomes impossible without a substantial 
external push (Giesbert and Schindler, 2012). In rural areas of many developing countries, weather-
related disasters (insufficient rainfall, extreme temperatures, droughts, etc) may have catastrophic 
consequences on crop production and therefore on farm revenues. For example, Carter et al. (2007) 
found evidence that short-term asset shocks (hurricane in Honduras) and long-term income shocks 
(drought in Ethiopia) were responsible of people being trapped into poverty.  
The concept of poverty traps originates from macro-economic literature on growth dynamics 
through three hypotheses. The first is the idea of unconditional convergence according to which all 
households will follow the same welfare equilibrium path and will ultimately converge to a unique 
living standard and asset stock. In this Solow-type growth model, any shock will only temporarily 
modify the welfare dynamics, without preventing the convergence towards the equilibrium to occur 
(Geromini et al., 2006). Under the conditional convergence hypothesis, dating back to Baumol 
(1986) and DeLong (1988), there are as many welfare pathways as there are groups or clubs of 
individuals sharing some intrinsic characteristics (agro-ecological conditions, natural resource 
endowments, ethnic diversity, innate abilities and skills, etc). Depending on their characteristics, 
some groups will face a low-level equilibrium from which they cannot escape and move to a higher 
equilibrium level. The last hypothesis posits the prevalence of multiple equilibria, with at least one 
associated with a poor standard of living and another with a high level of well-being (Carter and 
Barrett, 2006). In this context, poverty trap is characterized by the existence of critical thresholds, 
with at least one threshold, once crossed, leads to poverty exit and welfare accumulation and below 
which depletion occurs (Barrett et al., 2007; Kraay and McKenzie, 2014).  
Theoretically, the economics literature identifies at least three structural causes of multiple 
equilibrium poverty traps, playing at different scales: “big push” theories of development, 
originated from Rosenstein-Rodan (1943); physical work capacity theories (Dasgupta 1993, 1997); 
and incomplete and missing markets (Barrett and Carter, 2013) 
The first theoretical argument for poverty traps stems from the concept of “big push” that 
emphasizes the necessity of coordinated investments as a basis to industrialization. When many 
different sectors of an economy simultaneously adopt increasing returns technologies or when the 
economy allocates most of its resources to the increasing returns sectors, then wages will be high in 
all sectors, creating more income and demand for goods which in turn will enlarge the market, 
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leading to industrialization. Conversely, the allocation of resources to constant returns sectors will 
result in low wage levels across sectors and demand reductions (Kraay and McKenzie, 2014). On 
the other hand, the “big push” model can also be associated with coordination failures between 
firms wherein agents only mimic the economic behavior of their peers by deciding whether to 
invest or not depending on their expectations of what other agents will do. In this case, poverty trap 
occurs when all agents fail to invest in the efficient technology.   
The second widely developed cause of poverty trap assumes a non-linear relationship between 
individual physical work capacity and his nutritional or food intake status. In this model, labor 
productivity and wage depend solely on consumption and income is entirely derived from labor 
market (Van Campehnout and Dercon, 2012). The underlying idea is that poverty will beget poverty 
or be self-reinforcing insofar as poor households will not have enough resources to increase the 
quantity and quality of their food intake. They will become too undernourished to either participate 
productively into the labor market (from which they are thus rationed) or earn enough (and 
therefore consume enough) to help them climb out of nutritional poverty traps. As long as 
consumption will be below a certain threshold, the worker will remain unproductive and will thus 
be trapped into poverty.  
Finally, uninsured risks and incomplete credit and other financial markets can give rise to poverty 
traps’ mechanisms, particularly in developing countries where households often have limited access 
to capital and insurance markets. From this perspective, shocks can have disproportionally 
permanent consequences on welfare accumulation, trigger irreversible mechanisms for individuals 
already close to the poverty line, and keep poor households from climbing out of poverty (McPeak 
and Barrett, 2001; Dercon, 2005; Krishna, 2006). Ex ante management strategies to risk exposure 
and ex post mitigation mechanisms may also lead to poverty traps. To manage risk exposure, poor 
households may choose a diversified portfolio comprised of low-risk activities but at the expense of 
asset returns, reinforcing the likelihood of being trapped into poverty. For example, Bezabih et al. 
(2011) found that in Ethiopia crop portfolio choice was essentially influenced by rainfall variability 
and that farmers were likely to choose less risky crops at the expense of high returns. Ex post, 
empirical evidence indicates that poor households often sell out their meager assets, principally 
livestock, to cope with shocks and smooth their consumption, thereby exacerbating their already-
unsustainable welfare conditions. In some other circumstances, empirical findings suggest that poor 
may instead opt for asset smoothing by reducing their consumption or healthcare expenditures or 
withdrawing children from school, resulting in health and education deficiencies and potential 
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intergenerational transmission of poverty (Hoddinott, 2006; Carter et al., 2007; Amare and Waibel, 
2013).  
4.3 Empirical evidence on poverty traps 
 
Over the last two decades, empirical research that has concentrated on the identification of poverty 
traps and the existence of single or multiple welfare equilibria has obtained mixed results. For 
example, using a six-year panel of income from rural Chinese provinces, Jalan and Ravallion (2002) 
find evidence of a geographical poverty trap, implying that well-endowed areas enjoy consumption 
levels rising over time, while households trapped into geographic poverty are stuck into a lower 
standard of living. Lokshin and Ravallion (2004) analyze nonlinearities of household income in the 
presence of endogenous attrition using a four-year household panel from Russia and a six-year 
panel from Hungary. By means of a semi-parametric Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML), they find evidence of nonlinearities in income dynamics but fail to find a dynamic poverty 
trap.   
Lybbert et al. (2004) use 17-year cattle herd histories collected among pastoralists in southern 
Ethiopia to study stochastic livestock dynamics. They apply a Nadaraya-Watson estimator of 
bivariate case using Epanechnikov kernel with an arbitrary bandwidth of 1.5 and find evidence of 
multiple dynamic wealth equilibria among pastoralists. Particularly, they find that households with 
herd size less than 15 heads fall into a sedentarisation zone, while households with more than 15 
head converge to an upper equilibrium of about 75. Above this level, accumulation becomes too 
costly to be sustainable. 
Adato et al. (2006), Carter and Barrett (2006); Barrett et al. (2006), Quisumbing and Baulch (2009) 
Naschold (2009; 2013), Giesbert and Schindler (2012), Amare and Waibel (2013)  all look at 
poverty trap from an asset-based perspective and derive asset-based wellbeing indices through 
either a regression of expenditure/income on the household's productive assets or a factor analysis. 
Specifically, Carter and Barrett (2006) argue that an asset-based approach to poverty trap enables 
the researcher to distinguish persistent or structural poverty from stochastic poverty. Using a 
livelihood-weighted approach to compute an asset index, Adato et al. (2006) and Amare and Waibel 
(2013) find an S-shaped asset accumulation process and evidence of poverty traps in South-Africa 
and rural Vietnam, respectively. Barrett et al. (2006) study welfare dynamics in rural Kenya and 
Madagascar. They use qualitative and quantitative evidence to see what causes persistent poverty. 
They find evidence of S-shaped asset dynamics using both non-parametric regressions and a fourth 
order polynomial regression. On the other hand, Naschold (2009, 2013), Quisumbing and Baulch 
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(2009), Giesbert and Schindler (2012), have not found evidence for multiple equilibria but rather a 
single stable state at a low level of well-being around the poverty line towards which everyone 
converges.  
Van Campenhout and Dercon (2012) explore the existence of livestock asset poverty traps in 
Ethiopia using the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) from round 1 to round 6. Using a 
GMM estimation and Threshold Auto-Regression model proposed by Hansen (1999; 2000), they 
find nonlinearities in the dynamics of Tropical Livestock Units (TLUs) and multiple equilibria of 
TLUs. When estimating the speed of convergence towards the low and high equilibria, they find 
that the convergence to the former was almost twice as fast as convergence towards the latter. 
Kwak and Smith (2010) and Dutta (2014) test for the existence of both single and simultaneous 
poverty traps in Ethiopia and India, respectively.  Using a range of econometric (parametric, non- 
and semi-parametric) methods to the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) from 1994 to 2004, 
Kwak and Smith (2010) identify only a single stable welfare equilibrium when using the full panel 
sample but two equilibria when they split the data into two time intervals (1994-1999 and 1999-
2004). Moreover, their results suggest that households with chronic undernourishment and illiteracy 
are trapped into lower equilibria while richer households enjoy high level of asset equilibrium. 
Finally, Dutta (2014) uses the local polynomial regression with Epanechnikov kernel weights to test 
the existence of multiple equilibria in asset poverty dynamics and a partial linear mixed model to 
investigate the impact of under-nutrition and illiteracy on asset accumulation process in India. He 
finds evidence of a single dynamic asset equilibrium across rural households but multiple traps 
(asset, under-nutrition and illiteracy traps) in most depraved States.  
4.4 Conceptual model 
 
This study focuses on the analysis of consumption growth, assets accumulation, and the 
identification of household-level poverty traps in an intertemporal framework where heterogeneous 
economic agents are maximizing their welfare and accumulating assets. As in Jalan and Ravallion 
(2002), and Elbers et al. (2002), I use a variant of the Ramsey growth model of consumption. 
However, in the present model, I am explicitly allowing agents (households) to face two types of 
shocks that directly affect their wealth accumulation: food price shocks fht , through their impact on 
consumption levels and therefore household utility, and asset shocks
k
ht , through their effects on 
income levels.  
Concretely, let the consumption level and capital/asset stock of a utility-maximizing household h 
for period t be htc  and htk , respectively. For simplicity, I assume that the distributions of 
f
ht  and 
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k
ht  are independent of each other and across time and their respective cumulative density functions 
denoted by  .f  and  .k  are known by the household when he decides on htc  and 1htk . The 
relation between food price shocks and household consumption choices can be understood as 
follows: at the beginning of each period t, the household forms his expectations about both the 
probability of experiencing a price shock during period t and the magnitude of the shock given the 
information set at his disposal (current and past food price levels), expectations about future levels 
of food prices, and other constraints (labor, budget, or farm constraints). At the end of time t, after 
the realization or not of fht , the household adapts his period t+1 decisions accordingly.  
Formally, let  .u  be the instantaneous household’s utility function, twice differentiable, strictly 
increasing, and strictly concave     0.'';0.'  uu . To incorporate the effect of a food price shock 
into the analysis, I assume, along the lines of Köszegi and Rabin (2006), that a household’s utility 
depends on both the consumption bundle, c, and the realization or not of a food price shock  fz  , 
such that       ff zccucU  ; , where  cu  is an intrinsic consumption utility and   fzc   
is the utility gap or “gain-loss utility” function due to the realization of fht . The utility-gap function 
is given by         ff zcucuvzc   , with    01 fzc  , meaning that, in the absence of a 
price shock, 1f  and   fcU ;  reduces to the standard instantaneous utility function  cu .  
In terms of assets, the decision-maker accumulates a stock of assets at the end of each period t, 1tk , 
with a depreciation rate  , assumed constant over time. Unlike in the standard Ramsey model, the 
household assets are also exposed to shocks k . 
Each household h maximizes his expected lifetime utility and solves the following optimization 
problem: 
          








 

 0
0
,
;
1 t
f
tttt
tf
kc
zcucucucUMax
tt
 Ε  
subject to                    
     ttt
k
tt ckkfk   11  
0k  given 
where  0Ε  is the conditional expectation  00 ΨΕ  with 0Ψ  the household’s information set 
available at time 0;   1,0  is the time discount factor. Similarly to food price shocks, when 1k
, there is no asset shock while 1k  implies a negative shock that depletes part of the household 
(4.1)
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assets (Barrett et al., 2008). The value function derived from this problem in the presence of both 
food price and asset shocks can be defined as: 
                tttktt
ts
f
ssss
s
t
c
t ckkfktszcucucuMaxktV
s
t
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
  1., 1Ε  
The Bellman’s principle of optimality associated with the value function in (4.2) for each t = 0, 
1,2,… gives the following result: 
                 tttkttfttttt
c
t ckkftVzcucucuMaxktV
t
t
  1,1, Ε  
It is straightforward to show that the first order conditions derived from the stochastic Bellman 
equation in (4.3) give the following Euler equation
78
:  
                 
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where       ftttftt zcucucg  ;  
The Euler equation (4.4) equates the discounted marginal benefit of consumption in period t under 
exposure to food price shock ft  to the marginal cost, measured by the discounted marginal 
expected utility of potential consumption foregone in period t+1. The Euler equation (4.4) can be 
rearranged to give: 
 
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where 
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 This equation is obtained using the following Bellman-type equation obtained by maximizing (4.3): 
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Ε , where the subscripts k and c denote partial derivatives, and
          fttttt zcucucu  . , and        tttkt ckkf   1.  
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
(4.2) 
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The left-hand side of (4.5) represents the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption 
under price instabilities, while the right-hand side is the marginal rate of transformation in 
production (MRT) when assets are subject to shocks. Accordingly, the Euler equation (4.5) provides 
two key messages regarding the effects of food price and asset shocks on household’s intertemporal 
optimization problem. First, if exposure to food price shocks has no effect on household’s 
consumption behavior (for example, in the case of autarkic households who do not participate into a 
food market,        tzcucucg ftttftt  ,0;  ,     tcucU tftt  ,';'  ), and assets are not 
affected by shocks ( 1k ),  the left-hand side of equation (4.5) reduces to a standard Euler 
equation.  
Second, if instead      tzcucu fttt  , , in other words, if food price shocks push a household to 
modify his consumption behavior (think for example of pure consumers, net sellers, or net buyers of 
agricultural products), then the marginal utility of consumption under ft becomes:  
 
                 tcucgvzcucgvcucU tfttfttftttftt  ,';'';'1';'   
Hence, from equation (4.8), it is possible to get for some households   tftt czc   while for others
  tftt czc  , depending on their initial characteristics, attitude towards risk, preferences, or 
expectations about the future. Particularly, when   tftt czc  , a price shock, either its realization or 
household’s anticipation about its future realization, reduces the level of consumption that the 
household would have achieved (attainable well-being). Repeated price shocks over time may thus 
trigger downward welfare spirals and increase the likelihood of a poverty trap, unless the household 
luckily receives a positive income shock (social transfers, inheritances, job opportunities…) or 
policy interventions modify these price dynamics.  Furthermore, in the presence of negative asset 
shocks  1k , the standard marginal rate of transformation in output will be reduced the larger the 
magnitude of the asset shocks. 
To uncover the expression of the growth path of consumption 1lnlnln  ttt ccc , let us assume 
that the level of consumption under food price shocks is proportional to the importance of the shock 
such that     



 t
f
t
f
tt cucU

; , where  is a time-constant and household-specific elasticity that 
captures the magnitude of the price shock. Furthermore, let the utility  cu  be represented by a 
(4.8) 
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Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function:  





1
1c
cu  if 1,0    and 
  )ln(ccu   if 1 ; with   a measure of the degree of relative risk aversion. This implies that 
        tftftt ccU
1
;' and        

  1
1
111;' t
f
t
f
tt ccU . Expressing the Euler equation in (4.5) 
one period backwards and linearizing the resulting intertemporal marginal rate of consumption 
substitution, we get the following expression of the growth rate of consumption between t and t-1: 
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Equation (4.9), which will serve as the starting point to our empirical model, gives the consumption 
growth path when both food price and asset shocks are allowed to co-exist. It shows that the 
consumption path over time is affected not only by taste and preference shifters (time preference   
and degree of risk aversion  ) or marginal productivity of capital/assets net of depreciation rate 
(last term of 4.9) but also by the magnitude of relative changes in food price shocks 
f
t
f
tf
t
1



  
and capital/asset shocks
k
t . In reduced form, equation (4.9) leads to the following specification: 
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where htZ  is a vector of variables affecting taste and other preference shifters, htX  and hX  are 
vectors of time-varying and time-invariant variables that influence household’s asset levels and 
their marginal productivity; h  is the household-specific unobserved heterogeneity capturing 
household fixed effects; ht  is the error term; i  are unknown parameters to be estimated.  
Importantly, 2  measures the impact of variations in differential exposure to food price shocks on 
contemporaneous consumption growth, after controlling for other types of shocks, household 
characteristics, or unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, a negative coefficient of 2  will be 
indicative of consumption depletion consecutive to increases in the rate of exposure to price shocks, 
all other things equal.  
4.5 Data 
 
This last essay uses a four-wave panel dataset of the Uganda National Panel Surveys (UNPS) 
conducted in 2005/6, 2009/10, 2010/11, and 2011/2012 by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBoS) 
as part of the Living Standard Measurement Study-Integrated Surveys of Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) 
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
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of the World Bank. Among the 3,123 targeted households in 2005/9, the UBoS was able to track 
2,888 households in 2009/10, among which only 2,566 had complete information (Ssewanyana and 
Kasirye, 2012), which represents an attrition rate of 17, 8%.  And among the 2,566 households 
tracked in the 2009/10, 2,390 were re-interviewed in 2010/11 and 2,194 in 2011/12, with only 2,173 
households having complete information in all the four waves. Hence, for this essay, the final 
sample of each survey contains information on 2,173 balanced households
79
, located in all the 
geographical regions of the country. Pooling these time series and cross-sectional data gives 8,692 
observations. All surveys were based on a two-stage stratified random sampling design. In the first 
stage, Enumeration  Areas
80
  (EAs)  were  selected  from  the  4  geographical  regions of the 
country and grouped by districts and rural-urban location (UBoS, 2010). In the second stage, ten 
households in each EA were selected by simple random sampling. Each household was then visited 
twice in order to capture seasonalities in the agricultural production module
81
. The panel surveys 
provide detailed information on household demographics, production (quantities and values of both 
inputs and outputs), consumption (food and non-food commodities), landholdings and livestock 
ownership, types of shocks and coping strategies, among others.  Different recall periods were used 
depending on the nature of the expenditure items: they go from a seven-day recall period for food 
consumption to one year for durable, semi-durable and non-consumption expenditures (taxes and 
duties, pension, social security contribution, remittances, gifts, contribution to funerals,...).  
4.5.1 Construction of a food price shock variable 
A key challenge in estimating equation (4.10) is to find a suitable definition of being exposed to a 
food price shock. Two practical problems emerge when engaging in such task. First, although the 
datasets I are using provide information on households’ exposure to different types of shocks 
(health, agricultural, livestock or other asset shocks) as well as the responses in terms of coping 
strategies that households adopt, the surveys remain silent in regards to food price shocks, thereby 
leaving the researcher to surmise on the likelihood of exposure to price shocks. Second, price 
changes affect households differently depending on their tastes, preferences, composition, or their 
                                                          
79
 To test for a potential attrition bias, I apply the attrition probits’ tests of Fitzgerald et al. (1998), and the pooling 
tests of Becketti, Gould, Lillard and Welch (1988). The correction of attrition bias is then done through the inverse 
probability weighting (IPW) procedure (Fitzgerald et al, 1998; Wooldridge, 2002). See Appendix B.1. 
80
 An enumeration area represents “the smallest ground area, mapped with definite boundaries within which a study 
or interview is carried out” (UBoS, 2012: 32).  
81
 In the UNPS-2006, households were first visited between May and October 2005 and then between November 2005 
and April 2006. In the UNPS-2010, first visits occurred between September 2009 and January 2010 while the second 
were conducted between February 2010 and August 2010. In the third wave, first visits were conducted between 
October 2010 and March 2011, while the second were between April and September 2011. For the last survey, first 
occurred between November 2011 and April 2012  and second between May 2012 and December 2012. 
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decision to participate or not into a food market. Hence, observing a “large” change in food prices 
in a specific district between two periods does not automatically imply that all households within 
that district will be identically affected. One way to overcome the above complications is “to locate 
shocks using a pure statistical definition” (Dehn, 2000: 8). Hence, in order to compute a food price 
shock variable, I follow the methodology first developed by Deaton and Miller (1995) and recently 
applied by Collier and Dehn (2001) and Combes et al. (2012) in their studies of countries’ 
vulnerability to commodity price instabilities and shocks.  
First, I compute a household-specific consumer price index to reflect households’ heterogeneity in 
their consumption preferences. Theoretically, two approaches can be used to obtain these indices. 
One could estimate a food demand system and use the estimation results to compute a household-
specific true cost of living (Cage et al., 2002); or instead, one could use a vector of market prices at 
a certain disaggregation level (village, district, or sub-region) and a vector of household-specific 
budget shares to construct the index. I will use the second approach given its evident computational 
simplicity.  
Let  hctCPI  be the food price index, specific to a household h living in cluster (village or district) c 
in period t. If 
i
ctp  represents the median unit market price of a commodity i observed in cluster c at 
time t, and 


I
i
i
hct
i
ct
i
hct
i
ct
i
hct CpCps
1
/ is the food consumption share
82
 of the commodity i¸ then 
hctCPI , based on price levels in period 0 (in this essay, 2005/6), can be computed as a modified 
Laspeyres formula: 
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where the basket of goods in equation (4.11) is made up of 7 food commodities or commodity 
groups considered as the most important in the Ugandan diet:  matooke
83
, potatoes (sweet and Irish 
potatoes), cassava, maize, beans, meat and fish, fruits and vegetables. Hence, although market 
prices are assumed on average identical for households within the same village (Deaton, 1988), the 
use of food consumption shares 
i
hcts  as individual weights makes the price index household-
specific.  Given hctCPI , the second step consists in regressing the changes in each household’s price 
index on its lagged values,  time dummies t, and household’s fixed effects   as follows: 
 
                                                          
82
 I include the imputed values of consumption from self-produced goods 
83
 Matooke refers to starchy bananas that are cooked and consumed as staple (Haggblade and Dewina, 2010) and 
represents one of the most important staple foods in the Ugandan diet. 
(4.11) 
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TttCPICPI hcthcthct ,...,1;2110      
 
The residuals from equation (4.12), hctˆ , are then standardized by subtracting their mean values 
hct and dividing by their standard deviation ˆs  (Combes et al., 2012). Hence, contrarily to many 
previous studies on shocks, this specification allows not only to answer whether there is a 
significant impact of exposure to food price shocks on consumption growth but also how large this 
impact is given the magnitude of the shocks experienced by the household. Owing to the emphasis 
of the essay on positive price shocks, I consider for now a household as having been exposed to a 
food price shock if its normalized residuals from equation (4.12) are positive.  This definition will 
then be extended thereafter by including negative price shocks and varying cut-off points. The 
higher the values of the normalized residuals, the more important the scale of exposure to food price 
shocks. Using this definition, there are respectively 63.3, 51.7, and 34.2% households that were 
exposed to food price shocks in 2009/10, 2010/11, and 2011/12. The prominence of positive shocks 
over 2009-2011 is not surprising since this period corresponds to the recent global food price crisis 
but also has seen sharp increases in domestic food prices in Uganda
84
.  
Table 4.1 presents some key household characteristics according to whether a household was 
exposed or not to a food price shock. Households are then subdivided into three categories, 
depending on the extent of their exposure to price shocks: high if the normalized hctˆ  exceeds the 
75
th
 percentile of the sample value; moderate, if it lies between the median and the 75
th
 percentile; 
and low if it is positive but below the median.  
Different features emerge from table 4.1. First, the proportion of highly exposed households is the 
largest in 2009/10 (27.6% of surveyed households) and the lowest during the third survey (15.6% in 
2010/11). Second, while the number of moderately affected households is decreasing over time, 
those of unexposed and with low exposure rates are increasing, reflecting the general tendency of 
food price changes in Uganda. Third, we also note that on average households’ monthly real values 
of food consumption per adult equivalent were the highest when households were not exposed to 
food price shocks. Hence, unexposed households enjoyed an increase in their consumption relative 
to those exposed. Among the sub-sample of households exposed to price shocks, those at the 
highest vulnerability percentile reported on average a lower level of consumption compared to the 
baseline survey (2005/6), providing a first insight on a possible negative relationship between the 
degree of exposure to food price shocks and households’ consumption levels.   
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 See Essay II. 
(4.12) 
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Table 4.1 Household characteristics by exposure to food price shocks 
 Base 
survey:  
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
Low 
 
None 
 2005/6 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
              
Observations 2173 599 338 492 726 703 101 50 82 150 798 1,050 1,430 
Monthly real 
food cons. 
34,955 
(30,359) 
32,067 
(25,607) 
25,056 
(17,167) 
32,911 
(21,703) 
33,184 
(26,867) 
27,875 
(22,727) 
27,529 
(18,524) 
33,598 
(22,134) 
28,885 
(23,686) 
37,735 
(22,802) 
34,403 
(23,864) 
29,443 
(21,170) 
37,659 
(29,893) 
 
Household 
size 
5.78 
(3.03) 
6.67 
(3.34) 
7.49 
(3.78) 
7.62 
(3.68) 
6.77 
(3.88) 
7.45 
(3.45) 
7.74 
(3.63) 
6.96 
(3.46) 
7.80 
(3.27) 
7.86 
(4.85) 
6.42 
(3.17) 
7.01 
(3.53) 
7.06 
(3.93) 
 
Proportion 
of children 
0.54 
(0.23) 
0.58 
(0.22) 
0.57 
(0.23) 
0.54 
(0.22) 
0.55 
(0.23) 
0.55 
(0.22) 
0.51 
(0.22) 
0.58 
(0.24) 
0.54 
(0.21) 
0.49 
(0.23) 
0.53 
(0.23) 
0.54 
(0.22) 
0.51 
(0.22) 
 
Years of 
education 
5.25 
(3.94) 
4.73 
(3.88) 
5.40 
(4.15) 
5.73 
(4.41) 
5.11 
(4.12) 
5.35 
(4.26) 
4.90 
(3.88) 
4.38 
(3.64) 
5.54 
(3.97) 
8.00 
(5.74) 
5.39 
(4.11) 
5.59 
(4.29) 
5.00 
(3.96) 
 
Age of the 
head 
42.79 
(15.00) 
47.44 
(15.19) 
47.74 
(15.10) 
47.40 
(14.89) 
46.81 
(14.73) 
47.58 
(15.61) 
47.71 
(13.06) 
43.62 
(14.62) 
47.96 
(15.25) 
48.29 
(15.53) 
46.51 
(14.91) 
47.00 
(15.02) 
48.58 
(14.76) 
 
% of female-
headed  
 
0.28 
 
0.27 
 
0.24 
 
0.23 
 
0.35 
 
0.38 
 
0.05 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.36 
 
0.35 
 
0.71 
% of agr. 
households 
 
0.83 
 
0.34 
 
0.26 
 
0.19 
 
0.34 
 
0.38 
 
0.05 
 
0.29 
 
0.05 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.31 
 
0.76 
%  of  net 
sellers
** 
 
0.27 
 
0.28 
 
0.22 
 
0.07 
 
0.35 
 
0.41 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.05 
 
0.01 
 
0.34 
 
0.32 
 
0.85 
%  of net 
buyers
** 
 
0.55 
 
0.29 
 
0.27 
 
0.26 
 
0.37 
 
0.38 
 
0.06 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.02 
 
0.32 
 
0.31 
 
0.66 
% of poor 
households 
* 
 
0.28 
 
0.32 
 
0.24 
 
0.18 
 
0.31 
 
0.37 
 
0.04 
 
0.02 
 
0.05 
 
0.01 
 
0.34 
 
0.22 
 
0.78 
Note:  
* 
Poor households are defined using the official absolute poverty line of 1 USD PPP per capita/ per day converted into Uganda Shillings (UShs). A household is then 
poor if its real consumption (food and non-food) per adult equivalent lies below the poverty line. 
** 
Net sellers (buyers) are defined as agricultural households whose total values 
of crop sales are greater (lower) than the total values of consumption of those crops (matooke, cassava, potatoes, maize, beans, rice, millet, sorghum, fruits, and vegetables). 
Standard deviations into brackets 
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By and large, the lower the degree of exposure to food price shocks, the more important the 
level of consumption. Households likely to be highly exposed to food price shocks have on 
average larger household size, higher proportion of children, older heads and are run mostly 
by females.  
Unsurprisingly, agricultural and poor households display a higher likelihood of being exposed 
to large food price shocks. For example, the proportion of agricultural households with low 
degree of exposure to price shocks is around 2%, compared to an average of 25% and 26% for 
high and moderate degrees, respectively. This feature was expected, particularly for 
agricultural households since they generally live in rural areas and dependent essentially on 
the levels of market prices for their income. When we disaggregate agricultural households by 
their net seller/net buyer status, it appears that globally the proportion of net sellers (buyers) 
of food staples is decreasing (increasing) with the degree of exposure. Finally, the fact that 
most poor households were highly exposed to price shocks is also in line with many empirical 
findings (Cudjoe et al., 2008; Headey and Fan, 2008; Ivanic and Martin, 2008; Boysen, 2009; 
Hella et al., 2011) and is indicative of increased risks of being trapped into persistent poverty 
for those households. 
4.5.2 Asset index 
Household wellbeing can be analyzed through different measurement indicators, ranging from 
consumption to income and aggregate asset indices. In developing countries, consumption 
levels have always been preferred to income due to its potential measurement errors and acute 
volatility. Although very informative on household welfare dynamics, consumption-based 
approaches fall short of distinguishing structural changes from stochastic variations in welfare 
(Barrett et al., 2006). To enrich the analyses from consumption and account for the underlying 
structural wellbeing of households, I also compute, in line with Carter and May (2001), Adato 
et al. (2006), Carter and Barrett (2006), McKay and Perge (2013), Naschold (2013), and 
Kwak and Smith (2014), among others, an aggregate index of household assets. This index 
reduces the multivariate dimension of assets to a single dimension, thereby avoiding the 
“curse of dimensionality" problem in non-parametric estimations. I use the livelihood-
weighted regression approach (Carter and May, 2001; Adato et al.; 2006; Amare and Waibel, 
2013)
85
 where a livelihood indicator, in this study real monthly values of consumption per 
adult equivalent divided by the official poverty line, is regressed over a bundle of assets 
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 Another approach to construct an asset index is to use principal components or factor analyses. As indicated 
by Naschold (2013: 939), “[n]either method of constructing the asset index is inherently superior but one can 
be a useful validation for the results of the other”. 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
 
131 
 
(human, physical, financial, or social) likely to shape household’s wellbeing and the predicted 
value of the dependent variable is then used as the estimated asset index. Similar to previous 
studies (McKay and Perge,  2013; Naschold, 2013), the components of the asset index include 
a set of productive and agricultural assets (land, livestock, agricultural equipments, small 
business machinery,…), physical assets (owned houses and buildings, household utilities,…), 
and human assets (household size, maximum years of schooling of the head, proportion of 
adults and children,…). Formally, this requires estimating the following regression model 
(Amare and Waibel, 2013): 
hth
I
kj
k
ht
j
htjk
I
i
i
htiht AAA   

ωD'αΖ'
,1
0  
where the dependent variable 
t
ht
P
c
ht   is the real monthly values of consumption per adult 
equivalent htc expressed at a percent of the official poverty line
86
 tP  at time t. 
i
htA ,
j
htA , and 
k
htA are the amounts of physical or productive assets i,j, and k owned by household h in period 
t; Ζ is a vector of households’ characteristics (human assets); D  is a vector of district and 
time dummies included to account for geographical and time unobserved effects on assets 
accumulation, while h  stands for household-specific unobserved fixed effects. ht  is the 
error term. Equation (4.13) is estimated using a fixed-effects model and the predicted values 
htˆ  are interpreted as household-specific asset index. Deriving this index through a livelihood 
approach presents at least three appealing advantages. First, individual assets are included in 
the index based on their marginal contribution on the household’s overall livelihood level. 
Second, scaled in Poverty Line Units (PLU), the index is easily interpretable: an index above 
1 means that household’s asset holdings would be expected to yield a livelihood level above 
the official poverty line. Finally, the asset index can be used to distinguish between stochastic 
and structural poverty. 
In figure 4.1, I plot the asset index hta  at current period against its one period lagged value. 
The scatterplot portrays interesting features of households’ assets accumulation. First, there 
seems to be an equi-distribution of asset indices below and above the asset poverty line, 
particularly between 0.65 and 1.4, with only few observations (gray circles) located outside 
this interval. Second, there is evidence of households’ heterogeneity regarding their assets’ 
accumulation process: households whose asset holdings are below (above) the 45° line will be 
decumulating (accumulating) assets over time. Third, and probably the key take-away 
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 1 USD PPP per capita/ per day converted into Uganda Shillings (UShs) 
(4.13) 
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message from this bivariate analysis, is the evident absence of multiple critical thresholds in 
the assets accumulation process: Ugandan households seem to be converging towards a single 
asset equilibrium located slightly above the official poverty line.  
 
Figure 4.1 Scatterplot of asset index 
 
4.5.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics of key variables used in this study. Household total 
consumption expenditures (food and non-food) are fluctuating over time, while household 
food consumption expenditures are decreasing. Between the first and second waves, the 
average monthly real household expenditures increased by 19.6% to 257,244UShs. Then, they 
decreased by 18.9% to 208,727UShs between the second and third rounds, and finally 
increased by 23% to 256,640UShs between the third and last rounds. This translated into a 
decrease in the proportion of poor between the first two rounds, from 28.1 to 24.8%, an 
increase in the number of poor in 2010/11 at 29.1%, and a fall in the last survey at 27.2%. 
However, there are little fluctuations in asset indices, which globally increase over time. 
Agricultural households, representing more than 80% of the sample, are essentially small-size 
farmers, cultivating on average less than 5 acres. In terms of shocks’ occurrences, the majority 
of households were exposed to food price shocks in waves 2 and 3 (63.3 and 51.7%, 
respectively) against only 34.2% in the last round. Agricultural shocks (droughts, floods, pest 
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attacks and diseases…) were also relatively frequent, with around half of households being 
affected in the first three rounds.  
 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics by survey rounds 
 2005/6 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
 Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. 
         
Monthly real household 
expenditure (UShs) 
215,093 379,790 257,244 474,486 208,727 269,133 256,640 534,772 
Monthly real food cons. per 
adult equiv. (UShs) 
34,955 35,359 33,333 25,345 28,560 22,269 28,874 20,377 
Asset index (unitless) 1.042 1.247 1.076 1.414 1.067 1.381 1.101 1.282 
Land size (acres) 3.261 20.951 2.623 10.444 3.769 23.964 2.397 7.704 
Household size 5.758 3.026 6.620 3.265 7.316 3.560 7.946 3.869 
Proportion children (%) 0.551 0.231 0.515 0.408 0.521 0.389 0.549 0.383 
Education  head (years) 5.254 3.936 5.091 4.050 5.451 4.229 5.169 4.083 
Age of head (years) 42.786 15.001 46.801 14.928 47.435 14.899 48.268 14.707 
Female-headed  (%) 0.271 0.287 0.310 0.317 
Poor (%)
 
0.281 0.248 0.291 0.272 
Agric. households (%) 0.825 0.845 0.821 0.807 
Rural households (%) 0.796 0.799 0.799 0.796 
Food price shocks (%) baseline 0.633 0.517 0.342 
Agricultural shocks (%) 0.487 0.500 0.484 0.242 
Health shocks (%) 0.183 0.113 0.114 0.064 
Income shocks (%) 0.108 0.020 0.03 0.087 
Other shocks (%) 0.156 0.045 0.050 0.040 
 
Appendix D.1.A plots the distributions of households’ welfare indicators (log consumption 
values and asset index) between 2005/6 and 2011/12. The striking feature of these 
distributional plots is their shifts to the right in a zigzag fashion, suggesting an overall 
improvement in households’ assets accumulation over time coupled with significant 
downward and upward movements. These transitions are particularly pronounced with 
regards to consumption where for instance the plots of first and third surveys almost entirely 
overlap. These trends in asset holdings and consumption expenditures become apparent when 
they are expressed in growth rates, as in the second part of Appendix D.1.A which graphs the 
density functions of the average annual growth rates of assets and consumption.  The median 
growth rate of asset index between 2005/6 and 2009/10 was only 3.3% against an impressive 
18% in terms of consumption values. However, around 60.5% of households experienced a 
positive growth rate in their monthly real values of consumption during that period, whereas 
slightly more households (around 61.5%) accumulated assets. Between 2009/10 and 2010/11, 
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the median rates of consumption and assets growth were both negative at respectively -19.8 
and -0.8%, with only 37.6% displaying a positive rate of consumption growth and 44.5% for 
asset holdings. Finally, both the growth rates of both consumption and asset holdings were 
positive during the last sub-period, with a striking 29.3% increase in consumption compared 
to 3.2% in assets. 74.1% and 66.6% of surveyed households during this period reported a 
positive growth rate of their consumption and asset index. 
4.5.4 Poverty dynamics, stochastic, and structural poverty 
 
The analysis of poverty dynamics implies an explicit consideration of time. Indeed, empirical 
research on longitudinal data has revealed the importance of movements in and out of poverty 
and of the diversity of poverty trajectories from one period to another. Beyond the analysis of 
poverty evolutions based on cross-sectional data, it is particularly valuable to identify among 
poor households the chronically poor and those who are only transiently deprived. This is of 
utmost importance because not only the characteristics of these two types of poverty are not 
necessarily identical but also appropriate policy responses to tackle them might be different 
(Jalan and Ravallion, 2004;  Ribas and Machado, 2007). Using the spells approach (Baulch 
and McCulloch, 1998), table 4.3 distinguishes chronically poor, transiently poor, and non-
poor households between 2005 and 2012.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Percentage of households by poverty dynamics, by region: Spells approach 
  
All sample 
Regions 
Poverty status Central Eastern Northern Western 
Never poor 0.472 0.705 0.375 0.273 0.512 
Once poor 0.205 0.148 0.233 0.221 0.235 
Twice poor 0.149 0.086 0.208 0.176 0.133 
Thrice poor 0.106 0.049 0.124 0.169 0.084 
Always poor 0.067 0.013 0.060 0.161 0.036 
 
Using the full sample, around 6.7% of the households were chronically poor between 2005 
and 2012, whereas almost half of the sample was never poor (47.2%). The percent of 
households into each spell of poverty then decreases with the number of spells, from 20.5% 
for once poor to 10.6% for thrice poor. Furthermore, the table sheds some light on regional 
heterogeneity in terms of poverty dynamics: households in the central region are particularly 
better-off with the highest proportion of non-poor (70.5%) and lowest percent of chronic poor 
(1.3%), while the northern and eastern regions display the worst welfare performances.  
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It is also possible to go further into the analysis of poverty dynamics by decomposing 
movements into and out of poverty into stochastic and structural transitions using both the 
official poverty line and the asset index. Structural movements are related to changes in assets 
accumulation while stochastic or transient changes refer to movements in consumption. In 
table 4.4, I present a poverty transition matrix between pairs of successive panel waves. 
Between two periods t-1 and t, a household will be stochastically poor if its asset index hta is 
at least above 1 in both periods while its monthly real values of consumption per adult 
equivalent htc  lie below the official poverty line tP  in both periods. He will be structurally 
poor if both 1hta  and tht Pc   in t-1 and t.  A household is downward mobile, meaning he 
is falling into poverty if 11   tht Pc , and tht Pc  . This mobility will be explained by 
stochastic movements if hta 1, t , whereas in case of structural movements, hta 1 and 
1hta 1. Similarly, upward mobility implies that 11   tht Pc , and tht Pc  . If the household is 
climbing out of poverty for stochastic reasons, then both 1hta  and hta  are greater than 1 and 
if this mobility is due to structural factors, then 11 hta , and 1hta . Finally, stochastically 
(structurally) non-poor households have tht Pc  , t  and  1hta , t .  
By and large, the results from table 4.4 reveal that between pairs of successive panel waves, 
Ugandan households were overwhelmingly non-poor (more than 60% for each pair), while 
the shares of those twice poor, downward, and upward mobile were relatively close, ranging 
from 10 to 17%. Furthermore, the majority of household transitions into and out of poverty 
were attributed to stochastic movements rather than to assets depletion. For instance, over the 
first and second survey rounds, only 39.9% of chronic poor experienced a depletion of their 
assets while persistent poverty of 60.1% could be attributed to stochastic changes in their 
livelihood. The share of households that fell into poverty due to low asset levels during that 
period is less than the half of that of stochastically downward mobile. Among non-poor, only 
26.4% hold assets that would be expected to yield a livelihood above the poverty line. Hence, 
the majority of these non-poor (73.6%) would also be vulnerable in case of shocks of 
particularly large magnitude. Between 2009/10 and 2010/11, the proportion of chronic and 
downward mobile slightly increases at the expense of other categories. For households that 
slid into (out of) poverty during that period, 47.7 (46.1%) were structurally mobile against 
43.8 (42.8%) in the previous sub-period. Finally, the table highlights the importance of 
structurally persistent poverty over time. Indeed, the proportion of chronically poor 
households for structural reasons (reductions in asset holdings) is increasing over time, from 
39.9% during the first sub-period to 49.3% in the last sub-period.  
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Table 4.4 Poverty transition matrices 
  Poor Non-poor 
  2009/10 
 
 
 
2005/6 
 
Poor 
Twice poor 13.02  Upward mobile 15.05  
 Stochastically poor 60.07  Stochastically mobile 57.19 
 Structurally poor 39.93  Structurally mobile 42.81 
Non-
poor 
Downward mobile 11.78  Twice non-poor 60.15  
 Stochastically mobile 56.25  Stochastically non-poor 73.60 
 Structurally mobile 43.75  
 
Structurally non-poor 26.40 
  2010/11 
 
 
 
2009/10 
 
Poor 
Twice poor 14.31  Upward mobile 10.49  
 Stochastically poor 54.02  Stochastically mobile 53.96 
 Structurally poor 45.98  Structurally mobile 46.04 
Non-
poor 
Downward mobile 12.84  Twice non-poor 62.36  
 Stochastically mobile 52.33  Stochastically non-poor 72.18 
 Structurally mobile 47.67  Structurally non-poor 27.82 
 
  2011/12 
 
 
 
2010/11 
 
Poor 
Twice poor 16.80  Upward mobile 10.35  
 Stochastically poor 49.32  Stochastically mobile 60.88 
 Structurally poor 50.68  Structurally mobile 39.11 
Non-
poor 
Downward mobile 12.33  Twice non-poor 60.52  
 Stochastically mobile 52.99  Stochastically non-poor 77.34 
 Structurally mobile 47.01  Structurally non-poor 22.66 
 
4.6 Estimation methods and results  
 
In this section, the key propositions of the study are  exposed (4.6.1) and the different 
econometric models for analyzing welfare dynamics (consumption growth and assets 
accumulation process), identifying critical welfare thresholds, and testing for single against 
multiple equilibria are presented (4.6.2 – 4.6.4).  Finally, the section highlights the possibility 
of shifts in welfare equilibria due to differences in exposure to shocks and regional 
heterogeneity (4.6.5) and checks for the robustness of the econometric results by extending 
the definition of exposure to food price shocks (4.6.6). 
4.6.1 Propositions 
Two main propositions are tested regarding the effects of food price shocks on household’s 
welfare growth and likelihood of being trapped into poverty. First, I hypothesize that being 
exposed to food price shocks is associated with differential welfare growth rates 
(consumption and assets accumulation) which signs depend on households’ characteristics 
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and initial conditions. Second, conditional on these characteristics and initial conditions, the 
higher the degree of exposure to food price shocks, the higher the likelihood of being trapped 
into poverty or converging towards lower levels of welfare equilibria.  
Proposition 1: Let 0y , with  000 ,acy   and Λ  be respectively the initial welfare 
level (consumption levels 0c  or assets 0a ) and household demographic characteristics. 
For two households h  and j with identical initial welfare levels (i.e 000, yyy jh  ) 
and household characteristics at time t (net market position, household size, education, 
gender of the head, geographical location,…), then the household exposed to food 
price shocks will be likely to experience a lower welfare growth (consumption growth 
or assets accumulation) at time t+1 than a household who was unexposed. Formally, 
this means that:  
   1,ln1,ln 01,01,   fjttjfhtth yyyy  ΛΛ  
Proposition 1.1: Given initial welfare levels ( 0c  and 0a )  and household h’s 
demographic characteristics, the effects of food price shocks will be higher on 
consumption growth than on assets accumulation growth: 
   1,ln1,ln 01,01,   fhtthfhtth aacc  ΛΛ  
Proposition 1.2:  Let two households h  and j  be exposed to food price shocks 
at time t+1, with the degree of exposure being higher for h  (i.e. 1 fjt
f
ht  ). 
In this case, conditional on household characteristics and initial welfare levels, 
the welfare growth rate between t and t+1 will likely be lower the higher the 
degree of exposure to food price shocks. Otherwise stated:   
   fjttjfhtth yyyy  ,,ln,,ln 01,01, ΛΛ    for 1 fjtfht   
Proposition 2: Let households h and j with identical initial conditions 0y  and 
demographic characteristicsΛ . Then the household with a higher degree of exposure 
to food price shocks is likely to suffer from a lower welfare equilibrium level. 
Formally, if ehy  and 
e
jy  are the welfare equilibrium levels towads which households h 
and j are converging in the long run, then we have that: 
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   fjtejfhteh yyyy  ,,,, 00 ΛΛ   if 1 fjtfht   
Figure 4.2 illustrates the above propositions through the hypothetic non-linear welfare 
dynamics as theorized by Carter and Barrett (2006). sy represents the welfare subsistence 
level (consumption or asset holdings) below which accumulation is deemed impossible. For 
simplicity, households’ initial welfare levels ( 0y ) are assumed equal to this survival threshold. 
Conditional on their initial welfare levels and demographical characteristics, the households’ 
accumulation growth path depends on their exposure to food price shocks  fhtty 1 .  
Figure 4.2 Hypothetic relationships between welfare dynamics and exposure to food price shocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this setting, there are three types of welfare equilibria: low stable equilibria 3,2,1, iy eLi , 
high stable equilibria 3,2,1, iy eHi , and unstable equilibria 3,2,1, iy
M
i . Prior to any price 
shocks, households’ welfare dynamics are given by the  11  fhtty   curve, characterized by 
low and high stable equilibria eLy 1  and
e
Hy 1 .  
In case of exposure to food price shocks, households do not necessarily converge towards 
their potential welfare equilibria ( eLy 1  and
e
Hy 1 ) but there are instead shifts in both their 
welfare dynamics and equilibria. For example, the household exposed to price shocks will 
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follow a dynamic path (blue curve) located below that of an unexposed household and he will 
thus converge to much lower stable equilibria eL
e
L yy 12   and
e
H
e
H yy 12  . Hence, given initial 
welfare levels and demographic characteristics, exposure to food price shocks leads to lower 
welfare growth path  11  fhtty  . When it comes to comparison of two households exposed to 
food price shocks, the one with a higher degree of exposure will be characterized by lower 
welfare equilibria: eL
e
L
e
L yyy 123  and 
e
H
e
H
e
H yyy 123  . 
4.6.2 Parametric models of consumption and asset dynamics 
The starting point of our estimation strategy is given by equation (4.10). In line with existing 
studies (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002; Barrett et al., 2006; Kwak and Smith, 2010; Naschold, 
2013), I allow for nonlinearities in welfare dynamics by estimating changes in consumption 
htcln  as a cubic polynomial function of lagged consumption 1htc , household characteristics
Λ , and changes in exposure to food price shocks 
f
ht
ln  and other asset shocks  kt . Hence, 
our baseline empirical model is given by: 
 hth
j
kj
tj
f
ht
i
hti
i
ht cc  



3
1
11
3
1
0 lnlnln αΛ'  
where the dependent variable htc  represents monthly real values of consumption per adult 
equivalent in period t; Λ denotes a set of household characteristics, some of which are time-
varying and others time-invariant, likely to influence household consumption levels. 
Specifically, I include in Λ  household size )(hsize , dependency ratio )(dratio , age of the 
head )(age , age squared )2(age , gender )(sex , tropical livestock units )(tlu
87
, years of 
education of the head )(educ , land size in acres ( )land , household’s poverty status (
povstatus ) as well as regional ( region ) and time ( )year  dummies to control for geographic 
and time effects, respectively. i  are the coefficients of consumption polynomial terms; h  is 
the time-invariant component of the error term indicating household’s unobserved effects, 
potentially correlated with Λ  but not with ht ; ht is an independent and identically 
distributed (iid) error term; and the remaining right-hand side variables have been previously 
defined. Capital/asset shocks are subdivided into three categories: health shocks (
1k
ht ) which 
                                                          
87
 The concept of Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) represents a way of quantifying and aggregating a wide range of 
different types of livestock types/sizes into a single number by applying different exchange ratios among 
species. In this study, I used: 1 TLU = Camels 1.0; Cattle 0.7; Sheep/Goats: 0.1.  
(4.14) 
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take 1 if in the last 12 months a household member died, had severe injury or accident, had a 
serious illness, or if the household experienced the death of a member or close relative for 
whom it had to pay for the burial. Agricultural shocks (
2k
ht ) equal 1 if the household 
experienced in the last 12 months droughts, floods, or pest attacks and diseases, causing 
output losses, or faced increases costs of agricultural inputs and theft of agricultural assets. 
Income shocks (
3k
ht ) take 1 if in the last 12 months a household member lost a job or faced 
reduction of earnings.  
In this baseline specification, food price shocks enter linearly the empirical dynamic welfare 
equation (4.14) which would suggest a homogeneous impact of price shocks. I extend this 
model by investigating the presence of nonlinear effects of food price shocks on consumption 
growth in the following way. I assume that the impact of food price shocks will be different 
depending on the degree of a household’s vulnerability to price shocks. Adapting the criteria 
of countries’ vulnerability to commodity price instabilities as advanced by de Janvry and 
Sadoulet (2008) and applied by Combes et al. (2012), I identify three factors that might 
determine this vulnerability. The first factor, food dependency, is related to the importance of 
food consumption in the household’s budget. At a given period t¸ a household will be hit by 
food price instabilities the larger the share of food consumption in his budget. This degree of 
food dependency is approximated by the share of the total value of food consumption in the 
household’s total expenditures. The second factor concerns the extent of market participation 
in household consumption. Households that rely mainly on home production for consumption 
needs will be marginally affected than those constrained to purchase a large proportion of 
their food consumption, such as non-agricultural households or significant net buyers. Hence, 
the higher the degree of market participation, the higher the likelihood of being exposed to 
food price shocks. This second criterion is measured by the ratio of total food purchased to 
total food consumption. Finally, food price shocks may have differential impact on 
households depending on whether they are rich or poor. Indeed, it has been shown that poor 
households are generally more vulnerable to shocks and lack sufficient resources to play as 
safety nets in case of shocks’ occurrence (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; De Weerdt, 2004; 
Santos and Barrett, 2006). I measure this ability of households to mitigate the effects of price 
shocks by the level of monthly real income per adult equivalent. These three factors are then 
combined to compute a household’s vulnerability index to food price shocks ( htvul ) using the 
principal component analysis. The higher the value of the index, the more vulnerable the 
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household to food price shocks. The variable of price shocks fht  is finally interacted with the 
vulnerability index as follows: 
  ht
j
kj
tjhtht
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ht
f
ht
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where hthht    
This specification allows the impact of food price shocks to differ between households given 
their degree of vulnerability to price shocks. The coefficient 1  captures the impact of price 
shocks due to the actual level of exposure while 3  provides the impact related to the 
household’s predisposition to being vulnerable to price shocks. In addition, equation (4.15) 
can also be used to test both nonlinearities in price effects and our propositions 1 (and its 
corollaries) and 2. The total effect of changes in exposure to food price shocks on 
consumption growth rate is thus given by 

 h
c
luv
f
ht
ht
21
ln
ln
ˆˆ 


, where 1ˆ  and 2ˆ  are the 
estimated coefficients and  ht
T
t
Th
vulluv 


1
1  is the household’s h average vulnerability index 
over the sample period. Hence, checking for nonlinearity simply implies testing the null 
hypothesis that 2ˆ  is statistically different from 0. The proposition that food price shocks 
have detrimental consequences on consumption growth is akin to having 0ˆˆ 21 
 hluv .  
Finally, when  1ˆ  and 2ˆ  display opposite signs, it is possible to derive a threshold 
vulnerability index  
2
1
ˆ
ˆ

 

hvul  above which food price shocks start hurting households 
(reducing their consumption growth).  
The dynamic consumption growth model in (4.15) can equivalently be written in levels as: 
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The estimation of these non-linear dynamic panel models poses some practical problems. 
First, the construction of our food price shock variable suggests that 
f
ht
  will be endogenously 
determined since it is correlated with household characteristicsΛ . To solve this problem, one 
could use an instrumental variables’ estimation (such as Two Stage Least Squares, 2SLS). 
(4.16) 
(4.15) 
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However, with weak instruments, the fixed-effects IV estimators will be biased. Second, it is 
well known that OLS will yield inconsistent estimates since the polynomial terms in 
consumption 3,...,1,
1


ic i
ht
 will be correlated with the error term  hth   . As a result, the 
coefficients i  will be inflated upwardly (Hsiao, 1986; Bond, 2002), leading again to 
potential endogeneity problems and estimation instability. A possible way-out to reduce this 
upward panel bias is through a within-groups (fixed effects) transformation that wipes out 
household-specific time-invariant effects h . However, given the structure of our panel dataset 
(small T, large N), this solution is also unsatisfactory as it has a tendency towards downward 
panel bias (Nickell, 1981). The panel bias will be captured by introducing the first difference, 
which purges the fixed effects h . To estimate the consumption growth model, I use the 
System Generalized Methods of Moments (S-GMM) of Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-
Bond (1998).  Indeed, the S-GMM reduces the problem of finite sample biases associated 
with weak instruments and estimates a system of equations both in first differences and in 
levels. Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that lagged levels of the variables are suitable 
instruments in the difference equation, whereas in the levels equation, lagged differences are 
used as appropriate instruments. The implementation of S-GMM depends on the satisfaction 
of serial correlation and over-identification tests. The Sargan/Hansen test checks whether the 
set of instruments as a group are properly identified and valid. Therefore, the higher the p-
value of this statistic, the better
88
. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation AR(2) detects 
autocorrelation in levels and failure to pass test implies that the S-GMM estimator is 
inconsistent.  
Table 4.5 reports the two-step S-GMM estimation results of consumption growth model using 
four different specifications. Model I leaves aside shock variables (food price, health, 
agricultural, and income shocks) and regional and time dummies. Model II extends Model I 
by allowing for location and time dummies; the third specification takes account of both 
different shock variables and regional and time effects but only assumes linear effects of food 
price shocks. The last specification (Model IV) allows for potential nonlinear effects of price 
shocks. Specification tests were performed using both serial correlation and over-
identification tests.  
 
                                                          
88
 The choice between the Sargan and Hansen tests depends on whether the robust option is used, the Hansen 
test being applied in robust estimations. 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
 
143 
 
Table 4.5 Two-step system GMM estimation of consumption growth model 
Dependent variable: htcln  
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Polynomial terms     
1htc  
 -1.268 (0.009)
*** 
-2.395 (0.315)
*** 
-2.972 (0.084)
*** 
-2.795 (0.087)
*** 
2
1htc  
  0.562 (0.455)  0.315 (0.022)
*** 
 0.256 (0.077)
*** 
  0.765 (0.264)
*** 
3
1htc  
 -0.056 (0.049) -0.075 (0.024)
*** 
-0.074 (0.025)
*** 
-0.025 (0.009)
*** 
Household characteristics     
hsize    0.015 (0.001)
*** 
 0.071 (0.007)
*** 
 0.063 (0.006)
*** 
  0.039 (0.007)
*** 
dratio    0.032 (0.017)
* 
 0.131 (0.064)
*** 
0.129 (0.059)
** 
   0.313 (0.77)
*** 
age    0.025 (0.062)  0.142 (0.038)***   0.099 (0.031)***   0.050 (0.030)* 
2age  
 -0.002 (0.006) -0.001 (0.004)
*** 
 -0.001 (0.000)
*** 
 -0.000 (0.000)
* 
sex   -0.010 (0.040) -0.085 (0.028)***  -0.082 (0.028)***  -0.041 (0.023)* 
tlu    -0.007 (0.002)
*** 
 0.008 (0.002)
*** 
 0.008 (0.003)
*** 
  0.001 (0.001) 
educ    0.042 (0.019)
** 
 0.020 (0.002)
*** 
 0.019 (0.004)
*** 
  0.000 (0.003) 
land    0.005 (0.021)   0.052 (0.014)
*** 
 0.056 (0.001)
*** 
  0.021 (0.013)
* 
Sensitivity to food price and asset shocks    
f
ht  
  -0.183 (0.079)
** 
-0.775 (0.239)
*** 
 fht

htvul  
  
 
0.568 (0.225)
** 

htvul  
   -0.207 (0.094)
** 
1k
ht  
   -0.047 (0.021)
** 
-0.010 (0.018) 
2k
ht  
 
 -0.106 (0.031)
*** 
-0.040 (0.019)
** 
3k
ht  
   -0.045 (0.005)
*** 
-0.096 (0.056)
* 
povstatus   
 
-0.572 (0.245)
*** 
region  No Yes Yes Yes 
year  No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Specification tests     
)1(AR    0.016
**
    0.093
*** 
   0.000
*** 
   0.000
*** 
)2(AR  0.147 0.175 0.661 0.378 
Hansen J 0.386 0.935 0.156 0.725 
Joint significance test: 0ˆ1   and 
0ˆ2  , p-value 
    
0.002 
Vulnerability threshold:  hvul  
   1.364 
 
Percent of households above 
 hvul by survey (a) 
   57,65 (69.61; 
62.80; 40.53) 
Note: (
a
) The percents of households above the vulnerability threshold are related to the surveys 2009/10, 
2010/11, and 2011/12. The average percent throughout the sample is first reported and then disaggregated by 
survey round (into brackets). Robust standard errors into brackets. . 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 
10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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In all the four models, the null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation in first 
differences AR(1) is rejected while the test of AR(2) indicates that the S-GMM estimators are 
consistent in all models. The Hansen J statistic concludes that our instrumental variables, as a 
group, are valid.  
The effects of the polynomial terms on households’ consumption growth reveal some 
interesting features. First, the results show that the coefficients of one-period lagged 
consumption expenditures affect households’ consumption growth negatively and 
significantly in all model specifications, which indicates that households’ consumption 
growth between periods t-1 and t tend to decrease the higher the levels of consumption in t-1. 
Particularly, these estimated coefficients exceed one in all specifications and are the lowest 
when regional and time dummies are excluded from the consumption growth model. Second, 
the quadratic and cubic polynomial terms are respectively positive and negative in all models 
but simultaneously insignificant only in Model I, which implies a linear consumption growth 
path. In the other models, the hypothesis of nonlinearities in the growth rate of consumption is 
not rejected at 5% significant level in the richer specifications.  
All shock variables are both negative and significant at 5% levels.  Particularly, the results 
confirm our proposition 1 that being exposed to food price shocks lowers the rate of 
consumption growth. In model III, the coefficient 1ˆ  associated with food price shocks is -
0.18%, thereby indicating that a 1% increase in the growth rate of food price shocks is 
followed on average by a 0.18% decrease in consumption growth.  
The last column of table 4.5 (Model IV) reveals that allowing for nonlinear effects of the 
impact of food price shocks modifies considerably the estimation results. Indeed, the p-value 
of the joint significance test of 1ˆ  and 2ˆ  rejects the hypothesis of linearities of price shocks. 
Hence, once we allow for the presence of these nonlinear effects, the coefficient 1ˆ  becomes 
amplified to -0.78 while the coefficient 2ˆ  for the interaction between price shocks and the 
vulnerability index is positive and significant at 5%. These results suggest that the 
consumption growth rate is on average marginally decreasing with the degree of exposure to 
food price shocks, and this effect is increasing with the extent of household’s vulnerability. 
The higher the vulnerability index, the lower the growth rate of consumption once a 
household is hit by a food price shock. The destabilizing effect of food price shocks is 
consequently reinforced by higher food dependency, higher degree of market participation, 
and lower income levels. However, being potentially vulnerable to food price shocks does not 
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necessarily imply that a household will be negatively affected if the price shock effectively 
occurs. In the lower part of table 4.5, I thus report the level of vulnerability index above 
which exposure to food price shocks has detrimental effect on consumption growth rate. 
Given the estimated coefficients 1ˆ  and 2ˆ , the threshold vulnerability index  

hvul  is set at 
1.364
89
, which means that the consumption levels of households reporting a vulnerability 
index above that threshold would be negatively affected in case of exposure to food price 
shocks. The percent of households beyond this critical vulnerability level is given in the last 
line of table 4.5. Hence, the majority of households should have been particularly concerned 
by food price shocks because around 57.7% of surveyed households had a vulnerability index 
greater than 1.364. Over time, this percent has been however decreasing, from 69.6% in 
2009/10 to 40.3% in 2011/12.  
To see whether households located below and above this threshold are intrinsically different, 
Appendix D.2 summarizes some key statistics of these two groups of households. In line with 
our priors, households above the vulnerability threshold reported on average 24% higher food 
dependency, 18.8% higher market participation rate, and 80.1% lower per capita income than 
those below  hvul . The last column of the appendix also reveals that these mean differences 
were statistically significant at 1% level. Furthermore, higher vulnerability appears to be 
negatively correlated with the education of the head insofar as highly vulnerable households 
are ruled by on average by less educated heads.  Finally, I do not find any statistically 
significant difference between these two groups of households as of the household size.  
In terms of asset/income shocks, being exposed to health shocks (
1k
ht ) has a negligible effect, 
while the occurrence of agricultural (
2k
ht ) and income shocks (
3k
ht ) reduces consumption 
growth in Model IV by 0.04 and 10%, respectively.  
Many household-level variables have also contributed significantly to the consumption 
growth rates and present the expected signs. I find life-cycle effects in consumption growth: it 
tends to increase with age but only up a certain point before eventually declining. Similarly to 
Jalan and Ravallion (2002), the estimation results reveal that larger households tend to have 
higher consumption growth rates. Moreover, there are significant gender differences insofar 
as female-headed households are likely to have lower growth rates of consumption 
expenditures. Moreover, I find evidence that households with more TLUs, larger dependency 
                                                          
89
 Alternatively, one could derive this threshold level through a dynamic panel threshold model using non-
linear System-GMM as implemented by Masten et al (2008), Chami et al (2009) or Combes and Ebeke (2012). 
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ratio, and more educated heads, displayed higher growth rates, whereas poor households have 
significantly lower subsequent rates of consumption growth.  
Finally, as expected, increases in land holdings are translated into increases in growth rates of 
consumption. This result perfectly characterizes the Ugandan economy where the majority of 
households are not only engaged in agricultural activities but also use the products of their 
farm for subsistence consumption. Therefore, more lands to cultivate imply more food for 
home consumption. And given that food consumption often represents the largest share of 
household’s total expenditures, this situation ultimately leads to an increase in consumption 
growth rates. 
The above analyses of changes in growth rates of consumption give first insights on 
household welfare dynamics in Uganda. However, as pointed out by Barrett et al. (2006), 
restricting the analysis to consumption prevents us from identifying structural and stochastic 
patterns of welfare dynamics and distinguishing the characteristics of one from another. 
Hence, to focus on the structural part of household’s welfare, they suggest instead the study of 
asset dynamics, less likely to be sensitive to transitory variations. These dynamics may be 
determined by both household accumulation behavior and various asset shocks. Similarly to 
the above consumption growth model, the assets accumulation process can be described 
through a cubic polynomial regression model as follows: 
 
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where  kt  is a composite asset shock  constructed by summing health (
1k
ht ), agricultural (
2k
ht ), income (
3k
ht ), and other asset shocks ( )
4k
ht . It thus ranges from 0 (household did not 
face any type of asset shocks in the last 12 months) to 4 (household experienced each asset 
shock). Accordingly, asset shocks are incorporated linearly into the assets accumulation 
growth equation (4.17). They are also interacted with household asset poverty status 
apovstatus (which takes 1 if household asset index is below 1 and 0 otherwise) to allow for 
heterogeneous patterns in the effects of asset shocks across households. 0,ha  stands for 
household’s initial asset index. 
Table 4.6 displays the estimation results of equation (4.17) using a two-step S-GMM 
regression of Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998). All model results reveal that 
(4.17) 
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the coefficients associated with the first and cubic polynomial terms are negative whereas the 
quadratic term is significantly negative, which implies, similarly to the consumption growth 
model, nonlinearities in growth rates of assets accumulation. In the richer model (III), all 
selected household characteristics significantly affect the growth rate of assets accumulation 
which tends to increase with household size, the age of the household head – but up to a 
certain age -, the years of education, and decrease with initial asset holdings or when 
households are female-headed or have a high dependency ratio.  
Table 4.6 Two-step system GMM estimation of asset index growth model 
Dependent variable: htaln  
 Model I Model II Model III 
Polynomial terms    
1hta  
-0.711 (0.074)
*** 
-0.715 (0.067)
*** 
-0.984 (0.190)
*** 
2
1hta  
0.155 (0.106) 0.135 (0.115) 0.235 (0.119)
**
 
3
1hta  
-0.029 (0.016)
** 
-0.026 (0.017) -0.035 (0.016)
** 
Household characteristics    
hsize  0.028 (0.007)
*** 
0.022 (0.008)
*** 
0.034 (0.007)
*** 
dratio  -0.093 (0.030)
*** 
-0.084 (0.023)
*** 
-0.279 (0.113)
** 
age  0.103 (0.058)* 0.057 (0.067) 0.179 (0.060)*** 
2age  
-0.001 (0.000)
* 
-0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
*** 
sex  -0.042 (0.022)
* 
-0.025 (0.025) -0.072 (0.022)
*** 
educ  0.032 (0.003)
*** 
0.028 (0.003)
*** 
0.034 (0.004)
*** 
0,ha    -0.247 (0.125)
* 
Sensitivity to food price and asset shocks   
f
ht  
  -0.014 (0.002)
** 
1&0  apovstatuskt  
  -0.102 (0.015)
*** 
0&1  apovstatuskt  
  -0.009 (0.017) 
1&1  apovstatuskt  
  -0.152 (0.014)
*** 
0&2  apovstatuskt  
  -0.024 (0.021) 
1&2  apovstatuskt  
  -0.157 (0.024)
*** 
0&3  apovstatuskt  
  -0.074 (0.023)
*** 
1&3  apovstatuskt  
  -0.177 (0.028)
*** 
region  No Yes Yes 
year  No Yes Yes 
)1(AR  0.005
*** 
0.008
*** 
0.008
*** 
)2(AR  0.125 0.312 0.344 
Hansen  0.118 0.509 0.411 
Observations 6,519 6519 6519 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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In terms of the impact of shocks on assets accumulation growth, the results suggest that, 
although being exposed to food price shocks significantly reduce the assets growth rates, their 
impact appears relatively marginal compared to changes in consumption growth rates. Indeed, 
a 10% increase in the degree of exposure to a food price shock would be expected to decrease 
the assets growth rate by only 0.14%, largely lower than the 2.07%
90
 fall in consumption 
growth rates. This validates our sub-proposition 1.1 that the marginal effects of changes in 
food price shocks’ exposure are much more important on consumption growth than on assets 
accumulation. Moreover, the results show that the effects of asset shocks are much more 
important than those of food price shocks. However, these impacts appear nonlinear across 
asset poverty status and the number of asset shocks faced by the households. Households who 
are structurally poor are found not only more sensitive to the occurrence of asset shocks but 
also their sensitivity increases with the number of asset shocks. The results reveal for example 
that the growth rates of assets accumulation of structurally poor households fell on average by 
0.15, 0.16, and 0.18% when they faced one, two, and three types of asset shocks, respectively. 
Despite being also sensitive to shocks, assets accumulation rates of structurally non-poor 
households are only marginally affected. As pointed out by Amare and Waibel (2013), these 
households are generally engaged in high-return livelihood activities which increase their 
resilience to different shocks.  Indeed, the growth rate of their assets will shrink by only 
0.07% in case of exposure to three types of asset shocks against 0.18% for structurally poor. 
These results outline the inability of structurally poor households to maintain the welfare 
levels in the wake of shocks and other stressors and therefore shed light on the increased 
likelihood of being trapped into poverty or converging towards low level welfare equilibria.  
Testing for poverty traps 
 
The results of the parametric models of consumption growth and assets accumulation process 
have revealed the existence of nonlinearities in household welfare dynamics. However, 
finding these nonlinearities does not necessarily imply the presence of poverty traps or 
guarantee welfare multiplia equilibria (Kwak and Smith, 2010). To test for the existence of 
poverty traps, I first predict the values of consumption expenditures and asset indices using 
the estimation results presented in tables 4.5 and 4.6. I add to these results the lagged values 
of consumption 1htc  and asset 1hta  to get the predicted consumption levels and asset index.  
The relationship between these predicted values against their lagged values are then portrayed 
                                                          
90
 The sum of 1ˆ  and 2ˆ  in model IV 
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graphically through a scatterplot. If there are multiple welfare dynamic equilibria, then we 
must find an S-shaped curve or non-convex welfare dynamics characterized by the existence 
of multiple stable equilibria (with at least one equilibrium below the poverty line) and at least 
one unstable dynamic equilibrium (Barrett and Carter, 2013).  
Figure 4.3 shows markedly linear welfare dynamics with the absence of any S-shaped curve 
or bifurcated welfare dynamics necessary for the existence of multiple critical thresholds.  
 
Figure 4.3 Consumption and asset dynamics: Predicted values using parametric methods 
 
 
On the contrary, the 45 degree line cuts both consumption and asset dynamics’ lines at one 
point, suggesting a single dynamic welfare equilibrium at around 29,000UShs for monthly 
real values of consumption per adult equivalent and 1.10 PLUs for asset index. These 
equilibria are at relatively low level, slightly above the poverty line of 23,760UShs
91
 for per 
capita real monthly consumption.  
 
 
 
                                                          
91
 This value represents the average of poverty lines for each survey round. 
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Testing for conditional convergence  
 
The evidence of a single welfare equilibrium in either consumption values or assets 
accumulation suggests that households above that threshold are expected to converge 
downwards until they reach the stable equilibrium whereas those below the threshold will 
eventually improve their welfare levels and approach upwards the stable equilibrium. A 
standard empirical question is thus whether there is conditional convergence in the welfare 
data and, particularly, whether the convergence is occurring within or between villages or 
districts at identical speeds. Following Dercon (2004), I test parametrically these questions by 
estimating the following model:  
 
    htkhtfhtdhtdhththt yyyy    43121110 lnlnlnlnln ΛγΛ'  
 
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of either consumption or asset holdings.  
d
hty 1  
stands for the average welfare level in village/district d in period t-1. All the other variables 
were defined previously. 
The conditional convergence at the district level implies a negative and significant coefficient
1 , while the hypothesis of convergence at different speeds can be tested using a Wald test of
21   . Table 4.7 presents both the estimated results of equation (4.18) using a two-step 
GMM regression and the conditional convergence tests for consumption and assets.  
 
 
Table 4.7 Conditional convergence tests of welfare dynamics: Two-step GMM estimation 
 Dependent variable: 
 
ht
cln  htaln  
0  0.855 (0.084)
*** 
 -0.007 (0.021) 
1  -0.912 (0.025)
*** 
-0.668 (0.030)
*** 
2  -0.531 (0.078)
*** 
-0.464 (0.071)
*** 
3  -0.209 (0.019)
*** 
 -0.032 (0.018)
* 
4  -0.021 (0.010)
**
   -0.059 (0.031)
*
 
Λ  Included Included 
 
Convergence test   
Test: 21    (p-value) 
 
0.000
***
 0.004
*** 
Observations 6,519 6,519 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets.  
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
(4.18) 
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The estimated coefficients 1  are statistically significant and negative, shedding light on the 
convergence process within Ugandan districts in terms of consumption and assets 
accumulation. Similarly to Dercon (2004) in the Ethiopian case, these results suggest that 
richer districts are enjoying higher growth rates of consumption and assets accumulation (
12   ) than poorer districts.  Furthermore, the Wald tests reject the null hypothesis that 
convergence across districts are occurring at identical speeds. Since 1  is significantly larger, 
in absolute terms, than ,2 welfare convergence speeds are significantly different across 
districts than within the same districts. 
4.6.3 Non-parametric models of consumption and asset dynamics 
One of the main drawbacks of parametric methods developed above is that they require the 
researcher to specify pre-determined functional forms for the welfare dynamics process. 
Contrary to parametric methods, the appeal of non-parametric approach stems from letting the 
data determine the appropriate model specification without imposing any parametric 
assumptions on the data generating process. The functional form to be estimated is then 
unknown by the researcher and can be expressed as: 
   hthththththt acyyfy ,,1     
with  ~   TtandNhN  2,1,;0 2  
The non-parametric bivariate relationship between the current welfare level hty  and its lagged 
values  portrayed in equation (4.19) can be estimated using various non-parametric methods 
such as Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing, locally weighted scatterplot smoother 
(LOWESS), or different types of splines. In figures 4.4 and 4.5, I only present the results of 
consumption (figure 4.4) and asset (figure 4.5) dynamics using location polynomial 
smoothing and LOWESS estimates. Other non-parametric techniques, such as splines, 
provided substantially identical welfare recursion diagrams and are thus omitted for brevity. 
For each welfare indicator, I first report the LOWESS estimates and then the local polynomial 
smoothing diagrams (using an Epanechnikov kernel function with 3 degrees). The dashed 
lines stand for the 45 degree line and helps locate welfare threshold equilibria. Moreover, the 
range of the consumption graphs has been truncated at the 99
th
 percentile under the 
assumption that all extreme values are either outliers or due to measurement errors. Two 
features emerge from these non-parametric estimations. First, while consumption and asset 
dynamics paths are not exactly linear, they do not exhibit a typical S-shaped curves 
hypothesized by the theory of poverty traps (Carter and Barrett, 2006).  
(4.19) 
Essay IV 
 
152 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Consumption dynamics: LOWESS estimates and Kernel-weighted local polynomial smooth 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Asset dynamics: LOWESS estimates and Kernel-weighted local polynomial smooth  
 
Similarly to parametric methods, there is evidence of a single welfare dynamic equilibrium 
characterizing consumption expenditures and assets accumulation paths in Uganda. The 45° 
lines cross the consumption and assets curves at around 31,000UShs and 1.07 PLUs, 
respectively, slightly above the poverty lines. Second, as of the LOWESS curves, although 
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the observations appear widely distributed, consumption and asset plots do not show any 
substantial division of observations (represented by gray circles) into distinct subgroups with 
heterogeneous welfare characteristics, contrarily to the theory of bifurcated welfare dynamics 
of Carter and Barrett. Conversely, household asset holdings and consumption growth are 
distributed along the LOWESS curves, with some evidence of clustering of observations 
below 60,000UShs threshold for consumption.  
4.6.4 Semi-parametric methods 
Semi-parametric methods include both parametric components (such as time dummies and 
other explanatory variables), and a non-parametric component  1htyf , with
 ., 111   hththt acy  By incorporating control variables and allowing the data to dictate the 
shape of the relationship between current welfare indicators and their previous values, semi-
parametric methods gain in precision and robustness (Libois and Verardi, 2013). They often 
avoid unobserved heterogeneity problems arising from excluding control variables in non-
parametric techniques (Naschold, 2013). They are often referred to as partially linear models 
with the following general specification: 
  hthhtht yfy   1βXht  
where h  is the household h’s random or fixed effects and X is a vector of household 
characteristics such as age, gender, household size, and education. I run the Ruppert and al’s 
(2003) semi-parametric penalized splines estimator
92
.  The semi-parametric estimations of the 
relationship between the current welfare levels (consumption levels and asset indices) and 
their lagged values using the Ruppert and al.’s (2003) estimator are displayed in figure 4.6.  
What is evident from these figures is that despite nonlinearities in both consumption 
expenditures and assets accumulation, the recursion diagrams are in line with the results from 
(non-) parametric methods: they reveal the absence of multiple dynamic equilibria 
characterizing households’ welfare paths. They show instead that households are converging 
towards a single welfare equilibrium located approximately at 31,500UShs for monthly 
consumption and 1.13 PLUs for asset index. 
 
                                                          
92
 Other semi-parametric estimators include Baltagi and Li’s (2002) semi-parametric fixed effects estimator, 
Yatchew’s difference estimator, or Robinson’s double residual estimator. 
(4.20) 
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Figure 4.6 Semi-parametric penalized spline regression estimation: Consumption and asset 
dynamics 
 
4.6.5 Shifts in welfare equilibria, exposure to food price shocks, and regional 
heterogeneity 
So far, the estimation results relied on the assumption that all the sampled households share 
fundamentally similar dynamic welfare accumulation paths. However, different factors may 
lead households to display significantly different welfare trajectories or converge towards 
different welfare equilibria. For example, table 4.3 has revealed that the poverty profile of 
Ugandan households is not uniformly distributed across the country, some regions being 
particularly more vulnerable than others.  As highlighted by Jalan and Ravallion (2002) 
through the concept of geographical poverty traps, regional heterogeneity in terms of access 
to certain facilities (roads, transportation means, health structures,…) may be a powerful tool 
in explaining heterogeneous welfare dynamics within a country. Furthermore, high exposure 
to food price shocks may also undermine households’ efforts to climb out of poverty or 
increase their likelihood of falling into poverty (Ivanic and Martin, 2008), and therefore 
ensnare them at lower welfare equilibria. The net seller/net buyer status may also discriminate 
households regarding their welfare equilibria, while households below and above the 
vulnerability threshold might converge towards different equilibria.  
To assess the possibility of heterogeneous welfare dynamics and shifts in equilibria 
consecutive to differentials in the degrees of exposure and vulnerability to food price shocks, 
regional heterogeneity, and other households’ observed characteristics, I locate welfare 
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equilibria from different econometric methods when households are grouped into categories 
sharing similar features. Graphically, the shapes of welfare recursion diagrams were globally 
similar to those of the full sample inasmuch as they display single dynamic equilibria. 
However, they do differ in the location of those equilibria. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 report the 
estimated approximate locations of welfare dynamic equilibria by sub-groups of population. 
In terms of consumption, table 4.8 reveals that sub-groups of the Ugandan population are 
moving towards different welfare thresholds, regardless of the specified econometric method.  
 
Table 4.8 Approximate locations of real consumption equilibria by estimation methods  
 Non-parametric methods Cubic 
parametric 
regression 
(S-GMM) 
Ruppert et 
al.’s 
penalized 
splines 
 
 LOWESS Kernel linear 
Polynomial 
 regression 
Kernel cubic  
polynomial  
regression 
 Mean Mean CI Mean CI Mean Mean 
All sample 30,000 31,000 [28,000;32,500] 30,500 [29,000;32,000] 29,000 31,500 
Male-headed households 30,000 32,000 [28,700;33,500] 31,000 [29,500;32,000] 29,900 31,600 
Female-headed hhds 29,000 30,000 [27,300;31,600] 29,800 [27,200;30,400] 28,000 31,200 
Head with no educ. 25,000 23,000 [20,500;26,200] 25,000 [23,800;26,500] 27,000 29,300 
Head with primary educ. 29,000 29,000 [26,500;33,600] 28,800 [27,000;29,200] 30,000 31,100 
Head with sec. educ. 37,000 38,000 [35,300;41,100] 36,900 [31,000;38,500] 34,500 33,600 
Head with higher educ. 42,500 42,500 [33,500;47,800] 43,000 [38,500;50,000] 32,000 35,200 
Agric. Households 28,000 29,000 [25,000;33,000] 29,800 [26,700;31,500] 29,800 30,800 
Net sellers 28,000 31,200 [24,100;34,800] 33,000 [27,000;34,000] 28,000 28,000 
Net buyers 29,000 28,000 [26,500;32,700] 28,900 [24,000;30,000] 30,000 29,000 
Non-agric. households 42,500 33,000 [28,000;38,000] 37,000 [30,000;40,000] 36,000 34,900 
Poor households 24,000 24,000 [20,100;32,700] 24,200 [21,000;25,000] 20,000 28,200 
Non-poor households 36,500 33,800 [29,000;36,000] 35,000 [30,000;37,200] 37,500 32,700 
Exposed to price shocks 30,000 29,000 [24,000;36,800] 30,000 [26,000;34,200] 30,500 31,800 
High exposure 28,300 27,000 [24,400;30,000] 28,500 [26,500;33,000] 28,000 29,800 
Moderate exposure 30,000 31,000 [25,200;33,000] 31,200 [26,000;36,000] 31,000 30,800 
Low exposure 31,500 33,000 [29,000;37,000] 33,500 [28,300;35,000] 32,000 32,900 
Unexposed to price shocks 32,000 32,600 [26,500;36,000] 32,000 [28,000;36,500] 32,000 33,200 
Above the vulnerability threshold 21,000 22,000 [17,000;21,000] 20,000 [18,000;22,000] 21,000 23,000 
Below the vulnerability threshold 34,000 34,000 [30,000;37,000] 34,100  [32,000;36,000] 34,000 32,000 
Central  region 36,000 37,000 [31,000;40,200] 35,000 [33,500;38,500] 35,000 34,100 
Eastern region 27,500 28,000 [25,200;35,800] 28,200 [25,000;29,000] 28,000 31,000 
Northern region 27,200 26,000 [20,000;31,300] 25,700 [24,000;26,700] 27,800 29,200 
Western region 30,000 28,500 [25,000;31,000] 29,000 [27,000;32,000] 30,000 31,300 
Note: Extreme or outlier household expenditures were defined as those beyond the 99
th
 percentile and replaced 
by values observed at that percentile. CI stands for confidence intervals. 
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For instance, male-headed households are expected to converge to higher consumption levels 
than their female counterparts. On average, their dynamic welfare equilibrium is 4.4%
93
 
higher than what female-headed households could reach. Education of the household head is 
also positively correlated with the welfare equilibrium: the higher the level of education 
attained by the household head, the higher the dynamic equilibrium he is expected to reach in 
the long run. Particularly, everything held constant, non-educated heads are found to converge 
consistently to lower welfare equilibria. Heads with university education are expected to settle 
at an equilibrium that is on average 8.44, 31.98, and 50.97% higher than that of non-educated 
and heads with primary and secondary education, respectively.  
Moreover, differences between agricultural and non-agricultural households, on the one hand, 
and on the other, poor and non-poor households, is particularly striking. On average, 
agricultural households will move to an equilibrium that is 19.6% lower than that of non-
agricultural households. This significant difference can be explained by two related facts: 
first, since most households in the surveys are subsistence farmers and net buyers, the degree 
of their market participation and therefore their market purchases, is relatively limited 
compared to non-agricultural households; second, food consumption expenditures, which 
often represent the largest share of household total consumption expenditures, are 
substantially lower for agricultural households. On the other hand, non-poor households are 
expected to attain an equilibrium that is 45.8% higher than that of poor households, with an 
average monthly consumption of 35,100UShs against 24,080UShs for poor households.  
The location of consumption equilibria is found negatively correlated with the exposure to 
food price shocks. Hence, households exposed to food price shocks are moving towards a 
consumption threshold that is 6.5% lower than that of their unexposed counterparts, with 
30,260UShs of consumption values against 32,360UShs. Furthermore, the more the 
household is affected by food price shocks, the lower its attainable welfare equilibrium. 
Concretely, households with lower exposure rates (with degree of exposure below the sample 
median) can expect to reach a long term consumption dynamic equilibrium that is 15.1% 
higher than that of households with high exposure rates (above the 75 percentile of the sample 
value) and 5.8% higher than households with moderate exposure rates (between the median 
and the 75 percentile). These sequences of welfare equilibria conform to our proposition 2 
stating that the higher the degree of exposure to food price shocks, the lower the level of 
attainable welfare equilibrium.  
                                                          
93
 The average value from the different estimation methods in table 4.8. 
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Households located below the vulnerability threshold  hvul  can expect to reach a welfare 
equilibrium on average 57.1% greater than that of households beyond the estimated critical 
vulnerability index. Finally, table 4.8 shows that the geographical location also matters in 
explaining the levels of consumption equilibria. For instance, the northern region of Uganda, 
which is traditionally more vulnerable and with the largest proportion of poor households, is 
characterized by the lowest consumption threshold at 27,180UShs on average, whereas the 
better-endowed central region converges to the highest welfare level at an average of 
35,420UShs.   
In terms of assets accumulation process, table 4.9 reveals some similar patterns in welfare 
equilibria to those of consumption: female-headed households are expected to reach lower 
asset equilibria; the more educated the household head, the higher the likelihood of attaining 
higher asset equilibria; non-poor households consistently converge towards higher asset 
thresholds than poor households; while structurally poor regions (Northern region and to a 
smaller extent eastern region) are characterized by lower asset equilibrium levels. As of 
dissimilarities between the two welfare indicators, agricultural households are now moving to 
higher asset equilibria than non-agricultural ones, with an asset index 1.15 against 1.12. 
Finally, there seems to be only a marginal correlation between being exposed to food price 
shocks and the levels of asset thresholds. Hence, the difference in asset equilibrium between 
exposed and unexposed households is on average of 1.5%, compared to 7.6% when it comes 
to consumption expenditures. This consistently holds when I disentangle households by their 
degree of exposure to food price shocks: the asset level at equilibrium of low exposed 
households exceeds that of moderately and highly exposed only by 2% and 3.3%, 
respectively.  Net sellers are moving towards higher asset levels than net buyers, and 
households below the threshold of the vulnerability index have on average higher asset levels 
than those beyond  hvul .  
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Table 4.9 Approximate location of asset index (in PLUs) equilibria by estimation methods 
 Non-parametric methods Cubic 
 parametric 
 regression 
(S-GMM) 
Ruppert et 
al.’s  
penalized 
splines 
 
 LOWESS Kernel linear 
polynomial 
regression 
Kernel cubic 
polynomial 
regression 
 Mean Mean CI Mean CI Mean Mean 
All sample 1.15 1.18 [0.90;1.20] 1.15 [1.00;1.17] 1.10 1.13 
Male-headed households 1.19 1.20 [1.15;1.22] 1.19 [1.17;1.20] 1.13 1.15 
Female-headed households 1.09 1.07 [1.02;1.10] 1.10 [1.08;1.12] 1.02 1.05 
Head with no education 1.12 1.15 [1.00;1.20] 1.14 [1.12;1.17] 1.05 1.10 
Head with primary educ. 1.12 1.13 [1.12;1.15] 1.15 [1.13;1.18] 1.07 1.11 
Head with secondary educ. 1.23 1.22 [1.20;1.24] 1.23 [1.21;1.25] 1.18 1.19 
Head with higher educ. 1.21 1.21 [1.17;1.22] 1.20 [1.16;1.21] 1.20 1.18 
Agricultural households 1.15 1.15 [1.13;1.16] 1.14 [1.13;1.15] 1.16 1.14 
Net sellers 1.22 1.22 [1.20;1.23] 1.21 [1.19;1.23] 1.10 1.03 
Net buyers 1.12 1.13 [1.12;1.14] 1.14 [1.13;1.15] 1.07 1.00 
Non-agr. households 1.11 1.11 [1.10;1.13] 1.12 [1.10;1.14] 1.12 1.12 
Poor households 1.00 0.97 [0.70;1.00] 1.00 [0.98;1.10] 1.09 1.11 
Non-poor households 1.19 1.19 [1.17;1.20] 1.18 [1.17;1.19] 1.12 1.12 
Exposed to price shocks 1.11 1.12 [1.10;1.14] 1.13 [1.12;1.14] 1.05 1.10 
                       High exposure 1.09 1.10 [1.07;1.13] 1.10 [1.10;1.15] 1.03 1.08 
Moderate exposure 1.10 1.11 [1.09;1.14] 1.12 [1.11;1.13] 1.04 1.10 
Low exposure 1.12 1.13 [1.10;1.17] 1.15 [1.14;1.20] 1.07 1.11 
Unexposed to price shocks 1.13 1.14 [1.14;1.10] 1.14 [1.10;1.21] 1.07 1.12 
Above the vulnerability threshold 1.06 1.00 [0.08;1.02] 1.05  [1.03;1.06] 1.15 0.97 
Below the vulnerability threshold 1.18 1.18 [1.17;1.20] 1.17 [1.15;1.19] 1.07 1.01 
Central  region 1.25 1.23 [1.21;1.24] 1.22 [1.21;1.25] 1.21 1.20 
Eastern region 1.11 1.12 [1.10;1.13] 1.13 [1.12;1.14] 1.09 1.11 
Northern region 0.89 0.89 [0.85;0.90] 0.90 [0.89;0.91] 0.85 0.88 
Western region 1.11 1.13 [1.12;1.14] 1.14 [1.13;1.15] 1.011 1.12 
 
4.6.6 Sensitivity of estimation results to the definition of shock variable 
 
In this last section, I examine whether the previous estimation results are sensitive to the 
definition of the food price shock variable. In the previous sections, a household was assumed 
exposed to food price shocks if its normalized residuals from equation (4.12) are positive. I 
now extend this shock definition by including both negative price shocks and different cut-off 
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points. Indeed, although the sample period is characterized by increases in food prices, it is 
well conceivable that some households in specific villages or districts enjoyed remarkably 
average low prices between survey rounds. On the other hand, varying the cut-off for the 
shock definition helps check the robustness and stability of the results as the definition of 
food price shocks becomes more (less) severe. The cut-off points  range from 1 to 25% of 
observations falling into each tail region. For instance, with the 1% cut-off, a household is 
considered as having experienced a food price shock if its standardized residuals from (4.12), 
hctˆ , is either below the 1
st
 or above the 99
th
 percentile. The approximate welfare equilibria 
for each selected cut-off point and econometric estimation method are presented in table 4.10. 
 
 
Table 4.10 Sensitivity of welfare equilibria to the definition of the price shock variable 
 Exposed to food price shocks 
 %1  %5  %10  %25  
 ec  ea  ec  ea  ec  ea  ec  ea  
LOWESS 30,600 1.12 30,500 1.15 30,000 1.15 31,000 1.17 
Cubic Kernel 30,200 1.12 31,000 1.14 31,500 1.15 32,500 1.17 
GMM 31,500 1.08 32,500 1.11 33,000 1.13 33,800 1.16 
Penalized splines 33,000 1.12 33,000 1.15 34,000 1.16 33,700 1.17 
Average 31,325 1.11 31,750 1.14 32,125 1.15 32,750 1.17 
Observations 130 651 1,304 3,259 
 
 Unexposed to food price shocks 
 %1  %5  %10  %25  
 ec  ea  ec  ea  ec  ea  ec  ea  
LOWESS 29,900 1.15 31,000 1.17 32,500 1.18 36,000 1.19 
Cubic Kernel 31,000 1.15 32,500 1.18 31,700 1.17 34,500 1.20 
GMM 32,000 1.16 33,500 1.16 33,500 1.17 33,800 1.18 
Penalized splines 33,500 1.14 33,700 1.15 34,500 1.18 33,500 1.18 
Average 31,600 1.15 32,675 1.17 33,050 1.18 34,450 1.19 
Observations 6,389 5,868 5,215 3,260 
Note: 
ec  and ea  denote the approximate equilibrium locations of consumption expenditures 
and asset index. 
 
Overall, the different equilibria follow the same structure that our default measure of food 
price shock: for each cut-off point  , exposed households are expected to reach a lower 
equilibrium than their unexposed counterparts. Furthermore, as the cut-off point increases 
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(decreases) or the definition of the price shock becomes less (more) severe, the welfare 
thresholds increase (decrease), from 31,325UShs to 32,750UShs at %1  and %25 , 
respectively, when households experienced food price shocks. Finally, at lower level cut-off 
points, the location of consumption equilibria of exposed households appears insensitive to 
shifts in the cut-off points, contrarily to asset holdings. For instance, the equilibrium levels of 
consumption (assets) increase by 1.36% (2.7%) for exposed households and by 3.4% (1.74%) 
for unexposed households when   shifts from 1 to 5%. 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
Recently, empirical studies on households’ vulnerability to covariate and idiosyncratic shocks 
have been increasingly prominent, especially in developing countries. Of particular interest 
have been the poverty impacts of high food prices in rural and poor communities. It has been 
established that in many settings, increases in food prices were detrimental for the majority of 
households in developing countries, as they are primarily pure consumers or net buyers of 
agricultural products. However, most of these studies are developed under a cross-sectional 
approach and therefore fall short of uncovering the potential effect of price changes on 
poverty dynamics or persistent poverty. This last essay has tried to fill this empirical gap by 
analyzing the structure of household welfare dynamics in a context characterized by high food 
price volatility and differential exposure to food price shocks. It has particularly tested the 
assumption that households that faced large increases in food prices were likely to experience 
high risks of thrusting into poverty traps or converging towards lower welfare equilibria. In 
order to shed light on the likely effects of differential exposure to food price shocks on 
welfare growth and risks of poverty traps, this study combines advanced methods in 
parametric, non-, and semi-parametric dynamic panel models using longitudinal data 
collected in Uganda between 2005 and 2012 on around 2,200 households.  
By means of monthly real values of consumption per adult equivalent and asset indices as 
measures of welfare indicators, the empirical findings from a cubic polynomial regression 
model estimated through a two-step system GMM method suggest the existence of both 
nonlinearities in welfare dynamics and conditional convergence operating at the district level. 
Household characteristics such as household size, gender of the household head, land size as 
well as the changes in exposure to food price shocks are found to influence negatively the 
growth rates of consumption expenditures. Particularly, the results show that the higher the 
degree of exposure to food price shocks, the lower the rates of consumption growth, and the 
decreases in these rates are more important than those consecutive to exposure to health, 
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agricultural, or income shocks. Furthermore, and similarly to previous studies (Dercon and 
Christiaensen, 2011; Amare and Waibel, 2013), the assets dynamic model indicates that 
structurally poor households were more vulnerable to asset shocks than structurally non-poor 
and that the larger the number of assets shocks, the lower the assets accumulation growth 
rates.  
However, contrarily to most studies of welfare dynamics based on either consumption growth 
or asset-based approaches, I find no evidence in favor of multiple welfare equilibria or 
bifurcations of welfare trajectories. In contrast, consumption and asset recursion diagrams 
reveal the presence of a single dynamic welfare equilibrium towards which Ugandan 
households are converging.  The empirical insights from parametric methods are relatively 
consistent with non- and semi-parametric evidences in which welfare equilibria are located 
slightly above the official poverty line. Accordingly, welfare equilibria were located at around 
30,500UShs and 1.14 PLUS for consumption and asset indices, respectively. There are 
different potential explanations about the absence of any consumption- or assets-based 
poverty traps in Uganda, such as potential measurement errors, lack of information on other 
important aspects of household life (social network, kinship ties, membership to different 
organizations,...) (Giesbert and Schindler, 2012). But, as pointed out by Naschold (2013), 
studies that do find evidence of poverty traps are generally characterized by relatively long 
panel spells, likely to pick up long term welfare dynamics and significant differential 
processes, particularly if consumption expenditures or assets holdings are moving slowly. In 
our setting, although the time span between the baseline survey (2005/6) and the second 
survey (2009/10) is reasonably acceptable, the follow-up surveys were conducted annually, a 
particularly short period to uncover significant changes in long-run welfare dynamics.  
Finally, I split the household sample into sub-groups of population to consider the possibility 
of shifting welfare equilibria related to differential exposure to food price shocks, regional 
location, or other households’ observables. My results suggest that, regardless of the 
estimation methods selected, being exposed to food price shocks was not sufficient to push 
Ugandan households into poverty traps, as recently hypothesized.  However, I do find that 
households exposed to price shocks are expected to converge towards lower welfare equilibria 
(in terms of consumption and assets holdings) than unexposed households, though still above 
the poverty line. Furthermore, the higher the degree of exposure to price shocks, the lower the 
attainable equilibrium. The effects of these differential degrees of exposure to price shocks 
are substantially larger on consumption than assets accumulation, at 7.6% against 1.5%.  
Households living in better-off Ugandan regions, such are the Central and Western regions, 
are found to settle at higher welfare equilibria than those in poor Northern regions. There is 
Essay IV 
 
162 
 
also evidence of gender differences in welfare trajectories, with female-headed households 
consistently moving to lower welfare thresholds, while highly educated and non-poor 
households enjoyed higher welfare equilibria. 
These empirical findings have straightforward policy implications. First, the fact that the 
welfare equilibria of most households are located just slightly above the poverty lines (official 
and asset-based poverty lines) implies that policy interventions should primarily focus not 
only on keeping current households located above these thresholds from falling below but 
also on helping them move towards higher welfare levels. As of those already below these 
thresholds, and potentially below the poverty lines, safety nets mechanisms need to be 
enforced in order to extricate them from the low welfare levels they are truck in.  
The second implication is related to the impacts of both price and asset shocks, which are 
found to negatively affect consumption expenditures and assets holdings. As is well 
documented in the literature, when hit by shocks, poor households may deteriorate their 
already-critical welfare conditions by modifying for example their consumption behavior to 
smooth their assets (Amare and Waibel, 2013). One possible way out might be to build their 
resilience to these shocks and other stressors by increasing ex ante their capacities to manage 
risks and by helping them ex post to minimize the adverse consequences of shocks. 
Stimulating households to engage into diversified activities (for example, combination of 
farm and non- or off-farm activities) or developing targeted programs that aim at improving 
the structural characteristics of the country such as better access to land, credit, or insurance 
markets, improvements in health coverage or infrastructure coverage may well reduce the 
vulnerability of households to both food price and asset shocks.    
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Appendix A.1 Monthly price volatility plots (January 2000 – December 2012) 
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Appendix A.2  Monthly price volatility by main agricultural seasons, 2000m1 – 2012m12 
Agricultural 
seasons 
Months Matooke cassava Maize Sweet 
 potatoes 
Beans Millet  
flour 
Average 
 
Planting 1 
March 0.057 0.053 0.043 0.072 0.041 0.034 0.050 
April 0.075 0.069 0.049 0.083 0.067 0.032 0.063 
May 0.101 0.046 0.075 0.081 0.058 0.028 0.065 
Average 0.078 0.056 0.056 0.079 0.055 0.031 0.059 
 
 
Harvest 1 
June 0.056 0.053 0.093 0.121 0.097 0.038 0.076 
July 0.087 0.047 0.087 0.110 0.069 0.032 0.072 
August 0.048 0.036 0.078 0.091 0.051 0.025 0.055 
Average 0.064 0.045 0.086 0.108 0.072 0.031 0.068 
 
 
Planting 2 
 
September  0.080 0.065 0.065 0.087 0.172 0.033 0.084 
October 0.083 0.055 0.068 0.049 0.092 0.027 0.062 
November 0.043 0.044 0.112 0.066 0.064 0.024 0.059 
Average 0.068 0.055 0.081 0.068 0.109 0.028 0.068 
 
 
Harvest 2 
December 0.079 0.039 0.078 0.061 0.045 0.015 0.053 
January 0.070 0.030 0.081 0.090 0.050 0.028 0.058 
February 0.011 0.062 0.071 0.066 0.035 0.031 0.046 
Average 0.084 0.043 0.076 0.072 0.043 0.025 0.057 
 
Conclusion H1<P2 
<P1<H2 
H2<H1 
<P2<P1 
P2<H2 
<P2<H2 
P2<H2 
<P1<H1 
H2<P1 
<H1<P2 
H2<P2 
<P1=H1 
H2<P1 
<H2=P2 
Note: P1, P2, H1, and H2 denote respectively the first and second planting seasons, and the first and second harvest 
seasons in Uganda. 
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Appendix A.3  Estimated results of Multivariate VARs 
 Matooke Cassava Maize Sweet 
potatoes 
Beans Millet  
flour 
Matooket-1 0.689 
(0.076)
*** 
-0.156 
(0.062)
** 
-0.082 
(0.082) 
0.093 
(0.109) 
-0.132 
(0.068)
* 
0.029 
(0.038) 
 
Cassavat-1 -0.013 
(0.108)
 
0.756 
(0.088)
*** 
-0.180 
(0.106)
* 
0.328 
(0.085)
*** 
-0.287 
(0.126)
** 
-0.063 
(0.054) 
 
Maizet-1 -0.006 
(0.074) 
0.026 
(0.060) 
0.375 
(0.080)
*** 
0.026 
(0.107) 
0.058 
(0.087) 
-0.059 
(0.027)
* 
 
Sweet potatoest-1 0.079 
(0.048)
* 
0.106 
(0.048)
** 
0.015 
(0.064) 
0.458 
(0.085)
*** 
0.016 
(0.069) 
0.024 
(0.030) 
 
Beanst-1 -0.023 
(0.066) 
-0.031 
(0.054) 
0.108 
(0.051)
* 
0.057 
(0.096) 
0.507 
(0.078)
*** 
-0.017 
(0.033) 
 
Millet flourt-1 0.178 
(0.153) 
-0.110 
(0.125) 
-0.249 
(0.145)
* 
0.046 
(0.221) 
-0.011 
(0.179) 
0.638 
(0.077)
*** 
 
Matooket-2 0.437 
(0.080)
*** 
0.023 
(0.065) 
-0.035 
(0.086) 
0.098 
(0.116) 
-0.116 
(0.094) 
0.005 
(0.040) 
 
Cassavat-2 0.031 
(0.108) 
0.195 
(0.088)
** 
-0.062 
(0.116) 
0.082 
(0.156) 
0.046 
(0.126) 
-0.059 
(0.054) 
 
Maizet-2 -0.010 
(0.074) 
-0.024 
(0.060) 
0.274 
(0.080)
*** 
-0.017 
(0.107) 
0.008 
(0.087) 
-0.033 
(0.037) 
 
Sweet potatoest-2 0.031 
(0.059) 
0.053 
(0.048) 
-0.063 
(0.064) 
0.146 
(0.085)
* 
0.015 
(0.069) 
-0.036 
(0.030) 
 
Beanst-2 -0.014 
(0.064) 
0.027 
(0.052) 
0.199 
(0.069)
*** 
0.010 
(0.092) 
0.413 
(0.075)
*** 
-0.009 
(0.032) 
 
Millet flourt-2 0.080 
(0.154) 
-0.180 
(0.126) 
-0.400 
(0.166)
*** 
-0.358 
(0.202)
* 
-0.056 
(0.180) 
0.290 
(0.077)
*** 
 
     
 
break -0.008 
(0.025) 
0.041 
(0.020)
** 
-0.006 
(0.027) 
0.018 
(0.036) 
-0.021 
(0.029) 
0.032 
(0.012)
** 
 
Cons 0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
0.390 0.432 0.300 0.275 0.402 0.359 
Note: Standard errors into brackets. 
***
,
**
,
* 
denote significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively 
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Appendix A.4   Matrix of pairwise correlations of food price volatilities 
 Matooke Cassava Maize Sweet 
potatoes 
Beans Millet  
flour 
Matooke 1     
 
Cassava -0.255 
(0.001)
*** 
1    
 
Maize 0.191 
(0.018)
** 
-0.303 
(0.000)
*** 
1   
 
Sweet potatoes 0.076 
(0.347) 
0.315 
(0.000)
*** 
0.283 
(0.000)
*** 
1  
 
Beans -0.010 
(0.898) 
0.114 
(0.157) 
0.089 
(0.266) 
0.136 
(0.091)
* 
1 
 
Millet flour 0.022 
(0.787) 
-0.264 
(0.001)
*** 
0.127 
(0.115) 
0.139 
(0.086)
* 
-0.030 
(0.712) 
1 
Note: 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
denote significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively 
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Appendix B 
Additional data and estimation results for Essay II 
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Appendix B.1 Testing and correcting for attrition in the Uganda National Panel Surveys 
The prominence of available panel data in the recent decades has helped researchers to undertake 
the analysis of economic relationships that would have otherwise been impossible. Indeed, among 
the main advantages of longitudinal data, they usually provide the researcher with a large number of 
data points (N*T), thereby increasing both the degrees of freedom and the efficiency of econometric 
estimations by reducing the collinearity of explanatory variables. By tracking the same individuals 
or households over an extended period of time, panel data can control for their unobserved 
heterogeneity, investigate the dynamics of their welfare indicators such consumption, income, or 
asset holdings, and test for some microeconomic theories such as the Permanent Income Hypothesis 
(PIH), and consumption or asset smoothing.  
Despite the well-recognized and documented advantages of panel data, they generally suffer from 
sample selection and attrition. The former arises when the observed sample is not a random draw 
from the population of interest which can potentially lead to inconsistency and bias in the 
estimation of parameters of interest. The latter, often dubbed “the panel researcher’s nightmare” 
(Winkles and Withers, 2000), arises when the individuals or households that have dropped out of 
the panel are systematically different from those who have stayed. Consequently, the results based 
on the remained surveyed individuals may no longer be representative of the original population. If 
the drop-out is entirely random, then there is nothing further the researcher can do.  
In the present appendix, we present the procedure used to test and correct for the attrition bias
94
. To 
test for the consistency of the results, two tests are successively presented: the attrition probits’ tests 
of Fitzgerald et al. (1998) and the pooling tests of Becketti, Gould, Lillard and Welch (1988) 
(henceforth, BGLW test). The correction of attrition bias is then done through the inverse 
probability weighting (IPW) procedure (Fitzgerald et al., 1998; Wooldridge, 2002) 
Tests of attrition bias 
In table B.1.1, we summarize the number of population (and households) in the Uganda National 
Panel Surveys (UNPS) used in the present study as well as the attrition rate from the original 
sample. Out of the 3,123 households (representing 16,759 individuals) that were initially sampled 
for the panel dataset, 83.5% (or 2,607 households) were successively tracked in 2009/10 (UNPS-
2010). In the third survey, this percent slightly decreased to 82.1% (2,564 households) and in the 
UNPS-2012, around 1,000 households were not successively tracked. These numbers give an 
attrition rate relatively high (above 15%).  
                                                          
94
 The sample design of the LSMS (Living Standards Measurement Surveys) and LSMS-ISA (LSMS-Integrated Surveys on 
Agriculture) of which the UNPS are part eliminates or at least minimize the risk of sample selection problems. 
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Table B.1.1 Summary of the number of population and households in the UNPS and the attrition rate 
 Population 
interviewed 
Number of 
households 
sampled 
Number of households 
successively tracked 
Attrition rate from 
the original 
sample 
UNPS-2006: Baseline survey 16,759 3,123 3,123 0.00 
UNPS-2010 17,511 3,123 2,607 16.30 
UNPS-2011 18,810 3,123 2,564 17.90 
UNPS-2012 16,139 3,123 2,356 24.56 
 
To test whether the observed attrition was random, we estimate a probit model (Fitzgerald et al., 1998) in 
which the dependent variable (attrition) takes 1 if the household drops out of the sample after the 
first wave and 0 otherwise
95
. The independent variables are all baseline variables likely to affect the 
attrition. Among these variables, we include household characteristics such as household size, 
household composition (proportions of household members between 0 and 4, 5-14, 19-34, 35-54, 
and 55 and beyond), monthly real values of consumption per adult equivalent, the estimated values 
of productive assets, and the cultivated land size (in acres). We also add household head 
characteristics (years of education, age and its squared value, and sex), regional dummies, as well as 
the household’s net position in the food market.  
Results of the probit model, reported in table B.1.2, show that most explanatory variables negatively 
affected the probability of dropping out of the panel after the first survey. It appears that on average 
households that were most likely to be re-interviewed in all waves have significantly larger family, 
have a head significantly older, and are essentially agricultural (all the estimated coefficients 
associated with different net position in the food market are negative). However, monthly values of 
consumption significantly and positively influence the probability of dropping out of the sample. In 
addition, the value of the pseudo R-squared from the attrition probit is only 14.5%, implying 
baseline variables only explain about 14.5% of the panel attrition between 2005/6 and 2011/12. 
To perform the BGLW test, we first interact the dependent variable from table B.1.2 (attrition) with 
all the independent variables from the attrition probit and regress the log of monthly real values of 
consumption on household and auxiliary variables and their interactions with the attrition variable 
(Outes-Leon and Dercon, 2011; Baulch and Quisumbing, 2011). We then perform an F-test to 
check whether the attrition dummy variable and its interactions with household and auxiliary 
variables are jointly significant to zero, with the null hypothesis that the observed attrition status of 
                                                          
95
 In doing so, we are only treating a special form of attrition in which attrition is an absorbing state (Wooldridge, 
2002: 585), meaning that once individuals/households have dropped out of the survey (at t=2 or beyond), they cannot 
reenter. In the general case, surveyed units can reenter the sample after leaving. In the UNPS, only 20 households 
reenter after leaving in 2009/10.  
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a household is random. We find an F-test of 4.63 with a p-value of 0.000, meaning that the 
observed attrition in the Ugandan panel dataset was primarily non-random and therefore needs to be 
corrected for. 
Table B.1.2 Attrition Probit for household consumption (n=3,123) 
 Coefficient Standard errors (a) z-statistic (p-value) 
Years of education -0.004 0.009 -0.50 (0.619) 
Age -0.037 0.012 -3.09 (0.002)
*** 
Age squared  0.000 0.000  2.57 (0.010)
*** 
Sex: 1 if female-headed  0.032 0.061  0.52 (0.602) 
Household size -0.017 0.017 -1.01 (0.313) 
% of household members between: 0-4 years -0.873 0.270 -3.23 (0.001)
*** 
5-14 years -0.898 0.247 -3.64 (0.000)
*** 
15-19 years -0.712 0.269 -2.65 (0.008)
*** 
20-34 years  -0.401 0.219 -1.84 (0.066)
* 
35-54 years -0.245 0.207 -1.19 (0.235) 
Land size (acres) -0.004 0.004 -1.17 (0.241) 
Value of assets (log) -0.029 0.022 -1.30 (0.195) 
Region dummy:       1 if Eastern region -0.004 0.081 -0.04 (0.964) 
1 if Northern region -0.163 0.096 -1.70 (0.090)
* 
1 if Western region  0.343 0.096  3.58 (0.000)
*** 
Monthly consumption (log)  0.154 0.053  2.89 (0.004)
*** 
Net food market position:                1 if SNS -0.900 0.080 -9.99 (0.000)
*** 
1 if SNB -0.722 0.076 -9.46 (0.000)
*** 
1 if INS -0.953 0.183 -5.19 (0.000)
*** 
1 if INB -0.843 0.175 -4.82 (0.000)
*** 
Constant  0.109 0.631  0.17 (0.862) 
Pseudo – R squared 0.145 
Log Pseudolikelihood -1,440.117 
Note: (
a
): clustered-robust standard errors, at the village level (322 clusters). SNS, SNB, INS, and INB denote 
respectively, significant net sellers, significant net buyers, insignificant net sellers, and insignificant net buyers. 
***
 
and 
*
 denote significance levels at 1 and 10%, respectively. 
Computing Inverse Probability Weights (IPW) to correct for attrition bias 
To correct for the non-randomness of the attrition, we follow Moffit et al. (1999) by computing 
inverse probability weights (IPW). The procedure consists in first calculating the predicted 
probabilities from the unrestricted retention probit model using the same set of variables as in table 
B.1.2 and then re-estimating the same model by excluding household demographics and head 
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characteristics. The IPW are then computed as the ratio between the restricted and unrestricted 
probabilities.  The average value of the IPW was 1.331 with a standard deviation of 0.742. The IPW 
for non-attritors were found to be larger than those of attritors, with 1.429 against 1.010. These IPW 
are then using in all econometric estimations to account for the attrition bias. 
Figure B.1.1 Kernel distribution of IPW for attritors and non-attritors 
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Appendix B.2 Demand elasticities under separability 
Type of 
elasticity 
 
Symbol Formula 
Conditional 
expenditure 
elasticity 
i  
*
1
i
i
i
s

   
where 
  














Pa
x
Pb
i
iii ln
)(
2
  and iiii ss 
*
 
 
Conditional 
Marshallian 
elasticity 
u
ij  
ij
i
iju
ij
s


 
*
 
where




























 

2
1 )(
ln
)(
ln
Pa
x
Pb
p
s
ii
n
k
kjkjiij
i
i
ijij


and ij = 1 if ji  and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
Conditional 
Hicksian 
elasticity 
c
ij  *
* ji
i
ijc
ij s
s


    
Source: Banks et al., 1997; Shonkwiler and Yen, 1999 
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Appendix B.3 Estimated average shadow elasticities by food net market position 
 Net market  
position 
 ipwE /*   */ wcE i   xwE /*  
 
Matooke 
B 0.164 (0.047)
*** 
 0.145 (0.013)
*** 
-0.033 (0.018)
** 
C  0.087 (0.027)
*** 
 0.122 (0.022)
*** 
 -0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D -0.050 (0.001)
*** 
-0.124 (0.013)
*** 
0.127 (0.068)
* 
E 
 
    0.029 (0.138) -0.120 (0.014)
*** 
0.103 (0.059)
* 
 
Cassava 
B     0.070 (0.050)  0.070 (0.020)
** 
-0.033 (0.018)
** 
C     0.117 (0.037)
*** 
0.076 (0.018)
*** 
-0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D     0.051 (0.021)
* 
  -0.042 (0.022)
* 
0.127 (0.068)
* 
E 
 
    0.313 (0.149)
** 
-0.051 (0.019)
*** 
0.103 (0.059)
* 
 
Potatoes 
B    -0.034 (0.046)   0.070 (0.019)
** 
-0.033 (0.018)
** 
C     0.083 (0.032)
*** 
0.046 (0.024)
* 
-0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D    -0.066 (0.013)
*** 
-0.041 (0.021)
* 
0.127 (0.068)
* 
E 
 
    0.237 (0.132)
* 
 - 0.024 (0.023) 0.103 (0.059)
* 
 
Maize 
B    -0.222 (0.064)
*** 
 0.046 (0.026)
* 
-0.033 (0.018)
** 
C     0.033 (0.042)    0.071 (0.019)
*** 
  -0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D    -0.046 (0.017)
** 
   0.039 (0.023) 0.127 (0.068)
* 
E 
 
   -0.540 (0.176)
*** 
 0.047 (0.021)
** 
0.103 (0.059)
* 
 
Bean 
B     0.012 (0.063)    0.009 (0.015) -0.033 (0.018)
** 
C     0.051 (0.040)   -0.011 (0.016) -0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D    -0.073 (0.019)
*** 
  -0.017 (0.016) 0.127 (0.068)
* 
E 
 
    0.209 (0.106)
* 
  -0.011 (0.015) 0.103 (0.059)
* 
 
Meat and 
fish 
B     0.069 (0.051)    0.087 (0.013)
*** 
-0.033 (0.018)
** 
C     0.057 (0.025)
** 
0.089 (0.012)
*** 
-0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D    -0.241 (0.109)
** 
-0.075 (0.010)
*** 
0.127 (0.068)
* 
E 
 
   -0.133 (0.147) -0.064 (0.012)
*** 
0.103 (0.059)
* 
 
Fruits and 
vegetables 
B     0.104 (0.051)
** 
  -0.018 (0.015) -0.033 (0.018)
** 
C    -0.099 (0.035)
*** 
   0.005 (0.012) -0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D     0.063 (0.014)
*** 
-0.036 (0.015)
** 
0.127 (0.068)
* 
E 
 
    0.132 (0.085)
* 
  -0.009 (0.013) 0.103 (0.059)
* 
 
Fats and 
oils 
B     0.073 (0.063)    0.015 (0.018) -0.033 (0.018)
** 
C     0.060 (0.031)
*
 0.032 (0.015)
* 
 -0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D    -0.194 (0.026)
*** 
  -0.016 (0.016) 0.127 (0.068)
* 
E 
 
    0.249 (0.157)
* 
  -0.015 (0.016) 0.103 (0.059)
* 
 
Other 
foods (
a
) 
B     0.120 (0.073)
* 
 0.045 (0.014)
** 
-0.033 (0.018)
** 
C     0.106 (0.050)
** 
   0.039 (0.014)
* 
-0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D     0.302 (0.131)
** 
  -0.009 (0.016) 0.127 (0.068)
* 
E 
 
    0.042 (0.023)
*
    0.020 (0.015) 0.103 (0.059)
* 
Alcohol 
and 
tobacco 
B     0.030 (0.024) -0.094 (0.038)
** 
-0.033 (0.018)
** 
C     0.007 (0.017)   -0.068 (0.033)
* 
-0.062 (0.018)
*** 
D     0.067 (0.033)
** 
-0.080 (0.033)
** 
0.127 (0.068)
* 
C 
 
    0.005 (0.065) -0.112 (0.038)
*** 
0.103 (0.059)
* 
Note: B: Significant net sellers; C: significant net buyers, D: insignificant net sellers, and E: insignificant net buyers. 
(
***
), (
**
), and (
*
) denote significance levels at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Standard errors are reported into brackets. 
Source : Own computations using UNPS data 
 
 
Appendices 
 
198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
Additional data and estimation results for Essay III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical Essays on the Economics of Food Price Shocks 
 
199 
 
Appendix C.1 Patterns of crop choice combinations, 2005 – 2012 
 
Binary sixplet 
Number of farmers 
W1 W2 W3 W4 Pooled Binary sixplet W1 W2 W3 W4 Pooled 
 
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
 
10 
 
5 
 
10 
 
7 
 
32 
 
(0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) 
 
56 
 
48 
 
64 
 
55 
 
223 
(0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 11 9 22 14 56 (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1) 38 39 35 33 145 
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) 15 11 4 10 40 (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) 7 15 31 18 71 
(0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) 7 6 3 2 18 (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) 22 30 42 31 125 
(0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) 7 7 4 6 24 (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) 12 16 14 17 59 
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) 26 22 14 28 90 (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) 17 11 18 26 72 
(1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 3 10 14 9 36 (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) 17 6 5 9 37 
(1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) 4 5 4 4 17 (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) 16 19 14 17 66 
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) 8 12 5 6 31 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) 22 31 23 12 88 
(1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) 20 20 17 23 80 (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) 45 75 77 80 277 
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) 2 1 0 2 5 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1) 10 4 2 1 17 
(0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) 31 20 38 38 127 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) 44 37 39 61 181 
(0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) 6 16 18 6 46 (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1) 23 18 23 17 81 
(0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0) 16 13 15 28 72 (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) 21 17 19 19 76 
(0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) 31 35 22 40 128 (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) 7 3 4 3 17 
(0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) 14 7 5 4 30 (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) 7 12 6 63 88 
(0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) 26 29 19 33 107 (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) 19 31 58 34 142 
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) 46 31 41 34 152 (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) 1 1 3 1 6 
(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) 7 7 4 6 24 (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) 19 27 23 29 98 
(0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) 7 6 1 2 16 (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) 81 92 102 91 366 
(0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) 11 10 3 6 30 (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) 19 23 16 17 75 
(1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) 10 7 17 6 40 (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) 52 39 24 42 157 
(1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) 6 7 12 8 33 (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1) 70 90 60 49 269 
(1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0) 16 18 36 39 109 (0, 0, 1, 1,1 , 1) 16 22 16 10 64 
(1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) 2 1 2 2 7 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) 182 189 218 255 844 
(1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) 5 7 3 4 19 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1) 30 11 9 6 56 
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) 68 61 43 57 229 (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) 21 17 19 19 76 
(1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) 3 1 1 0 5 (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) 13 19 16 10 58 
(1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) 10 24 14 26 74 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1) 40 20 26 25 111 
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) 1 1 2 1 5 (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 74 97 78 55 304 
(1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) 5 17 10 16 48 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 116 69 70 42 297 
(0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) 36 37 38 30 141 Total 1,587 1,579 1,589 1,581 6336 
Note: Each element in the sixplet is a binary variable for the crop combination Matooke – Cassava – Maize – 
Potatoes – Beans - Other cereals having 1 if the specific crop was grown by the farmer and 0 otherwise. W1  to W4 
denote the 4 panel waves used.  The “total” row gives the sum for each wave. The number of farmers that did not 
grow any of the selected crops (the omitted category (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) can be obtained by the difference between 
the sample size (1,598 per wave) and the above “total” row. 
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Appendix C.2 Farmer’s characteristics by GPS measurement status (2005/6 and 2009/10) 
 2005/6
a 
2009/10
a 
           A     B       C      D    A    B    C  D 
Plot size         
GPS-based 
areas (acres) 
3.249 3.249 -  2.644 2.644 -  
Farmer’s self 
report (acres) 
3.984 3.136 9.476 -6.340** 3.025 2.589 4.827 -2.237*** 
Number of 
plots 
1.935 1.998 1.534 0.464*** 2.011 2.058 1.824 0.233*** 
Plot ouput and 
input use 
        
Total  value of 
harvest (UShs) 
814,910.8 810,039.7 846,605.4 -36,565.7 2,018,187 2,036,901 1,943,330 93,571* 
Total value of 
inputs (UShs) 
83,880.23 68,994.05 180,615.8 -111,621.75** 61,036.43 59,306.45 67,956.33 -8,649.88* 
Plot location 
(km) 
1.535 .946 5.379 -4.434*** - - - - 
Less than 15 
min 
- - - - 0.695 0.755 0.416 0.339*** 
Between 15-30 
min 
- - - - 0.115 0.112 0.129 -0.017 
Between 30-60 
min 
- - - - 0.081 0.062 0.169 -0.107*** 
Between 1-2 
hours 
- - - - 0.057 0.041 0.132 -0.091*** 
Tenure system     0.025 0.008 0.101 -0.093*** 
Freehold 0.070 0.074 0.049 0.025* 0.387 0.421 0.249 0.172*** 
Leasehold 0.027 0.026 0.033 -0.007 0.039 0.034 0.060 -0.026** 
Customary 0.706 0.714 0.656 0.058** 0.496 0.475 0.576 -0.100*** 
Soil quality          
Good  0.475 0.473 0.488 -0.015 0.568 0.567 0.573 -0.006 
Fair 0.433 0.431 0.442 -0.011 0.314 0.319 0.294 0.024 
Poor 0.103 0.107 0.076 0.031*** 0.093 0.095 0.085 0.010 
Plot slope          
Gentile 0.359 0.367 0.304 0.064** 0.389 0.394 0.369 0.025*** 
Flat 0.501 0.494 0.545 -0.051* 0.444 0.439 0.464 -0.025 
Other (Hilly, 
steep, valley) 
0.155 0.154 0.158 -0.004 0.144 0.149 0.119 0.030* 
Household 
characteristics 
        
Household size 5.884 5.867 5.993 -0.126 6.708 6.706 6.719 -0.011 
Age of the 
head 
43.686 44.172 40.544 3.628*** 46.588 47.239 43.900 3.338*** 
Dependency 
ratio 
1.327 1.360 1.124 0.236*** 1.525 1.570 1.345 0.224*** 
Education of 
the head 
4.833 4.657 5.970 -1.313*** 4.798 4.591 5.725 -1.134*** 
Sex of the head 0.734 0.731 0.751 -0.020 0.721 0.721 0.719 0.002 
Central 0.218 0.201 0.292 -0.086*** 0.215 0.203 0.261 -0.058*** 
Eastern 0.262 0.273 0.193 0.079*** 0.256 0.258 0.246 0.013 
Northern 0.261 0.253 0.311 -0.059** 0.279 0.246 0.414 -0.168*** 
Western 0.259 0.268 0.203 0.065*** 0.243 0.289 0.055 0.234*** 
Non-farm 
income 
598,177.6 468,997.7 1,4338,824 -964,826.3*** 538,240.5 530,907.9 568,566.8 -37,658.9** 
Note:* A, B, and C refer respectively to the entire sample, the sample restricted to plots with observed GPS-based 
measures, and plots without GPS-based measures. The last column D computes the difference between B and C. 
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Appendix C.3 Farmer’s characteristics by GPS measurement status (2010/11 and 2011/12) 
 2010/11
 
2011/12
 
      A      B      C      D     A   B    C        D 
Plot size         
GPS-based 
areas (acres) 
4.202 4.202 - - 2.377 2.377- - - 
Farmer’s self 
report (acres) 
2.729 2.401 3.944 -1.543*** 2.622 2.444 2.879 -0.435* 
Number of 
plots 
1.779 1.794 1.724 0.071 1.854 1.884 1.810 0.073 
Plot ouput and 
input use 
        
Total  value of 
harvest (UShs) 
967,971.4 940,134.5 1,070,611 -130,476.5 1,401,579 1,281,891 1,574,111 -292,220 
Total value of 
inputs (UShs) 
57,016.6 50,640.78 80,525.41 -
29,884.63*** 
54,304.94 47,756.04 63,745 -15,989.2*** 
Less than 15 
min 
0.708 0.776 0.456 0.320*** 0.691 0.793 0.545 0.249*** 
Between 15-
30 min 
0.133 0.120 0.182 -0.063*** 0.199 0.196 0.204 -0.007 
Between 30-
60 min 
0.086 0.070 0.143 -0.073*** 0.185 0.152 0.233 -0.082*** 
Between 1-2 
hours 
0.050 0.026 0.140 -0.114*** 0.099 0.080 0.126 -0.046*** 
Tenure system         
Freehold 0.412 0.456 0.249 0.207*** 0.347 0.392 0.283 0.109*** 
Leasehold 0.019 0.022 0.010 0.011** 0.047 0.041 0.055 -0.014** 
Customary 0.538 0.492 0.705 -0.213*** 0.545 0.533 0.562 -0.029* 
Soil quality          
Good  0.612 0.592 0.687 -0.095*** 0.590 0.608 0.564 0.045*** 
Fair 0.349 0.367 0.285 0.082*** 0.464 0.459 0.470 -0.011 
Poor 0.040 0.045 0.023 0.021*** 0.122 0.124 0.119 0.004 
Plot slope          
Gentile 0.379 0.389 0.343 0.045** 0.354 0.363 0.342 0.021* 
Flat 0.487 0.479 0.518 -0.039* 0.466 0.490 0.433 0.057*** 
Other (Hilly, 
steep, valley) 
0.137 0.138 0.133 0.004 0.122 0.129 0.112 0.017* 
Household 
characteristics 
        
Household 
size 
7.533 7.488 7.703 -0.215 8.114 8.029 8.239 -0.210* 
Age of the 
head 
48.537 48.774 47.659 1.115* 48.633 49.589 47.254 2.335*** 
Dependency 
ratio 
1.709 1.722 1.663 0.059 1.907 1.809 2.048 -0.239*** 
Education of 
the head 
5.110 4.958 5.674 -0.717*** 4.811 4.596 5.120 -0.524*** 
Sex of the 
head 
0.720 0.721 0.718 0.003 0.714 0.718 0.707 0.011 
Central 0.207 0.226 0.134 0.092*** 0.201 0.160 0.260 -0.101*** 
Eastern 0.266 0.256 0.305 -0.049** 0.256 0.249 0.267 -0.018 
Northern 0.285 0.246 0.426 -0.059*** 0.295 0.281 0.314 -0.033** 
Western 0.239 0.271 0.121 0.149*** 0.248 0.311 0.158 0.152*** 
Non-farm 
income 
537,708.8 540,858.1 526,015.1 14,843 659,108.2 405,719.4 1,024,370 -618,650.6*** 
Note:* A, B, and C refer respectively to the entire sample, the sample restricted to plots with observed GPS-based 
measures, and plots without GPS-based measures. The last column D computes the difference between B and C. 
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Appendix C.4 OLS estimation results of Observed GPS-based plot area measures (in acres) 
Dependent variable: 
Observed  
GPS-based areas (acres) 
2005/6 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Plot size     
Farmer’s self report (acres) 0.959 (0.021)*** 0.922 (0.14)*** 0.901 (0.150)*** 0.888 (0.201)*** 
Number of plots -0.898 (0.345)*** -0.526 
(0.099)*** 
-0.882 (0.081)*** -0.305 (0.139)** 
Plot output and input use     
Total  value of harvest 
(UShs) 
-0.004 (0.243) 0.084 (0.042)** 0.165 (0.054)*** 0.127 (0.114) 
Total value of inputs (UShs) 0.006 (0.111) 0.122 (0.034)*** 0.091 (0.188) 0.066 (0.039)* 
Plot location (km) -0.149 (0.154) - - - 
Less than 15 min - -0.343 
(0.049)*** 
-0.255 (0.055)*** 0.230 (0.175)* 
Between 15-30 min - 0.574 (0.617) 0.026 (0.084) 0.030 (0.196) 
Between 30-60 min - 0.367 (0.075)*** 0.076 (0.010)*** -0.153 (0.184) 
Tenure system     
Freehold 0.196 (11.442) -0.015 (0.723) -0.089 (0.069) -0.021 (0.029) 
Leasehold 0.926 (0.572) -0.512 (0.912) -0.068 (0.087) -0.076 (0.030)*** 
Customary -0.075 (1.661) 0.378 (0.748) -0.219 (0.704) -0.344 (0.366) 
Soil quality      
Good  1.661 (1.357) -0.153 (0.373) 0.428 (0.324) 0.191 (0.188) 
Fair 2.247 (1.371)* -0.794 (0.399)** -0.709 (0.441)* -0.299 (0.117)** 
Plot slope      
Gentile -1.214 (1.313) 0.171 (0.360) 0.082 (0.098) 0.222 (0.192) 
Flat -1.674 (1.317) -0.455 (0.363) -0.300 (0.146)* -0.299 (0.217) 
Household characteristics     
Household size 0.393 (0.167)** 0.198 (0.038)*** 0.214 (0.193) 0.109 (0.057)* 
Age of the head 0.016 (0.029) 0.020 (0.008)** 0.042 (0.038) -0.001 (0.005) 
Dependency ratio -0.314 (0.438) -0.140 (0.108) -0.615 (0.341)* -0.077 (0.064) 
Education of the head 0.016 (0.133) 0.031 (0.036) 0.035 (0.170) -0.031 (0.029) 
Sex of the head 0.924 (1.252) 0.044 (0.056) 0.083 (0.051) 0.076 (0.003)*** 
Central -0.237 (0.045)*** 0.055 (0.356) -0.071 (0.004)*** -0.032 (0.001)*** 
Eastern 1.368 (1.222) 0.449 (0.521) -0.259 (0.794) -0.247 (0.286) 
Northern 0.593 (0.035)*** 0.079 (0.005)*** 0.081 (0.125) 0.046 (0.028)* 
Non-farm income -0.013 (0.041) -0.009 (0.081) -0.002 (0.053) 0.001 (0.004) 
Multiple imputation results     
Observed GPS-Based areas 3.249  2.467 4.202 2.377 
Imputed GPS-Based areas 3.625 2.556 4.516 2.412 
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Appendix C.5 Estimated ARIMA models for monthly real price series 1999 (9) – 2012 (12) 
Commodity ARIMA results(
a
) 
 
Matooke  
     tt LpLL 23 413.011515.01   
(0.047)                            (0.039) 
 
 
Cassava 
     tt LLpLL 22 411.0396.011732.01   
                          (0.093)                             (0.089)       (0.046) 
 
 
Maize 
     tt LpLL 122.011965.01   
                                  (0.021)                             (0.047) 
 
 
Potatoes 
     tt LLpLL 23 887.0522.011770.01   
                       (0.049)                                (0.047)       (0.049) 
 
 
Beans 
     tt LpLL 654.011812.01 3   
(0.052)                            (0.063) 
 
Other cereals (rice, millet, 
sorghum) 
     tt LpLL 23 171.011885.01   
  (0.027)                             (0.026) 
Note: (
a
): The general ARIMA model has the following form:      tt
d
LBpLLA  1 , where 
  pp LLLLA   ...1
2
21  and  
q
q LLLLB   ...1
2
21 are polynomials in lag 
operator L ; t  are errors terms assumed to be white noise. The Box-Jenkins methodology has been used to 
determine the values of p (autoregressive terms) and q (moving average terms) in the ARMA (p, q) process 
through the Bayesian information criteria (BIC). d (the order of integration of the price series tp ) was 1 for 
all commodities. Standard errors are reported below each ARIMA specification.  
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Appendix C.6 Unbiasedness tests of expected-price formation hypotheses (OLS estimation) 
cmdt Naive expectations model Adaptive expectations model 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
     F – 
Stat. 
2
adjR  
F-Stat Reject 
?0H  
    F – 
Stat. 
2
adjR  
F-Stat Reject 
?0H  
1k  167.384 
(12.727) 
0.491 
(0.037) 
179.41 
 
0.284 81.16 Yes 123.235 
(15.781) 
0.640 
(0.046) 
189.44 0.254 31.25 Yes 
2k  56.806 
(11.228) 
0.911 
(0.026) 
1268.92 0.679 15.17 Yes 21.575 
(12.758) 
1.025 
(0.030) 
1193.94 0.683 16.37 Yes 
3k  109.139 
(7.343) 
0.843 
(0.021) 
1537.45 0.646 168.29 Yes 53.565 
(5.602) 
0.974 
(0.017) 
3504.25 0.674 96.96 Yes 
4k  108.574 
(6.991) 
0.706 
(0.025) 
754.72 0.487 120.77 Yes 92.901 
(10.508) 
0.763 
(0.016) 
2150.11 0.420 131.83 
 
Yes 
5k  161.831 
(15.409) 
0.817 
(0.027) 
908.10 0.669 170.66 Yes 91.454 
(11.721) 
0.929 
(0.023) 
1630.09 0.737 41.48 Yes 
6k  255.321 
(137.682) 
0.768 
(0.143) 
28.76 0.544 5.15 No 104.109 
(64.109) 
0.964 
(0.068) 
 
200.52 0.606 23.36 Yes 
 Quasi-rational expectations model Mixed expectations model (
a
) 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
     F – 
Stat. 
2
adjR  
F-Stat Reject 
?0H  
    F – 
Stat. 
2
adjR  
F-Stat Reject 
?0H  
1k  19.187 
(5.727) 
1.059 
(0.015) 
4922.38 0.550 10.53 Yes 5.086 
(8.085) 
1.031 
(0.029) 
123.32 0.832 5.01 No 
2k  34.311 
(6.536) 
1.086 
(0.013) 
6721.69 0.798 22.04 Yes 0.888 
(3.081) 
1.043 
(0.015) 
483.29 0.775 5.82 No 
3k  9.349 
(4.891) 
1.018 
(0.009) 
1301.91 0.889 4.23 No 4.945 
(2.319) 
1.013 
(0.005) 
475.83 0.834 5.54 No 
4k  18.170 
(2.007) 
1.051 
(0.008) 
2188.59 0.736 50.16 Yes 1.977 
(3.772) 
1.012 
(0.008) 
176.58 0.619 5.26 No 
5k  56.832 
(9.148) 
1.077 
(0.011) 
8661.10 0.828 30.04 Yes 9.549 
(5.937) 
1.026 
(0.010) 
100.34 0.807 4.13 No 
6k  38.812 
(14.373) 
1.043 
(0.013) 
6149.52 0.691 28.11 Yes 4.555 
(13.295) 
1.026 
(0.016) 
452.48 0.700 2.84 No 
Note: 1k , 2k , 3k , 4k , 5k , and 6k refer respectively to matooke  ¸ cassava, maize, potatoes, beans, and other 
cereals. Standard errors into brackets. 
           (
a
) For each price series, different values of   were tested ( 9.0;...;2.0;1.0 ). Here, I only report the 
model with the “optimal” weights (best statistical fits): 0.3 for cassava and beans; 0.4 for matooke and 
potatoes; 0.5 for maize and 0.6 for other cereals.  
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Appendix C.7 Definition and descriptive statistics of relevant variables 
 
Definition of variables 
Matooke Cassava Maize Potatoes Beans Other cereals 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
            
:iy Actual yields (kg/ha) 
3,187.57 1,712.66 4,864.67 1,744.65 2,675.34 1,538.78 3,061.79 1,255.16 2,813.08 1,414.98 1,718.60 969.85 
:eiy Expected yields (kg/ha) 
2,520.76 1,164.42 3,124.86 1,314.80 2,495.60 1,048.41 2,722.69 912.37 2,065.28 919.38 1124.23 1,039.80 
evy1 : Yield risk (unitless) 
674.125 1,078.684 1,116.002 2,714.136 1,542.151 576.417 1,820.589 715.485 766.703 1,482.178 265.690 742.097 
:iA Multiply imputed area planted of crop i 
(ha) 
 
0.136 
 
0.469 
 
0.189 
 
0.719 
 
0.178 
 
0.673 
 
0.102 
 
0.701 
 
0.138 
 
0.566 
 
0.111 
 
0.365 
:is Multiply imputed acreage share of crop i 
(%) 
 
0.120 
 
0.191 
 
0.151 
 
0.196 
 
0.137 
 
0.177 
 
0.088 
 
0.132 
 
0.130 
 
0.166 
 
0.090 
 
0.131 
:ip Market price of crop i (Ushs/kg), deflated 
by UBOS’ All items consumer price index  
 
404.937 
 
163.655 
 
566.410 
 
205.772 
 
780.087 
 
215.044 
 
439.861 
 
152.87 
 
993.879 
 
231.798 
 
1,258.768 
 
344.449 
:,
e
iNp Expected output price of crop i from 
naive expectations model 
 
392.320     
 
204.261 
 
516.690 
 
226.659 
 
739.508 
 
220.706 
 
437.842 
 
122.563 
 
975.849 
 
295.929 
 
1238.239 
 
377.296 
:,
e
iRp Expected output price of crop i, rational 
expectations model (ARIMA model) 
 
373.550 
 
138.792 
 
525.429 
 
196.176 
 
760.973 
 
239.576 
 
423.196 
 
124.186 
 
968.780 
 
226.281 
 
1222.099 
 
330.374 
:,
e
iAp Expected output price of crop i, adaptive  
expectations model 
 
388.770 
 
154.727 
 
490.462 
 
201.653 
 
703.204 
 
189.053 
 
423.870 
 
127.223 
 
953.207 
 
253.796 
 
1,186.577 
 
347.950 
:,
e
iMXp Expected output price of crop i, mixed  
expectations model (with optimal  ) 
 
383.659 
 
104.889 
 
526.517 
 
164.223 
 
750.834 
 
199.748 
 
424.179 
 
89.293 
 
957.878 
 
229.497 
 
1,220.348 
 
303.900 
:,
e
iNvp Expected price risk of crop i using 
naive expectations model 
 
187.582 
 
131.765 
 
137.599 
 
92.821 
 
174.200 
 
85.952 
 
112.213 
 
82.322 
 
144.582 
 
79.572 
 
244.325 
 
185.538 
:,
e
iRvp  Expected price risk of crop i using 
rational expectations model (ARIMA model) 
 
119.366 
 
94.710 
 
110.382 
 
77.122 
 
159.386 
 
81.420 
 
90.405 
 
71.322 
 
126.595 
 
70.387 
 
196.606 
 
169.701 
:,
e
iAvp  Expected price risk of crop i using 
adaptive  expectations model 
 
206.288 
 
134.715 
 
195.269 
 
127.616 
 
236.437 
 
118.922 
 
152.973 
 
117.996 
 
190.274 
 
109.491 
 
346.534 
 
253.844 
:,
e
iMXvp  Expected price risk of crop i using 
mixed  expectations model 
 
164.892 
 
104.948 
 
145.512 
 
88.527 
 
205.962 
 
92.786 
 
122.062 
 
89.347 
 
154.489 
 
72.580 
 
302.576 
 
214.757 
Note: SD: Standard deviations  
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Appendix C.8 Dynamic Multivariate fractional logit estimation results – Models with (I) and without (II) unobserved heterogeneity 
 
 Matooke Cassava Maize Potatoes Beans Other cereals 
 I II I II I II I II I II I II 
 
1,1 ts  0.313* 0.324 -0.038 -0.079 -0.078 -0.101 -0.069 -0.023 -0.184 -0.201 -0.193 -0.200 
1,2 ts  -0.465** -0.477** 0.412*** 0.437*** -0.007 -0.039 -0.299* -0.343** -0.298* -0.328* -0.062 -0.098 
1,3 ts  -0.378* -0.389* -0.510 ** -0.515** 0.424** 0.429** -0.584*** -0.589*** -0.561*** -0.579*** -0.596*** -0.616*** 
1,4 ts  -0.151* -0.170* -0.261** -0.264* -0.412* -0.432* 0.572*** 0.591*** -0.101 -0.107 -0.099*** -0.103*** 
1,5 ts  -0.698*** -0.725*** -0.431** -0.469** -0.489** -0.471** -0.582*** -0.638** 0.678*** 0.682*** -0.625** -0.635** 
1,6 ts  -0.686** -0.724** -0.226 -0.263 -0.085 -0.098 -0.422* -0.447* -0.189 -0.192 0.366* 0.364* 
1,1s  2.861 *** 2.927*** 1.277*** 1.337*** 1.580*** 1.644*** 1.867*** 1.937*** 2.105*** 2.149*** 1.329*** 1.388*** 
1,2s  0.727*** 0.780*** 1.960*** 1.966*** 1.332*** 1.344*** 1.345*** 1.374*** 1.086*** 1.088*** 1.130*** 1.144*** 
1,3s  1.379*** 1.416*** 1.613*** 1.637*** 2.704*** 2.733*** 1.679*** 1.702*** 1.726*** 1.748*** 1.625*** 1.648*** 
1,4s  1.460*** 1.514*** 1.136*** 1.185*** 1.439*** 1.481*** 2.903*** 2.944*** 1.412*** 1.441*** 1.049*** 1.096*** 
1,5s  2.511*** 2.538*** 1.602*** 1.607*** 1.752*** 1.753*** 1.830*** 1.815*** 2.690*** 2.691*** 1.577*** 1.596*** 
1,6s  1.235*** 1.314***  0.993*** 1.028*** 1.219*** 1.253*** 1.172*** 1.200*** 1.277*** 1.291*** 2.408*** 2.412*** 
ep1  
0.364*** 0.365*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
ep2  
0.081*** 0.082*** 0.352*** 0.349*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 
ep3  
0.051*** 0.052*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.397*** 0.396*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
ep4  
0.027*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.449*** 0.450*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.016** 
ep5  
0.112*** 0.114*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.405*** 0.404*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
ep6  
0.049*** 0.048*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.056 *** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.422*** 0.421*** 
ey1  
8.605*** 8.376*** 8.279*** 8.760*** 7.423*** 7.523*** 9.063*** 9.949*** 7.228*** 6.182*** 6.741*** 6.506*** 
ey2  
6.502 5.042 10.189*** 10.894*** 11.680*** 11.372*** 13.052*** 13.806*** 9.175*** 9.432*** 9.142*** 9.913*** 
ey3  
1.282 1.069 6.817*** 5.184*** 6.020*** 6.635*** 7.813*** 7.696*** 5.315*** 5.528*** 5.860*** 6.603*** 
ey4  
5.974* 5.918* 9.833*** 9.095*** 9.368*** 9.525*** 11.572*** 11.895*** 8.762*** 8.005*** 8.069*** 7.548*** 
ey5  
1.020** 1.522* 1.395*** 1.518*** 1.496*** 1.640*** 1.387*** 1.069*** 1.792*** 1.955*** 1.324*** 1.808*** 
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Appendix C.8 (continued) 
 
 Matooke Cassava Maize Potatoes Beans Other cereals 
 I II I II I II I II I II I II 
ey6  
3.693* 7.643* 5.382* 5.379* 6.294** 6.326** 10.314*** 10.368*** 7.097*** 7.139*** 5.337* 5.251 
evp1  
-4.676*** -4.593*** -4.742*** -4.737*** -4.854*** -4.785*** -5.665*** -5.695*** -4.347*** -4.263*** -4.079*** -3.935*** 
evp2  
-3.887*** -3.780*** -3.421*** -3.458*** -3.671*** -3.605*** -4.105*** -4.142*** -2.845*** -2.761*** -3.510*** -3.379*** 
evp3  
-4.076*** -4.003*** -3.382*** -3.379*** -3.296*** -3.234*** -4.071*** -4.087*** -3.144*** -3.076*** -2.786*** -2.655*** 
evp4  
-4.717*** -4.640*** -3.832*** -3.861*** -3.998*** -3.954*** -4.934*** -4.964*** -3.536*** -3.464*** -3.506*** -3.401*** 
evp5  
-4.059** -2.002*  -3.177*** -3.004*** -3.421* -3.002**   -4.0195* -4.017** -3.325** -3.568* -3.251* -2.011 
evp6  
-2.021*** -1.056   -3.115 -3.000* -3.804*** -2.058* -4.751*** -1.348*** -3.867*** -3.195* -3.498** -2.025*** 
evy1  
-0.142*** -0.108*** -0.114*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.075*** -0.091** -0.069** -0.111*** -0.079** -0.086** -0.036 
evy2  
-0.059*** -0.034 -0.023*** -0.006* -0.042*** -0.024 -0.069* -0.037 -0.043* -0.030 -0.077* -0.025 
evy3  
-0.044 -0.027 -0.051 -0.049 -0.046* -0.048* -0.036 -0.035 -0.064* -0.046 -0.098* -0.078* 
evy4  
-0.060* -0.021 -0.462* -0.047 -0.543 -0.042 -0.107* -0.052 -0.168* -0.035 -0.156 -0.012 
evy5  
-0.012* -0.044 -0.039* -0.000 -0.013 -0.069* -0.037 -0.030 -0.130*** -0.061* -0.042 -0.066* 
evy6  
-0.121*** -0.080*** -0.119*** -0.097*** -0.095*** -0.741** -0.144*** -0.122*** -0.107*** -0.086*** -0.140*** -0.128*** 
mar  -0.006 -0.074 -0.035*** -0.016* 0.040*** 0.052*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.037*** 0.049*** -0.010 -0.030*** 
marcv  -8.639*** -8.522*** -5.129*** -5.176*** -4.907*** -4.840*** -5.722*** -5.750*** -4.591*** -4.492*** -4.589*** -4.475*** 
dmt  -2.947** -3.549* -4.431*** -6.185*** -4.438*** -6.528*** -5.252*** -8.002*** -4.415*** -5.880*** -2.170 -3.970*** 
dmtcv  -3.523 -3.493 -9.317*** -9.143*** -6.658*** -6.551*** -9.971*** -10.050*** -8.559*** -8.571*** -6.642*** -6.242*** 
tld  0.702*** 0.688*** 0.695*** 0.682*** 0.619*** 0.614*** 0.712*** 0.701*** 0.692*** 0.690*** 0.703*** 0.706*** 
ldq  0.024* 0.054 0.048* 0.102** 0.077** 0.148*** 0.051* 0.145*** 0.057* 0.131*** 0.067** 0.126** 
ldir  0.204 0.112 0.098 0.204* 0.099 0.040 0.144 0.049 0.157 0.124 -0.106 -0.157 
ldsp  0.149 0.147* 0.014 0.044 0.017 0.047 0.103 0.149* 0.038 0.133* 0.091 0.129 
educ  0.018 -0.002 0.007 -0.003 0.013 -0.011* 0.011 -0.007 0.020 -0.007 0.012 -0.022*** 
age  -0.381* 0.145 -0.167 -0.015 -0.314 -0.040 -0.074 0.007 -0.156 0.025 0.013 0.085 
sex  0.048 0.059 -0.103 0.099* -0.111 0.095* -0.193 0.102* -0.123 0.043 -0.139 0.067 
  0.206*** 0.230*** 0.812*** 0.839*** 0.259*** 0.320*** 0.553*** 0.625*** 0.645*** 0.698*** 0.253*** 0.385*** 
hsz  0.143* 0.042 0.109** 0.074 0.045* 0.005 0.058** 0.025 0.067* 0.012 0.052* 0.011 
Cons 29.106 27.422 39.894*** 31.344*** 88.980*** 39.160*** 56.563*** 40.809*** 74.488*** 28.303*** 23.729*** 27.344*** 
 
Note: In models I, unobserved heterogeneity is allowed to be correlated with some variables and the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach has been applied. In models II, unobserved 
heterogeneity is ignored during estimation. To preserve space, coefficient parameters of time-averaged variables have been omitted from the table but are available upon author’s request. 
Results are obtained after normalization of the coefficients of “other crops” share. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix C.9 Static Multivariate fractional logit estimation results – Models with (I) and without (II) unobserved heterogeneity 
 Matooke Cassava Maize Potatoes Beans Other cereals 
 I II I II I II I II I II I II 
ep1  
0.409*** 0.416*** -0.068*** -0.064*** -0.081*** -0.078*** -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.059*** -0.056*** 
ep2  
-0.106*** -0.117*** 0.365*** 0.359*** -0.112*** -0.123*** -0.113*** -0.127*** -0.108*** -0.121*** -0.103*** -0.122*** 
ep3  
-0.062*** -0.064*** -0.056*** -0.054*** 0.436*** 0.440*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.046*** -0.045*** 
ep4  
-0.048*** -0.053*** -0.043*** -0.048*** -0.038*** -0.042*** 0.461*** 0.463*** -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.032*** -0.037*** 
ep5  
-0.069*** -0.069*** -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.055*** 0.448*** 0.453*** -0.039*** -0.043*** 
ep6  
-0.060*** -0.058*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.061*** 0.457*** 0.469*** 
ey1  
11.629*** 12.146*** 12.027*** 15.748*** 12.740*** 18.848*** 13.285*** 15.561*** 12.395*** 14.764*** 11.376*** 11.353*** 
ey2  
  7.168 5.276 15.723*** 17.570*** 18.653*** 18.986*** 19.723*** 14.938*** 18.058*** 12.699*** 16.794*** 17.083*** 
ey3  
  1.582 0.845 8.299*** 7.314*** 10.388*** 7.391*** 11.122*** 9.227*** 10.097*** 7.942*** 9.362*** 6.149*** 
ey4  
  9.808*** 6.203* 14.124*** 8.165*** 15.961*** 16.095*** 16.786*** 11.582*** 15.493*** 17.910*** 14.293*** 8.831*** 
ey5  
  1.930*** 1.661*   2.493*** 6.912*** 2.764*** 5.303*** 2.849*** 6.507*** 2.639*** 6.344*** 2.503*** 3.358*** 
ey6  
4.878 3.760   5.572** 6.250** 9.068*** 9.785*** 12.014*** 12.714*** 10.863*** 11.398*** 7.023** 7.428** 
evp1  
-6.400*** -3.797***  -7.021*** -4.364*** -7.760*** -4.875*** -8.120*** -5.309*** -7.557*** -4.638*** -6.864*** -3.753*** 
evp2  
-5.829*** -2.965**  -6.241*** -3.356*** -6.940*** -3.783*** -6.880*** -3.795*** -6.259*** -3.097*** -6.568*** -3.197*** 
evp3  
-5.504*** -3.195***  -5.356*** -3.025*** -5.712*** -3.201*** -6.055*** -3.606*** -5.725*** -3.164*** -5.058*** -2.398*** 
evp4  
-6.854*** -3.993***  -6.594*** -3.736*** -7.286*** -4.190*** -7.692*** -4.642*** -7.077*** -3.913*** -6.562*** -3.278*** 
evp5  
-5.049** -3.020*  -4.107*** -3.054*** -5.035* -4.032**   6.003 2.003 -5.043** -4.002 -5.051* -3.001 
evp6  
5.011*** 3.023   4.015 -3.014 -5.084*** -4.018 -6.079*** -2.005*** -5.123*** 4.001 -5.098** -4.005*** 
evy1  
-0.277*** -0.113*** -2.570*** -0.103*** -0.256*** -0.090*** -0.249*** -0.081*** -0.266*** -0.093*** -0.265*** -0.057*** 
evy2  
-0.463*** -0.388*** -0.403*** -0.430*** -0.447*** -0.348*** -0.498*** -0.463*** -0.476*** -0.288*** -0.517*** -0.058*** 
evy3  
-0.205*** -0.173* -0.178*** -0.028* -0.167*** -0.173*** -0.204*** -0.251*** -0.203*** -0.032* -0.245*** -0.067* 
evy4  
-0.598*** -0.124* -0.654*** -0.829** -0.666*** -0.727* -0.607*** -0.418** -0.683*** -0.628* -0.633*** -0.408* 
evy5  
-0.097** -0.059* -0.092* -0.023* -0.147*** -0.084** -0.099** -0.049* -0.142*** -0.085** -0.220*** -0.071* 
evy6  
-0.416*** -0.087** -0.401*** -0.469*** -0.372*** -0.256* -0.445*** -0.112*** -0.409*** -0.417** -0.416 -0.100*** 
mar  -0.026 -0.080 -0.049*** -0.020* 0.043*** 0.059*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.056*** -0.019 -0.031*** 
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Appendix C.9 (continued) 
 
 Matooke Cassava Maize Potatoes Beans Other cereals 
 I II I II I II I II I II I II 
 
marcv  -10.544*** -6.866*** -8.375*** -4.753*** -8.447*** -4.513*** -8.569*** -4.771*** -8.221*** -4.290*** -7.731*** -3.729*** 
dmt  0.3037 -0.103 -0.647*** -0.253* -0.498*** 0.756*** -0.704*** 0.368*** -0.717*** 0.712*** -0.285 -0.392*** 
dmtcv  -5.189** -3.759* -10.504*** -8.251*** -9.554*** -7.528*** -12.522*** -10.702*** -12.034*** -9.848*** -9.570 -6.900*** 
tld  0.384*** 0.848*** 0.365*** 0.812*** 0.255*** 0.725*** 0.377*** 0.879*** 0.324*** 0.832*** 0.299*** 0.815*** 
ldq  0.132** 0.081* 0.156*** 0.138*** 0.194*** 0.179*** 0.166*** 0.203*** 0.170*** 0.181*** 0.190*** 0.139*** 
ldir  0.134 0.168 0.092 0.284** 0.086 0.121 0.112 0.072 0.117 0.153 -0.070 -0.082 
ldsp  0.061 0.181* 0.126 0.131 0.142 0.055 0.076 0.202** 0.150 0.192** 0.081 0.211** 
educ  0.008 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.014 -0.006 0.001 -0.006 0.011 -0.003 0.009 -0.038*** 
age  0.043 -0.041 0.291 -0.205** 0.143 -0.342*** 0.374 -0.210** 0.312 -0.220** 0.471 -0.186* 
sex  0.225 0.053 0.097 0.134** 0.069 0.096 0.042 0.029 0.091 0.029 0.117 0.095 
  0.951*** 0.845*** 0.766*** 0.739*** 0.148*** 0.951*** 0.455*** 0.421*** 0.457*** 0.429*** 0.419*** 0.522**** 
hsz  0.462*** 0.119* 0.426*** 0.160*** 0.324*** 0.126** 0.400*** 0.173*** 0.404*** 0.094* 0.436*** 0.152*** 
Cons 18.451 43.421 44.108*** 45.249*** 53.119*** 20.801*** 57.605*** 94.041*** 52.647*** 21.793*** 47.028*** 31.802*** 
Note: In models I, unobserved heterogeneity is allowed to be correlated with some variables and the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach has been applied. In models II, unobserved 
heterogeneity is ignored during estimation. To preserve space, coefficient parameters of time-averaged variables have been omitted from the table but are available upon author’s request. 
Results are obtained after normalization of the coefficients of “other crops” share. . ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
Additional data and estimation results for Essay IV 
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Appendix D.1 Cumulative distributions and growth rates of households’ welfare 
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Appendix D.2 Test of equality between households above and below the vulnerability index  hvul  
 j
ax  
j
b
x  
jx  j
b
j xx /  Equality test 
1j  0.783 
(0.139) 
0.544 
(0.221) 
0.240 0.441 77.069 
[0.000]
*** 
2j  0.585 
(0.312) 
0.398 
(0.281) 
0.188 0.471 40.387 
[0.000]
*** 
3j  23,501 
(19,311) 
87,197 
(161,592) 
-94,379 -0.801 -220 
[0.000]
*** 
4j  3.435 
(3.217) 
6.038 
(4.229) 
-2.603 -0.431 -36.247 
[0.000]
*** 
5j  7.285 
(3.470 
7.298 
(3.676) 
-0.013 -0.002 -0.172 
[0.864] 
Note: 
j
ax  and 
j
b
x  denote the reported values of the characteristic j for households above and below the vulnerability 
threshold, respectively. 
j
b
j
a
j xxx  . The equality test is a t-test with unequal variances checking whether the mean 
values of the characteristic j are significantly different between households above and below the threshold  hvul .  
Standard deviations and standard errors are reported into parentheses and into brackets, respectively. 
***
 indicates 
coefficients statistically significant at 1% level. The characteristics under investigation include: 1j : Food dependency, 
measured by the ratio of food consumption to total household expenditures; 2j : Market participation, approximated by 
the share of food purchased into total value of food consumption; 3j : monthly real income per adult equivalent; 4j : 
Years of education of the head; 5j : Household size.  
 
